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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to address three important issues relating to the efficient functioning
of the Istanbul Stock Exchange. In particular the thesis seeks to answer the following
questions
1. What makes markets informationally efficient or inefficient?
2. Has increased stock market volatility had an impact on the equity risk
premium and the cost of equity capital to firms? and
3. How is it possible to reconcile the view that markets are weak form
efficient and yt(t technical analysis is a pervasive activity in such
markets?
Unlike previous studies, this thesis seeks to examine the issue of efficiency when
institutional features specific to the market under investigation are taken into account.
Specifically, the thesis adopts a testing methodology which enables us to recognize
possible non-linear behaviour, thin trading and institutional changes in testing market
efficiency. The results from this investigation show that informationaily efficient
markets are brought about by improving liquidity, ensuring that investors have access
to high quality and reliable information and minimising the institutional restrictions
on trading. In addition, the results suggest that emerging markets may initially be
characterised as inefficient but over time, with the right regulatory framework, will
develop into efficient and effective markets.
The second important issue to be examined in this thesis concerns the impact of
regulatory changes on market volatility and the cost of equity capital to firms. It is not
sufficient to simply examine whether volatility has increased following a fmancial
market innovation such as changes in regulation. Rather, it is necessary to investigate
why volatility has changed, if it has changed, and the impact of such a change on the
equity risk premium and the cost of equity capital to firms. Only then can inferences
be drawn about the desirability or otherwise of innovations which bring about
increases in volatility. Surprisingly, these issues have not been addressed in the
literature. The evidence presented here suggests that the innovations which have taken
place in the ISE have increased volatility, but also improved the pricing efficiency of
the market and reduced the cost of equity capital to firms.
Finally, the thesis tries to identify the conditions under which weak-form efficiency
is consistent with technical analysis. It is shown that this paradox can be explained if
adjustments to information are not immediate, such that market statistics, in particular
statistics on trading volume contain information not impounded in current prices. In
this context technical analysis on volume can be viewed as part of the process by
which traders learn about fundamentals. Therefore, the thesis investigates the issue
whether studying the joint dynamics of stock prices and trading volume can be used
to predict weakly efficient stock prices.
In summary, the findings of this thesis will be of interest to international investors,
stock market regulators, firms raising funds from stock markets and participants in
emerging capital markets in general. The implication of the results presented here is
that informational efficient emerging markets are brought about by improving
liquidity, ensuring that investors have access to high quality and reliable information
and minimising the institutional restrictions on trading. In addition, the evolution in
the regulatory framework of, and knowledge and awareness of investors in, emerging
markets may mean that they will initially be characterised by inefficiency, but over
time will develop into informational efficient and effectively functioning markets
which allocate resources efficiently. In addition, the results of this thesis have
important implications, for emerging markets in general, in identifying the regulatory
framework that will achieve efficient pricing and a reduction in the cost of equity
capital to firms operating in the economy.
I.	 INTRODUCTION
The past fifteen years have witnessed spectacular growth in both the size and relative
importance of emerging equity markets in developing countries. High economic
growth, the pursuit of liberalisation policies within these countries and trends towards
financial markets globalisation provided the environment in which equity markets
could thrive. In addition, Western equity fund managers were attracted to these
markets by the potentially high rates of returns offered and the desire to pursue
international diversification. As these capital markets have developed considerable
attention has been given to the question of whether they function efficiently. This
thesis seeks to address three important issues relating to the efficient functioning of
emerging capital markets. In particular the thesis seeks to answer the following
questions:
1.	 What makes markets informationally efficient or inefficient?
2.	 Has increased stock market volatility had an impact on the equity risk
premium and the cost of equity capital to firms? and
3. How is it possible to reconcile the view that markets are weak form
efficient and yet technical analysis is a pervasive activity in such
markets?
The issue of efficiency is of great significance to both foreign investors and the
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allocation of scarce resources within these countries. The question of whether these
markets price securities efficiently is ultimately an empirical issue and it is this which
has attracted most attention in the literature. However, if the evidence on
efficiency/inefficiency is to be reliable it is essential that the methodology adopted in
statistical tests takes account of the institutional features and trading conditions of the
market under investigation. Only then can we address the more important issue of
what makes markets informationally efficient or inefficient. An understanding of this
issue will help to determine the appropriate regulatory framework for the
establishment of efficiently functioning equity markets.
The issue of efficiency in emerging markets has been widely investigated in recent
years. Research has focused on either the conventional form of efficiency (Fama,
1970) or on examining the question of whether anomalies exist. Overall results are
mixed. For example, Barnes (1986) reports the Kuala Lumpur stock market to be
inefficient, Butler and Malaikah (1992) find evidence of inefficiency in the Saudi
Arabian stock market, but not in the Kuwait market and Panas (1990) concluded that
market efficiency could not be rejected for Greece. Fama (1991) has questioned the
validity of some of the results demonstrating market inefficiency by arguing that 'With
many clever researchers, on both sides of the efficiency fence, rummaging for
forecasting variables, we are sure to find instances of hlreliableu return predictability
that are in fact spurious..., evidence of predictability should always be met with a
healthy dose of scepticism...' (1991, pp.1585-1586). It is possible, in the spirit of
Fama, that the positive evidence in favour of efficiency is also questionable: it is
difficult to believe that the Nairobi stock market is efficient (see, Dickinson and
2
Muragu (1994)) when there is evidence that some of the most developed markets in
the world are characterised by inefficiency (see, for example, DeBondt and Thaler
(1985, 1987), Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Conrad and Kaul (1988)). Thus, both the
positive and negative evidence on efficiency in emerging markets may reflect the
methodology adopted for testing and the time period under investigation, rather than
giving a true picture of the state of the market. The conventional tests of efficiency
have been developed for testing markets which are characterised by high levels of
liquidity, sophisticated investors with access to high quality and reliable information
and few institutional impediments. On the other hand, emerging markets are typically
characterised by low liquidity, thin trading, possibly less well informed investors with
access to unreliable information and considerable volatility.
Furthermore, efficiency implicitly assumes that investors are rational, where rationality
implies risk aversion, unbiased forecasts and instantaneous responses to information.
Such rationality leads to prices responding linearly to new information. However,
emerging markets, especially during the early years of trading, may be characterised
by investors who do not have these attributes. In particular, investors may not always
be risk averse, sometimes they may be risk loving or risk neutral if by taking risk they
believe they can minimise their losses. In addition, investors may place too much faith
in their own forecasts introducing bias into their actions. Similarly, investors do not
always respond instantaneously to information. They may delay their response to see
how others behave because they do not have the resources to fully analyse the
information or because the information is not reliable. As a result prices may respond
in a non-linear fashion.
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Failure to take into account the institutional features of these equity markets may lead
to statistical illusions regarding efficiency or inefficiency. With reference to evidence
in favour of efficiency, this is perhaps the outcome of using linear models for testing
efficiency in markets characterised by inherent non-linearities. If the generating
process is non-linear and a linear model is used to test for efficiency, then the
hypothesis of no predictability may be wrongly accepted. This is because non-linear
systems such as 'chaotic' ones look veiy similar to a random walk. If however, the
system is non-linear, the series may be predictable. Conventional tests of efficiency,
such as the ones used in chapter 4 of the thesis (for example, autocorrelation tests,
runs tests, spectral analysis and frequency tests) are not capable of capturing non-
linearities and therefore, inferences drawn from such tests may be inappropriate.
Similarly, if markets are inefficient prices do not fully incorporate information.
However, as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) have argued, why should investors not use	 -
something of value? Perhaps, the reason why inefficiencies are observed is due to the
fact that information is not free or is not reliable, investors are not able to process
information, the market is ilhiquid leading to infrequent trading or there are restrictions
on trading. Thus, while evidence that, for example, prices do not follow a random
walk suggests that the market is inefficient, thin trading and illiquidity may mean that
trades cannot be carried out at the prices shown in the data. This feature of the market
must, therefore, be recognised in empirical tests. In addition, emerging markets by
their very nature change rapidly through time. The dismantling of barriers to the flow
of capital both within the country and from external sources will cause changes in the
institutional and regulatory environments which will impact on both the informational
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and allocational efficiency of the market. It is therefore necessary to examine the
evolution of these markets, rather than simply taking a snapshot of the market at a
particular point in time. By examining markets in this way it is possible to identify
the impact of regulatory changes on the efficient functioning of the market. This
allows clear policy implications to be reached regarding the appropriate regulatory
framework for newly developing equity markets.
This thesis seeks to examine the issue of efficiency when institutional features specific
to the market under investigation are taken into account. Specifically, the thesis adopts
a testing methodology which enables us to recognize possible non-linear behaviour,
thin trading and institutional changes in testing market efficiency.
The second important issue to be examined in this thesis concerns the impact of
regulatory changes on market volatility and the cost of equity capital of firms. There
is a widespread belief that financial market volatility has increased during the 1980s
and 1990s. Changes in volatility following financial market innovation have important
implications for investors and policy-makers. Traditionally, increased volatility has
been viewed as an undesirable consequence of destabilizing forces such as speculative
activity, noise trading or feedback trading. However, greater volatility resulting from
an innovation may simply reflect the actual variability of information regarding
fundamental values. Hence, increased asset volatility need not be undesirable, rather
it may be the result of improvements in the functioning of markets. The question of
whether increased volatility following financial market innovation is the result of the
more rapid impounding of information or the result of destabilizing forces is
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essentially an empirical issue. However, even if increased volatility is the result of
improvements in informational efficiency, it may still lead to an increase in the equity
risk premium and, hence, the cost of equity capital. For example, French, Schwert and
Stambaugh (197) present evidence of a direct relationship between expected risk
premiums and volatility. Thus, if investors perceive increased volatility as being the
result of an increase in the riskiness of the market they may direct their funds towards
less risky investments, raising the cost of equity to firms and leading to a
misallocation of resources. Furthermore, small and new firms may be most adversely
affected as investors concentrate their investments in established large firms which are
perceived to be less risky. In the light of this, it is not sufficient to simply examine
whether volatility has increased following a financial market innovation. Rather, it is
necessary to investigate why volatility has changed, if it has changed, and the impact
of such a change on the equity risk premium and the cost of equity capital to firms.
Only then can inferences be drawn about the desirability or otherwise of innovations
which bring about increases in volatility. Surprisingly, these issues have not been
addressed in the literature.
An important determinant of financial innovation and, hence, volatility is changes in
the regulatory framework within which the market operates. The regulatory framework
will partly determine the number and quality of investors in the market, the quality
of investment analysis and the quantity and reliability of information flowing to the
market. In turn, these factors will impact on volatility, pricing efficiency and the
equity risk premium. Emerging markets provide a rich source of information by which
the issues discussed above can be investigated. By their very nature, emerging markets
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tend to be characterised by major changes in the early years of operation. For
example, as the market develops the flow of capital may be freed up, the requirements
on firms to disclose information may change and the reliability of information flowing
to the market may be improved by more strict auditing requirements. All such changes
are likely to impact on volatility, efficiency and the cost of equity capital.
The thesis addresses the following three important issues:
*	 have changes in the regulatory framework had an impact
on the level of stock price volatility?
*	 if there has been a change, is this due to information
being impounded into prices more rapidly or is it the
result of destabilizing forces?
*	 how have any changes in volatility impacted on the
equity risk premium and what are the implications of
such changes for the cost of equity capital to firms?
Finally, the thesis tries to identify the conditions under which weak-form efficiency
is consistent with technical analysis. It is shown that this paradox can be explained if
adjustments to information are not immediate, such that market statistics, in particular
statistics on trading volume contain information not impounded in current prices. In
this context technical analysis on volume can be viewed as part of the process by
which traders learn about fundamentals. Therefore, the thesis investigates the issue
whether studying the joint dynamics of stock prices and trading volume can be used
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to predict weakly efficient stock prices.
The market chosen for investigation in the thesis is the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE).
This market has undergone considerable regulatory changes since the inception of
trading in l96. The developments and regulatory changes which have taken place in
the ISE provide a valuable opportunity to examine the above mentioned issues. The
results of this investigation have important implications not only for the regulation of
the ISE, but also help in identifying the regulatory framework for any emerging
market which wishes to achieve efficient pricing and a reduction in the cost of equity
capital to firms operating in the economy.
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2, provides an overview of the Turkish
economy and the Istanbul Stock Exchange. This is intended to provide the background
against which the stock exchange has developed. The development of capital markets
crucially depend on the stage of economic development of the country, otherwise
capital markets will become speculative casinos and will lead to the missallocation of
scarce resources within the economy. The chapter shows that the economic
environment of Turkey at the time the ISE was developed was, conducive to the
successful development and subsequent growth of the stock exchange.
Chapter 3 sketches the development of the efficient market theory, by reviewing the
principal contributors. The idea was formalised by Roberts (1959) and Fama (1965).
The chapter shows that the efficient market theory despite its restrictive assumptions
successfully opened stock markets to economic thought and altered both the way we
think about, and our respect for, financial markets.
Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter of the thesis and investigates the efficiency of
the ISE using the conventional tests used in previous literature. Most of these
techniques are primarily intended to test whether financial markets are efficient or not.
While they do not address the more important question of what makes financial
markets efficient and why should markets be inefficient, they provide a benchmark
against which the results of chapter 5 can be evaluated. The chapter shows that the
market could be classified as inefficient.
Chapter 5 develops and uses a methodology for testing market efficiency which
directly recognises that emerging markets are characterised by low liquidity, thin
trading, possibly less well informed investors with access to unreliable information and
considerable volatility. Furthermore, the chapter examines the impact of the market
maturing and regulatory changes on the trading behaviour and efficiency of the
market. The results show that, uniike the findings in chapter 4 using conventional
tests, in its early years of development the exchange was characterised by thin trading,
nonlinear behaviour and inefficient pricing. However, changes in the regulatory
structure from 1989 encouraged participation in the market, improved the quality of
information available and led to the more rapid impounding of information into prices.
Chapter 6 examines the impact of the regulatory changes on level of stock market
volatility, the equity risk premium and the cost of capital to the firms. The chapter
demonstrates that increased volatility may be undesirable if it increases the cost of
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capital to firms. The evidence presented here suggest that the innovations which have
taken place in the ISE have increased volatility, but also improved the pricing
efficiency of the market and reduced the cost of equity capital to firms. These findings
reinforced the results of chapter 5.
Finally, chapter 7 identifies the conditions under which stock markets could be
classified as weak form efficient and yet technical analysis is a pervasive activity. The
chapter shows that if prices are not fully revealing then technical analysis on prices
in conjunction with volume will aid traders to infer information about fundamentals.
Therefore, technical analysts could contribute to the efficient pricing of stocks and
hence any actions on the part of the regulators in reducing their activities will have
a negative impact on the efficient functioning of capital markets.
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II. THE RoLE OF CAPITAL MARKETS, THE TURKISH ECONOMY
AND THE ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE
2.1. INTRODUCTION
The chapter provides a brief discussion on the role of capital markets in contributing
to economic development, an overview of the Turkish economy and the Istanbul Stock
Exchange (ISE). In particular, after reviewing some aspects of capital market
development and their contribution to economic development, the general economic
trends of the Turkish economy are analyzed over the period 1988-1993, (the period
of investigation cover by the thesis) and the regulatory framework and structure of the
ISE is explained. The rationale for this, is to enable the investigation of the efficiency
and effectiveness of the ISE to be placed within the general developments of the
economy, given that the fundamental role of capital markets is to facilitate the transfer
of funds between lenders (savers) and borrowers (business enterprises). The price of
lending is set in the capital markets and the accuracy of this pricing process is
essential if scarce capital resources are to be used most efficiently. Moreover, the
development of capital markets crucially depend on the stage of economic
development of the country, otherwise capital markets will become considerably
speculative and lead to misallocation of scarce resources within the economy.
The concept of efficiency is based on the notion that capital markets are fair and
competitive, therefore the regulatory structure and trading rules could be very crucial
to the efficient and effective functioning of these markets. Institutional restrictions
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could affect the pricing of securities and hence the allocation of capital resources.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section (2.2), provides a brief discussion on the role
of capital markets in emerging economies. This is followed by section (2.3), which
provides an overview of the Turkish economy. Section (2.4) explains the sucture and
organisation of the ISE. Finally, section (2.5) concludes the chapter.
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2.2. THE R(.)LE OF CAPITAL MARKETS
Purpose of Capital Market Development
A necessary if not sufficient condition for a rapid economic growth of a nation is the
development of an efficient capital market where savings by individuals flow
efficiently into investment by suppliers of real productive capital. Economic pioneers
such as Goldsmith (1969), Shaw (1973), McKinnon (1973), and Patrick (1966)
emphasise the importance of the link between the capital market development and the
economic growth of a nation.
Capital markets play an important role in economic development because they directly
affect two of the major development goals of developing countries, namely, the
mobilization of savings and the channelling of investments into productive enterprises.
Thus the main reasons for developing capital markets are to attract an increased
volume of medium and long term savings into the financial system by offering
investors a variety of financial institutions and investment opportunities, and to
improve efficiency in the allocation of financial resources by allowing a broad
spectrum of entrepreneurs an opportunity to obtain financing for their projects.
Therefore, capital markets are mechanisms for mobilizing and channelling funds which
are received from surplus units and are allocated among deficit units.
Recently the stock market has been the focus of intense and professional research in
finance. Research activity in this area and the amount of attention directed at the stock
13
market has surpassed that devoted to any other area of finance. This attention at the
stock market lies in the important economic functions the stock market is supposed
to perform within the economy. These functions include: Firstly, the provision or offer
of guidance to corporate management, especially with respect to information on the
current cost of capital which is so important in determining the level of investment
which is appropriate for the firm to undertake. Secondly, the possibility of long term
investments to be financed by funds provided by individuals, who wish to make the
funds available for only a very limited period or who wish to withdraw them at will
without necessarily having to wait until the liquidation of the firm or the maturity of
the financial instruments which they hold. Thus, the market imparts a measure of
liquidity to long term investment that permits their instruments to be sold. Thirdly, the
stock market is often said to play critical role in the efficient allocation of the
economy's capital resources, so that the more profitable and efficient a firm is, the
greater the amount of resources that it uses or invests. Capital markets help to allocate
resources efficiently by directing savings flow to the best investment returns for a
given level of risk.
It is this last function of the stock market, that of efficient allocation of resources,
which is of primary interest to us in this thesis. Since as Salameh (1986) suggested,
"although stock markets are important mechanisms for the mobilization of resources,
it is necessary to know more about their relationship to economic stability if their
benefits for development are to be realised". The stock exchange interacts with the
economy in such a way that any developments in the economy are reflected in stock
prices which in return affect financial markets which further affect the economy.
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Structure of Capital Markets
Capital markets are that part of the financial system which deals in medium and long
term credits which may take the form of loans or cover the issuance of stocks and
bonds. On the other hand, money markets lend and borrow at short and medium terms
and these operations are carried out by commercial banks and other financial
intermediaries. It could therefore be said that capital markets provide long term funds
which can be used to make capital investments, whereas money markets provide short
term funds for meeting fluctuating needs and must be paid relatively quickly. Capital
markets are divided into two segments: the securities markets and the non-securities
markets. Securities markets provide medium and long term equity and debt funds in
negotiable form which are issued by corporations and governments, or through
financial institutions such as investment and merchant banks and venture capital firms,
directly to individual and institutional investors and are then traded among different
holders. Non securities markets provide non-negotiable medium and long term debt
funds through financial institutions such as commercial banks, development banks and
contractual savings institutions which mobilize savings and then lend those mobilized
funds directly to business, industry and other users of funds.
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Table 2.1
Organization of Capital Markets
Securities Markets	 Non-Securities
Instruments	 Equity (shares & stocks)	 Loans
Equity equivalents	 Mortgages
Convertible bonds or	 Leases
debentures	 Sale & lease back
debt securities (bonds or
debentures)
Institutions	 Development banks	 Primary Markets	 Secondary
Specialized banks
Commercial banks
Savings banks
Insurance Companies
Pension & Employee
provident funds
Lending companies
Corporate government
issues
investment merchant
banks
Brokers-dealers
OTC
Stock
Exchange
Brokers
dealers
Clearance
settlement
Transfer
Securities-
Regulatory bodies
Debenture tmstees	 agents and mutual
funds
The above table shows how capital markets are composed. Although each institution
plays an important role in the capital market, it should be stressed that a well
established system of organized securities exchanges should provide investors with (1)
market places for securities aheady outstanding, (2) availability of market liquidity,
and (3) orderly market price fluctuations.
For a long time it was believed by governments and institutions that it was not worth
setting up a stock market in developing counties because the costs would overweight
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the economic benefits. However, in recent years economists have focused attention on
capital markets and particularly on the securities markets and stock exchanges in order
to find the ways and means of financing economic development. There are, however,
difficulties in creating securities markets in developing countries:
A.	 The demand for stocks depends on several factors, some of which are
following
1. Individual demand : The first factor is the number of financially
sophisticated individuals with enough money to purchase shares. In their early
stages stock markets cater to as few as 10,000 shareholders, of whom only
several hundred may be active traders. Also remittances from workers abroad
can play a significant role in the demand for shares, where non resident -
workers and overseas resident represent a potentially important source of
demand for securities investment.
2. Institutional demand: In many emerging markets, demand from insurance
companies, pension funds, and mutual funds is negligible; in some countries
their presence plays an important role. Private parties and government
authorities interested in the development of a stock market are often not
sufficiently aware of the potential importance of institutional investment whose
active participation is critically important because they represent a potentially
large source of stable investible funds. Without them, there is a great risk of
17
a market dominated by individual speculators.
3.	 Investment alternatives : Individual as well as institutional investors are
more attracted to shares in comparison with other investment alternatives. In
determining how and where to invest their money, rational investors look at
risk, liquidity, overall return and tax treatment.
B.	 Factors behind the supply of stocks
A greater constraint on the development of an active equity market is not having
enough stock issues to trade adequately more than the number of investors. Too few
stocks may at first deter investors from entering the market at all. Later, when trading
is active, too many people may be chasing to few stocks, thus adding to price
volatility. The lack of float is another potential problem frequently encountered in
developing stock markets. Before a stock market can start, at least 20 companies, each
with a float of about 25 percent of their capital, should be available for trading. Active
emerging markets now have 300 or more listed stocks, of which at least 25-50 are
actively traded on a daily basis. The factors influencing the supply of securities are:
1.	 Size : What determines the number of sizeable corporations which are likely
to be available for listing their shares on the stock exchange are the size of the
economy, its level of development and growth rate and its free enterprise
orientation.
2.	 Attitude : Equally important is the attitude of existing owners regarding
dilution of the ownership and conol of their firms. This attitude usually
depends on whether the companies are still managed by the original owners
or whether professional managers have been brought in. In the latter case,
existing shareholders are more likely to be willing to list their companies on
a stock exchange and sell some of their shares, especially if they can make an
ataetive profit.
3. Need The need for a sizeable amount of additional capital is a major factor
inducing companies to go public. Such a need exists when the company is
growing so rapidly that internally generated cash flow or the owner's resources
are outstripped by the capital requirements of major expansion.
4. Interest rate policies : Entrepreneurs find it advantageous to borrow rather
than to issue shares to the general public when interest rates are generally held
below inflation levels for sustained periods or loans with a large subsidy
element are easily available.
5. Legislation : In many countries, under outdated company laws, the prices at
which shares can be sold to the public are determined by government
authorities on the basis of par or book value and rights issues must be offered
first to existing shareholders.
6. (:;overnment participation : In some countries, governments dominate the
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ownership of major enterprises, which means that they may be in a position
to increase substantially the supply of stocks available from trading by
directing their interest in public sector corporations which are profitable and
professionally managed.
C.	 Factors limiting the development of securities markets
1. Limited supply of corporate securities: Fundamentally the limited supply
of private securities in underdeveloped countries is related to the small size
and limited investment horizons of many local businesses. It will inevitably
take time for such firms to reach the point of raising funds through public
shares and debentures issues, thus providing the necessary augmentation of the
supply of private paper. In sorn& countries it might be desirable for
development banks, etc. to raise funds by issuing shares and debentures
publicly. It is therefore argued that the whole machinery of public companies,
issuing shares and bonds which are traded on the stock exchange, is
inappropriate to underdeveloped countries, where there is likely to be, for some
time, a preponderance of firms which are too small to approach the public
capital market and depend upon self fuiance or institutional finance for
expansion.
2. Limited demand for securities: There are a number of reasons for expecting
the demand for securities to be limited in an under developed economy:
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1. Individual savings accrue in the main to unsophisticated people, who are
financially inexperienced and have conservative attitudes towards money.
2. Share ownership by individuals tends to be confined to those with high
incomes who may spread their risks through diverse portfolios.
3. The generally underdeveloped financial system means that there is little or
institutional demand for securities.
4. Price uncertainty reinforces the traditional preference for money over
financial assets which fluctuate in value.
5. Investment in securities is extremely risky and in the nature of a race
course gamble, as accurate information is scarce, the costs of obtaining it are
inordinately high and market regulation is limited.
D.	 Other factors behind the creation of securities markets in less developed
countries
1.	 Political and economic environment: Investors are very sensitive to political
uncertainty. The level of political development is a critical detriment in
influencing the supply of securities. In counties which are in domestic turmoil
engaged in major border conflicts there is little interest in establishing a stock
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market and investing in shares. If a market exists, trading activity and prices
are usually in decline.
Political disruption in economic activity is almost always affected, because
companies postpone investments and scale down their growth projection. A
major reason for the lack of activity of securities markets in many developing
countries are unfavourable or unstable macro economic policies such as, high
inflation, negative real interest rates, frequent devaluations, and discriminatory
tax treatment of shares. Frequent devaluations and negative real interest rates
at home tempt investors to invest abroad.
2.	 Tax policies and other inducements : an essential feature for the
establishment and development of an equity market is an flexible and positive
government attitude. Companies may not want to go public becausetliey fear
that tax authorities could catch them more easily at tax evasion, a widespread
practice among privately held companies in many countries. Tax incentives are
designed to counter such fears and to provide a positive inducement for
companies to go public or for owners to sell (supply incentives) and for
investors to buy shares (demand incentives).
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2.3. THE TURKISH ECONOMY
Following the establishment of Turkey in 1923, the county followed a state contolled
economic policy. The foundations of indusy in Turkey were laid during that period.
After the Second World War, measures toward liberalization were adopted and Turkey
began opening to the West. Since January 1980, the Turkish economy has been in the
midst of a prolonged process of economic reform and liberalization, based on a model
of economic growth driven by exports. Import barriers have been lowered thus
improving productivity levels through enhanced competition. On the other hand,
exports have boomed, tourism has surged, and foreign exchange reserves have risen
so far as to ensure the convertibility of the Turkish lira.
Table (2.2) provides figures for the GNP and growth rates for the Turkish ecoiiomy
oit a yearly basis from 1988 to 1993. As can be seen from the table the average
economic growth between 1988 and 1993, was 4.8%, a level considerably higher than
the OECD average for the same period.
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Table 2.2
ON? AND GROWTh RATES IN TURKEY YEARLY BASIS
(TRILLION ii)
1988	 1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993
GNP TrillionTL	 134	 230	 397	 634	 1,104	 1,909
GNP#
	77	 77	 85	 85	 90	 97
GRWR %
	
72.1	 78.3	 72.4	 59.7	 74	 72.9
GRWR" %
	
1.4	 1.6	 9.4	 0.4	 6.4	 7.3
ON? Per Capita	 -	 4,2	 7,1	 11,1	 18,8	 31,9
MillionTL
ON? Per Capita"	 -	 1,4	 1,5	 1,5	 1,5	 1,6
MillionTL
Per Capita	 -	 74.5	 68.7	 56.3	 70.3	 69.2
GRWR %
Per Capita"	 -	 0.6	 7.0	 1.8	 4.1	 5.0
GRWR %
Per Capita"	 -	 2.0	 2,7	 2,6	 2,7	 2,9
Thousand $
SECTOR
SHARE IN GNP
AGR.	 17.0	 16.4	 18.0	 15.6	 16.5	 13.1
IDUST.	 26.8	 26.6	 25.0	 25.8	 29.9	 32.4
SERVICE	 56.2	 57.0	 57.0	 58.6	 53.6	 54.5
GRWR: Growth rate
*: Current prices
#: In 1987 constant prices
(Suurce: Istanbul Chamber of Commerce)
Turkey, which historically had exploited its comparative advantage in the labour
intensive indusuies of agriculture and textiles, was now developing an efficient
manufactured goods indusy. Throughout the latter half of the 1980s, public sector
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fixed investment formerly at the vanguard of Turkish economic development, declined
in the face of surging private sector investment. Overall, private sector was 54.4% in
1992, 57.1% in 1993 as a proportion of total investment in Turkey.
Over the period 1988 to 1993, however, the purchasing power of money has been
declining due to increases in the rate of infladon as shown below in Table (2.3),
Table 2.3
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
1987	 1988	 1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993
23.4	 38.4	 62.53	 100.00	 166.10	 282.25	 468.83
INFLATION RATE BY YEAR
1987	 1988	 1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993
23.4	 38.4	 62.53	 100.00	 166.10	 282.25	 468.83
(Source: Istanbul Chamber of Commerce)
A further look at export figures reveals the reason behind the growth rates in the
Turkish economy over the period. In 1980, exports of manufactured goods amounted
$1 billion; by 1990, this had increased by ten-fold to $10.2 billion. While obviously
emphasizing the growth of its manufactured food sector, Turkey, self-sufficient in its
food production, has not ignored its more adidonal stengths in agriculture.
Agricultural exports increased from $1.7 billion in 1980 to $2.4 billion in 1990.
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Table 2.4
EXPORTS BY MAIN SECTORS AND % SHARE'S [N TOTAL
MILLION $
EXPORTS=l00%
Year	 Total Agriculture	 %	 Mine	 %	 Industry	 %
198K	 11,662	 2,341	 20.1	 377	 3.2	 8,944	 76.7
1989	 11,625	 2,126	 18.3	 413	 3.6	 9,086	 78.2
1990	 12,959	 2,388	 18.4	 331	 2.6	 10,240	 79.0
1991	 13,593	 2,726	 20.1	 286	 2.1	 10,581	 77.8
1992	 14,715	 2,259	 15.4	 264	 1.8	 12,192	 82.9
1993	 15,344	 2,381	 15.5	 238	 1.6	 12,725	 82.9
(Source: Istanbul Chamber of Industry)
Total income from exports increased from $11,662 to $15,344 million over the period
under investigation. Income from the agricultural sector averaged 19.23% between
1988-199 1 but this figure decline to 15.5% in 1993 which indicates the reduction on
this sector's contribution to exports. Income from Mining also decreased from 3.2%
to 1.6%. However, industrial exports increased from 76.7% to 82.9% and this shows
the increasing importance of this Sector in the growth of the economy.
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Table 2.5
IMPORTS BY MAIN GOODS GROUPS AND % SHARE'S IN TOTAL
MILLION $
Year	 Total	 Investment	 %	 Consume	 % Raw	 %
Metr.
1988	 14,335	 3,989	 27.8	 1,110	 7.7	 9,236	 64.4
1989	 15,792	 3,845	 24.3	 1,389	 8.8	 10,558	 66.9
1990	 22,302	 5,928	 26.6	 2,885	 12.9	 13,489 60.5
1991	 21,047	 6,051	 27.7	 2,911	 13.8	 12,085 57.4
1991	 22,872	 6,772	 29.6	 2,972	 13.0	 13,128 57.4
1993	 29,429	 9,566	 32.5	 4,116	 14.0	 15,747 53.5
(Source: Istanbul Chamber of Industry)
Total imports seem to have increased over the years from $14,335 million in 198 to
$29,429 million in 1993. Import for investment have also increased over the same
period from 27.8% to 32.5%. Import for consumer goods seem to have double over
the same period. But raw materials' seems to have been decreasing from 64.4% to
53.5% in this period.
Export and import ties with the OECD countries have been consistently on the rise
throughout the 1980s. The combining of the EC trading groups will no doubt increase
trade opportunities especially as Turkey is on schedule to achieve customs union with
both blocks by 1996.
Table 2.6
EXPORT AND IMPORT BY COUNTRIES GROUPS AND % SHARE'S [N
TOTAL
MILLION $
EXPORT= 100%
IMPORTS=100%
Year	 Total	 OECD	 % Islamic	 % Others	 %
EXPORT
1988	 11,662	 6,707	 57.5	 3,525	 30.2	 1,430	 12.3
1989	 11,625	 7,175	 61.7	 2,870	 24.7	 1,580	 13.6
1990	 12,959	 8,810	 68.0	 2,490	 19.2	 1,659	 12.8
1991	 13,593	 8,856	 65.2	 2,666	 19.6	 2,071	 15.2
1992	 14,715	 9,346	 63.5	 2,775	 18.9	 2,594	 17.6
1993	 15,344	 9,065	 59.1	 2,704	 17.6	 3,575	 23.3
IMPORT
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
64.4
62.8
63.8
66.9
67.4
67.9
20.4
18.5
17.3
15.1
14.9
12.0
14,335
15,792
22,302
21,047
22,872
29,429
9,238
9,912
14,225
14,071
15,422
19,975
2,926
2,921
3,855
3,175
3,414
3,518
2,171
2,959
4,222
3,801
4,036
5,936
15.1
18.7
18.9
18.1
17.6
20.2
(Source:Istanbul Chirnber of Industry)
It seems over the six year period, exports and imports to and from OECD countries
have increased while exports to be Islamic countries seem to have declined.
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Table 2.7
TOURISM INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS
(BILLION $)
Year	 Inflows	 Outflows	 Net Income
1988	 2,355	 358	 1,997
1989	 2,556	 565	 1,991
1990	 3,308	 520	 2,788
1991	 2,654	 592	 2,062
1992	 3,639	 776	 2,863
1993	 3,959	 934	 3,025
(Source:Iscanbul Chamber of Commerce)
Another important sources of revenue for the Turkish economy has been tourism.
Revenues from tourism almost doubled between 1988 and 1993.
Table 2.8
WORKERS REMITI'ANCE'S INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS BY YEAR
(TEN BILLION $)
	1988	 1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993
ANNUAL
TOTAL	 1,865	 3,138	 3,325	 2,901	 3,074	 2,963
ANNUAL
	
CHANGE(%) (11.3)	 68.3	 6.0	 (12.8)	 6.0	 (3.6)
() provisional
(Source: Isuuibul Chamber of Commerce)
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Worker remittances represent another substantial source of foreign currency inflow to
Turkey. Corning predominantly from workers in Germany. Combined, tourism
revenues and worker remittances have provided enough of cash cushion to give
Turkey a comfortable current account surplus of $5,988 billion in 1993.
Inflow of international capital is another important factor conibuting to economic
development. In 1981, international investment comprised $338 million, while in 1992
the figure increased to $913 miiliori. The liberalization programme adopted by the
government in the early 1980s along with the deregulation programme followed since,
render foreign investors the same rights, privileges and incentives granted to Turkish
enterprises. In addition with the opening of the Istanbul Stock Exchange to
international investors in 1989, international capital has found another outlet through
which to invest in Turkey's future. 	 -
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Table 2.9
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PERMITS BY YEARS
(MILLION $)
YEAR ANNUAL CUMULATIVE INFLOWS OUTFLO NET
VALUE VALUE	 WS
1988	 821	 3,279	 387	 33	 354
1989	 1,512	 4,791	 738	 75	 663
1990	 1,861	 6,652	 789	 76	 713
1991	 1,967	 8,619	 910	 127	 783
1992	 1,820	 10,439	 912	 133	 779
1993	 2,271	 12,710	 797	 175	 622
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PERMITS BY SECTORS
(MILLION $)
Sectors	 1991 Annual	 1992 Annual	 1993 Annual
	
A	 B	 A	 B	 A	 B
Agriculture	 18	 22.4	 23 -	 36	 30	 31.2
Mining	 21	 39.8	 18	 19	 13	 11.8
Manufacture	 378	 1,095.5	 431	 1,273.9	 427	 1,726.6
Services	 523	 809.6	 609	 492.2	 650	 501.7
TOTAL	 940	 1,967.3	 1,081	 1,821.1	 1,120	 2,271.3
(Source:Istanhul Chamber of Commerce)
The manufacturing Sector seems to have atacted more investment from foreign
investors. Again reflecdng the importance of this sector to the economy. The second
largest Sector in terms of attacdng foreign investment is services, which includes
tourism, banking, investment financing among others.
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Table 2.10
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PERMITS BY COUNTRIES
(MILLION $)
Countries	 1991 Annual	 1992 Annual	 1993 Annual
A	 B	 A	 B	 A	 B
OECD	 656	 1,774.3	 763	 1,612.8	 774	 2,042.8
Islamic	 108	 122.9	 102	 127.1	 108	 78.7
Other	 176	 70.1	 216	 80.1	 238	 149.9
Total	 940	 1,967.3	 1,081	 1,820	 1,120	 2,271.3
(A):Number of permits
(B):Amount of capital
(Source: Isuinbul Chamber of Commerce)
Again above table shows the importance of trading relations between Turkey and
OECD countries. Investment from OECD countries to Turkey represent almost 90%
of total foreign direct invesnrient.
As the Turkish economy looks forward to the 21st century, one could state that its full
potential has yet to be reached. Every year, new industries enter the export arena
while foreign investment continues to increase.
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2.4. TURKISH CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE ISTANBUL STOCK
EXCHANGE: STRUCTURE, PERFORMANCE AND REGULATION
Even though securities wading in Turkey has been seen as early as the 17th century,
it was carried out in the form of unorganized markets.The concept and operations of
an organized securities market in Turkey have its roots which back to Crimean War
in the middle of the 19th century. The first securities market was established
immediately after the Crimean War (1866) under the name "Imperial Securities
Exchange" when the Ottoman Sultan issued sovereign bonds to finance the war
campaign. Although it emerged as one of the leading financial cenes in Europe, the
market fell victim to a succession of wars. After the Turkish Republic was proclaimed
in 1923, a new attempt was made to launch a stock exchange. However, this effort
was averted by the Depression. After the Depression, as the pace of change in political
environment gained momentum throughout the world, the number of joint stock
companies rose sharply.
Imperial Securities Exchange created also a medium for European investors who were
seeking higher returns in the vast Ottoman markets. Following the proclamation of the
Turkish Republic, on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, a new law was enacted in 1929
to reorganize the fledgling capital markets under the new name of "Istanbul Securities
and Foreign Exchange Bourse." In short time, the bourse became very active and
contibuted substantially to the funding requirements of new enterprises across the
countty. Nevertheless, its success was clouded by a s-ing of events including the 1929
Depression and the impending Second World War abroad which taken their toll in the
33
embryonic business world in Turkey. An unfortunate decision to move it to the
commercially inactive capital city of Ankara during the war years, coupled by poor
communications, further exacerbated the problems of the capital markets. During the
industrial drive of the subsequent decades, there was a continuous increase in the
number and size of joint stock companies, which began to open up their equity capital
to the public. Those mature shares faced a strong and growing demand from mostly
individual investors and some institutional investors. While the stock exchange existed
as a legal entity, the secondary market developed at a faster pace in parallel to an over
the counter market.
From 1940 to 1990, bank debt was the premier source of finance for Turkish
companies most of which operated high leverage at low or negative real interest rates.
This became too risky after 1980 following rises in inflation, interest rates, and change
in government policy which introduced significant real interest rates on loans with 	 - -
making high leverage a risky proposition for most institutions. Additionally,
increasingly sophisticated Turkish savers changed the direction of savings, with greater
investment in securities. During this time, trading was carried out through unorganised
markets, mostly in Istanbul.
The early phase of the 1980's saw a marked improvement in the Turkish Capital
Markets, both in regard to the legislative framework and the institutions required to
set the stage for sound capital movements. In 1981, the "Capital Market Law" was
enacted. One year later, the major regulatory body responsible for the supervision and
regulation of the Turkish Securities Markets, the Capital Market Board based in
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Ankara, was established. A new Decree-Law was issued by Council of Ministers in
October l93, to define the establishment and activities as well as the operation
principles and arrangement for the supervision of securities exchanges as warranted
by the Capital Market Board (CMB). The purpose of the Decree-Law was to secure
and provide for the ansparent, coherent and prudent operation of the securities
exchanges for the objective of ansacting securities in a medium of confidence and
stability and to lay the foundations for the securities exchanges to assume an effective
role in the capital markets by arranging for their establishment, management,
adminisation and operation principles and eventual supervision.
The regulations concerning operational procedures were approved in subsequent
exuaordinary meetings of the General Assembly and the Istanbul Stock Exchange was
formally inaugurated at the end of 1985, commencing operations in 1986.
Further impetus was given in August 1989 when irading conditions for international
investors were improved significantly; free repaiation of dividends, initial investment
and capital gains were allowed, and taxes on capital gains were suspended. There is
no tax on dividends.
The growth of the newly established stock has been very impressive. The daily
average value of ade in shares increased from $0.45 million in 1988 to $3.03 million
in 199, $23.70 million in 1990, $34.42 million in 1991, $34.13 million in 1992 and
over $8.50 million by the end of the 1993. In the same time, daily average volume
of trading has been increasing. From 13,000 in 196 it increased to 934,000 in 19K9
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and 143,289,000 in 1993.
As shown in the following table, the growth number of traded companies, number of
companies traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, total trading values and volume
over the same period
Table 2.11
OVERALL PROFILE OF ISE
Years	 No. of Corn. Traded Total Trading	 Total Trading
on The ISE	 VALUE	 VOLUME
($ Million)	 ('000)
1986	 80	 13	 3.273
1987	 82	 118	 14.731
1988	 79	 115	 31.679
1989	 76	 773	 238.056
1990	 110	 5.854	 1.537.387
1991	 134	 8.502	 -	 4.531.153
1992	 145	 8.567	 10.285.263
1993	 160	 21.771	 35.249.007
(Source:Istanbut Stock Exchange)
Naturally, there was a lag between the opening of the Istanbul Stock Exchange and
the commencement of effective operations. As shown previous table (2.11), while
trading values boomed in 1987, the world stock market crash in October 1987 and
high interest rates had a negative impact on operations until 1989 when extremely low
valuations and high dividend yields encouraged an increase in stock market activity.
While annual trading volume increased in 1990, the number of companies traded
surged form 76 to 160 in 1993, indicating a fast development of the Exchange.
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Other important developments included the ending of doubled taxation of corporate
income in 1985, the abolition of withholding tax on dividends in 1986 and changes
in tax laws making mutual funds viable investment vehicles in 1987. Further recent
changes have awarded tax advantages to institutions investing in equities. Short selling
is abolished in 1992. Virtually all shares aded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange are
common stock, with the majority of those traded being in bearer form.
More deregulation was introduced; enabling the issuance of new instruments and
taking measures against insider trading with the passing of the new Capital Markets
Law by the Parliament in 1992.
The Capital Market Board
The Capital Market Board, founded in 1982, is- the supervisory and regulatory
authority. Its actions to date have included introducing and expanding accounting
principles for listed companies that are more in line with international accounting
standards than those used for the purposes of tax declarations to the Ministry of
Finance; the institution of trading practices; and the general overseeing of all types of
activity pertaining to securities. The mission of the Board is to create an ever more
efficient system within which securities markets may operate and to safeguard the
interest of investors who channel their savings into these markets. The head of the
Capital Market Board and its members are appointed by the government.
The Istanbul Stock Exchange is a self-regulated, professional public organization and
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is governed by an Executive Council composed of the Chairman and four elected
members who each represent a different group of intermediary institutions. The
Chairman is appointed by the Government for five years. The Chairman and the
employees of the Exchange cannot perform any other duties. The Chairman also acts
as the Chief Executive Officer and is responsible for acting as an intermediary
between the members and authorities. The Istanbul Stock Exchange is accountable to
two governing bodies, the Under secretariat of Treasury and the Capital Market Board.
Administrative matters are controlled by the Under-secretariat of Treasury. The
General Assembly is the decision making body of the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Its
decisions are subject to approval by the Capital Market Board (CMB). AU accounts
of the Istanbul Stock Exchange are audited by two internal auditors appointed by the
General Assembly and also by the cMB.
Members comprise banks and brokerage houses. The banks are divided into two
categories: development and industrial banks and commercial banks including foreign
banks established in Turkey. Members have to obtain a licence from the Capital
Market Board to operate in the capital markets. With the Capital Market Law
amendments, the Exchange has the authority to control admission to the trading floor
and permission to trade in the Bonds and Bills Market.
The number of trading members of the Exchange has risen from 47 in 1986 to 176
at the end of 1993. These 176 members are 112 brokerage houses, 53 commercial
banks and 11 investment banks. Security trades are concluded in cash payment. Both
domestic and international securities traded on the Exchange are in Turkish Lira.
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There is one main market and a market for unlisted securities at the Istanbul Stock
Exchange. 160 stocks are traded on the trading floor on a continuous auction system.
The unlisted market, on the other hand, hosts trading in stocks which do not meet all
the requirements of full listing on the Exchange. The purpose of this market is to give
companies and institutions the opportunity to trade in an organized Exchange and the
possibility of upgrading to the Main Market.
The Istanbul Stock Exchange reviews the performance of stocks every six months and
is authorized to review stocks for various reasons. At present, there are no foreign
companies waded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. However, local subsidiaries of
international firms are traded.
To meet a growing demand from small investors, the Exchange initiated an odd-lot,
off-Exchange trading in pre-deterrained stocks by designated members. Designated
members are required to quote two way prices and accept buy and sell orders up to
a predetermined level. Settlement is done on cash basis (same day value).
The Istanbul Stock Exchange is currently housed in a building in the old financial
centre of Istanbul. There are two sessions; the first (for odd lots) is between (7.15) am.
and (X.00) am. (GMT); the second is between (8.30) am. and (10.30) am. (GMT),
Monday to Friday.
The Bound Market is located in the same premises and has longer trading hours from
(.00) am. to (3.00) pm. GMT., Monday to Friday. Authorized dealer from approved
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intermediaries transact business on a screen based system. At present, only the best
bids and offers are displayed blind on the screen for securities falling due at and given
date but, upon phoning the Exchange other bids and offers can be learned. For same
day value transactions, settlement in cash can take place until noon or by bank transfer
until (2.00) pm. Only future value transactions (of up to one week) may take place
between (2.00) pm. and (5.00) pm. Settlement is through exchange of securities for
cash or bank account transfers.
Companies with securities to be listed on the Exchange are required to submit a
written registration form that contains basic information about its financial position,
assets and liabilities, profit and loss statements and the right attached to the securities.
The Executive Council is entitled to seek further information in case of ambiguities
and if necessary, additional markets for the securities not listed on the Istanbul Stock
Exchange. Additionally, the Executive Council may terminate the markets of -
companies or delist the securities of companies if the securities of such companies are
not traded for a period of more than three months.
Corporations have to apply with a written registration form concerning the financial
position of the concerned security. In general, a company must have a minimum paid-
in capital of TL 500 million of which 15% must have been offered to the public and
should have at least 100 shareholders. Furthermore, a company needs to have three-
year-end financial statements and should be profitable for the last two years. In
addition, these requirements mainly apply to industrial corporations, banks, remain
under the supeiision of the Central Bank and the relevant Minister of State may
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waive any and all of the conditions for state-owned companies. Listing fees consist
of the admission and extension fees. The admission fee is paid within seven days
following the acceptance notice to listing. Whereas the extension fee is paid annually
as long as the securities remain on the Exchange while it is not require for the first
year.
By the approval of the Executive Council, of the securities unlisted on the Exchange,
the ones satisfying the qualifications specified in the circular of the Executive Council
are transactect. Later on, if a security loses such qualifications, it is discharged from
the market by the decision of the same authority. Admissions and transactions fees for
the unlisted securities are not fixed and are subsequently published in the Exchange
Bulletin.
Subject to the permission of the Executive Council, the following special transactions
are conducted on the Istanbul Stock Exchange.
In the case of the desire of a member to sell or buy a quantity higher than the
predetermined size, firstly the Chairman is informed about the transaction. Once
the Chairman is informed either prior to the session or during the session. One
organises one or more special sessions to enable the execution of such securities.
Information on the said special sessions as to the number of securities and the
location is announced on the Exchange Bulletin.
Official Auctions take place on the request of enforcement officers and other
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government departments. The limit to session are determined on the account of the
securities' qualifications and their transactions volumes. At the end of the
predetermined period for the transactions, the unsold securities are return to the
concerned authority. Delivery of the securities and payment of revenues are
conducted by the Exchange after deducting all the fees related to the transaction of
such securities.
Transactions are supervised by the Exchange experts. "Multiple Price" method is
employed in trading securities which are conducted according to a continuous auction
method in which the ask and bid orders are entered on the boards assigned to each
stock where a transaction is concluded by matching ask and bid orders under the
following priority rules.
The matching of ask and bid orders in the markets can only be executed within the
price limits determined by the Exchange Adrninisiiation. Prices formed during a
session cannot exceed (+ -) 5 percent of the base price. Price limits are fixed at 10
percent for special orders and registered shares. The base price is the weighed average
price on the preceding trading day. In the cases of dividend payment and bonus issues,
the base price is determined by the Exchange. The method determining the base price
is ascertained by the Executive Council and publicized in the Exchange Bulletin.
The bids and offers are written on boards and the counterpart, by crossing off the
relevant bid or offer, completes the trade. All trading slips are entered into the
computer by the Stock Exchange employees, and confirmation of trading is issued
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later that same day. Settlement is by physical exchange of documents for payment and
occurs on the next business day.
Ask and bid orders are submitted to the Exchange members for trading in securities.
In principle, such orders are given in a written form. However, Exchange members
may accept direct verbal orders, telephone calls or requests through other
communication means. A customer may either determine the price or may assign this
task to the member. Prices are fixed according to the "limited" or "free price" option.
Limited price is the price that the buyer or seller wishes to receive on a specific day.
The Istanbul Stock Exchange member is bound to seek this price on the market during
the session. The "free price" option is giving the authority to the members to sell and
buy at the most suitable price. The customer is ready to accept the price negotiated
by the member. Exchange members may require a partial or full collateral or payment
concerning the value of the order.
A transaction is realized when one party checks out, using felt-tipped markers, the
corresponding price of the other party. This party who closes the deal initiates the
trade execution process by filling out three copies of the trade agreement form and
time-stamps it. The Exchange, during the day, distributes to each member a
transaction book that shows every trade on every stock by each member. Following
the distribution of the book, the members can ask for correction within a time limit.
Real-time prices are fed to the systems of local and international information vendors.
Members are liable to each other and to the Exchange for the implications of their
transactions.
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With the permission of the Executive Council, block t-ade of securities, official
auctions, sales of securities pertaining to the primary market operations which are
subject to special ansactions are conducted by the Exchange experts under the
framework of the said Regulations.
Shares are aded in lots, each lot representing 1,000 shares.
Orders For Odd Lots : An order issued for a number of shares less than a
unit of uansaction.
Special Orders Orders valued at market value at the daily base level of the
issuing day. The market value of the special order must not be below TL 2
billion. Special orders may only be taded as an entirety and not partially.
Preferred shares are entered as special orders.
Market Order : Buy or sell securities at the price.
Limit Order : Buy or sell securities provided if a specified price is met.
Types of Stocks
Ordinary Shares : Shares representing equal ownership in a corporation
embodying such rights as the receipts of dividends, subscription to bonus and
rights issues and the liquidation of assets, including voting rights. Almost all
shares quoted on the Istanbul Stock Exchange belong to this category. Most
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of the stocks naded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange are bearer type. Registered
stocks may be aded also as bearer stocks in case the issuing company accepts
the "blank endorsement" of its registered shares.
Preferred (preferences) Shares : Preferred shares carry preferential rights as
to voting rights or dividends in conast to ordinary shares.
Founders' Shares : The owner has special benefits in case of distibution of
profits.
The Istanbul Stock Exchange Indices
The Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) has been computing and publishing a stock price
indx (the ISE Index) as a comprehensive measure of the market's performance since
its introduction in January 1986. The ISE was weighted average of stocks based on
the weighted total market value of a large number of companies. The Istanbul Stock
Exchange Composite Index is weighted by the proportion of the product of the
company's number of stocks, multiplied by the market price of the stocks offered to
the public.
Thus, any price change in stocks of companies with a large market value and widely
held by the public will have a greater impact on the Istanbul Stock Exchange
Composite Index than price changes occurring in smaller companies. 75 companies
are included in the ISE Composite Index. Selection criteria are the proportion of
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equity actually held by the public, trade value, number of shares traded, number of
contracts and market value. About 93 percent of the total market value is covered by
the Index. The continuity of the index is secured by adjustments to capital increases.
The 75 companies represented in the ISE Composite Index are divided into two groups
according to their nature. 59 companies are included in the Industrial Index"
representing 63 percent of the total market value. The "Financial Index", comprising
16 banks and holding companies as well as insurance companies, represents 37 percent
of the market value. All indices are computed on the basis of the closing prices as
well as on the basis of weighted average prices. The list of the companies on which
the index is based is reviewed every six months. The ISE Composite Index and the
"Financial Index" and the "Industrials Index" are displayed on Reuters and Telerate
pages.
The Istanbul Stock Exchange charges members a fee in the form of a corrirnission by
their representatives for their intermediary actions in security trading. Commission fee
will amount to 0.75 percent of the traded value times two percent.
For transactions made through the Exchange, at the end of each month, a fee is
changed that will amount to 0.25 percent of the buy or sale value times two percent.
On transactions executed over the counter, an amount of 0.25 percent of the traded
value times three percent will be charged at the end of each week.
Commissions on security transacdons are negotiable, but may not exceed 1%. There
is a small turnover tax. Custody fees are generally around 0.75% of corporate actions.
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The Exchange disseminates both market and corporate information to its members and
to the investing public. At present, aded companies submit half-year externally
audited balance sheet and income statement data to the Exchange, in addition, to
unaudited first and third quarter results. Such information is ansmitted without delay
to the vendors and published in various forms by the Exchange. Quotations including
real-time stock ade information, indices, various market news about companies, and
current events, historical indices, P/E ratios, market value, most active members and
stocks and statistical records are entered on the Reuters and Telerate screens.
The Istanbul Stock Exchange puts out several publications both in Turkish and
English, as Daily Bulletin in Turkish, incorporating the last day's closing, high-low
and closing prices, number and volurhe of shares taded, the weighted average price
and the median taded price. The Bulletin also features aggregate results of "off-
exchange" odd-lot transactions. Such information is rounded up in weekly and
monthly bulletins. Monthly Bulletin is also printed in English. In addition to these
bulletins, the Istanbul Stock Exchange also issues semi-annual, quarterly and annual
reports, Yearbook of Companies in Turkish and English.
Other sources of information include the Capital Market Board with its regular
publications, the companies themselves as and when they publish information required
by the Board or the Exchange and intermediaries, which have significantly bolstered
their research capabilities over the past 6 years.
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Investor Protection
All transactions on the Istanbul Stock Exchange are under the strict control of the
Istanbul Stock Exchange management supported at times by the functions of the
Disciplinary and Arbitration Committees. To prevent unjustified and potentially
detrimental price fluctuations, the Istanbul Stock Exchange has authority to suspend
trading in any security for a specific time.
All other regular arrangements designed for the protection of the investor are also
applicable. In addition, the Istanbul Stock Exchange itselt its members, arid virtza1ly
all securities transacted on the Istanbul Stock Exchange have been insured against
fraud, theft, damage and loss. The coverage involves all of the conceivable risks
associated with operating a cohesive and sound stock market. Another innovation
devised purposefully to enhance confidence in the market will enable traded
companies to have their stock certificates be printed abroad, equipped with a wide
variety of "security printing" features.
Investments
There are no restrictions on foreign portfolio investors. Foreigners can freely invest
in Turkish securities and repatriate the proceeds. However, all investments in securities
and the repatriation of the sale proceeds inclusive of capital gains have to be done
through banks and special finance institutions. Banks and brokerage houses are
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required to provide the Treasury with quarterly reports and information concerning
investment from abroad.
Legislative Changes and Reform
On 13th May 1992, amendments to the Capital Market Law (CML) took effect after
publication in the Official Gazette. The new changes aim to create new capital market
insu-uments, channel savings into the securities sector as well as boost investor
confidence, particularly in the stock market by making insider trading a criminal
offense and improving transparency. Under the new Law, banks' shares traded on the
Istanbul Stock Exchange are required to conform with the Capital Market Law which
were previously subject to the Banking Law. Banks' monopoly to Set up mutual funds
was abolished. The amendments eliminate differences in dividend payments between
existing shares and new shares issued against capital increases.
	 -
Taxation
Dividends are exempt from withholding tax. On the other hand, the interest earned on
private corporate debentures is subject to tax withholding at the rate of 10.5%. For
foreign-national corporate entities and real persons, this withholding constitutes the
entire tax burden on interest income.
The interest income earned by foreign individuals on treasury bills, government bonds
and revenue-sharing instruments is not taxed in Turkey. The gains resulting from the
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appreciation of foreign currency exchange rates in the case of government revenue-
sharing insuments that are foreign currency indexed are also tax-exempt.
Until December 31st 1999, the capital gains that private individuals secure from the
disposal (through a bank or brokerage house) of securities that they own are not
taxable. Similarly, in the case of securities that private individuals purchase through
the Stock Exchange and those that they retain in their portfolios for at least one year
(regardless of where or how they may have acquired them), the capital gains that they
secure from the disposal of such instuments are also tax-exempt.
The capital gains that corporations secure in Turkey from the disposal of Treasury
bills, Government bonds and Revenue-Sharing Instruments are exempt from the
corporation tax.
Disclosure
While corporate disclosure requirements are not quite as sophisticated as those in most
markets, they are exemplary by the standards of emerging markets. The mid-year and
annual financial statements have to be reviewed and audited by independent auditors.
Quarterly reporting has been expanded to give greater details on companies'
performance. Accounting norms are much in line with GAAP, expect in certain cases
where the treatment of income and expenses are similar to the cash basis used for
Turkish tax purposes rather than the accrual basis.
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Investments are stated at cost; plant and equipment are revalued at the end of each
financial year in line with the revaluation coefficient announcement by the
government. Companies are free to capitalise or expense financing costs occurred after
the investment period. Both normal and accelerated depreciation may be used.
Provisions for retirement and severance pay are set aside in line with the regulations
but are not allowable for taxes.
2.5. CONCLUSION
The objective of this chapter was to the place the main theme of the thesis, namely
the efficiency of the Istanbul Stock Exchange within a more general context. This is
because capital markets play an important role in the economic development as they
directly affect the mobilization of savings and the channelling of investments into
productive enterprises. In other words, capital markets play a critical role in the
efficient allocation of the economy's resources, so that the more profitable and
efficient a firm is, the greater the amount of resources that it atacts and invests.
The Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) was developed at a time when the Turkish
economy went through a process of economic reform and liberalization. This process
lowered import barriers and promoted growth. As a result the growth rate of the
economy between l9 and 1993 averaged 4.8 percent, a level considerably higher
than the OECD average for the period. Therefore, the economic environment was
conducive to the development of the exchange and its subsequent expansion.
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Capital markets will conibute to economic growth and the efficient allocation of
resources if they function effectively, in other words, if capital markets price stocks
efficiently. However, the efficient functioning of an exchange crucially depends on its
regulatory sucture and ading rules. The ISE went through considerable regulatory
changes from its inception. A priori, these changes encourage participation and have
led to a considerable increase in the volume of uading. The important questions are
whether such changes had an impact on the efficiency of the market, the volatility and
the equity market risk premium. These questions among others are the subject matter
of the subsequent chapters of this thesis.
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III. THE EFFICIENT MARKET THEORY AND DEVELOPMENTS
3.1. INTR0DucTJ(:)N
The objective of the chapter is to sketch the developments of the efficient market
theory, the subject matter of this thesis, by reviewing the principal contributions. The
nature and extent of our knowledge of stock market efficiency is examined. The
development of the concept of efficiency is traced from Roberts (1959) and Fama
(1965) onward. The concept of an efficient stock market has stimulated both insight
and controversy since Fama (1965) introduced it to the financial economics literature
and it commonly describes the relationship between information and security prices.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Secüon 3.2' pio'ñts rief	 aist
which the idea of efficient markets emerged. This is followed by Section (3.3) which
traces the early use of the ten1 efficiency. Section (3.4) compares and contrasts
Fama's models with alternative definitions and identifies some of the limitations of
the theory of Efficient Market Hypothesis. Finally, section (3.5) summarizes the
chapter.
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3.2. BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH THE fflEA EMERGED
Before the theory of efficient markets was developed, the areas of finance and
economics had little to offer on the behaviour of stock prices. The stock market was
generally explained as exhibiting little economic order whatsoever (see, Ball and
Brown (l96)). In the empirical literature the relationship between prices and
information was simply a statistical one with no economic insights or explanation. For
example Bachelier (1900), Working (1934), Kendall (1953), Cootner (1962), Osborne
(1962), Granger and Morgenstern (1963) and Fama (1965), among others, suggested
that successive stock price changes are approximately independent: that prices behave
like random walks. Thus in the absence of an economic explanation the behaviour of
stock prices and returns was described using a statistical language.
The connection of random walk models with the economics of ëompetitive markets
began with Roberts (1959, p.7) who provisionally reasoned:
"...there is a plausible rationale [for the random walk model]. flJf the
stock market behaved like a mechanically imperfect roulette wheel,
people would notice the imperfections and by acting on them, remove
them. This rationale is appealing, if for no other reason than its value
as counterweight to the popular view of stock market "h-rationality",
but it is obviously incomplete."
Stock price behaviour which was not shown as being describable in terms of economic
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theory, however Roberts' reasoning provided a foundation for doing so. From this
point onwards statistical dependence in security returns began to be interpreted as
indicating unexploited economic rents and thus being inconsistent with rational
investor behaviour in competitive markets. Later on this interpretation of evidence
became known as "market inefficiency".
3.3. EARLY USE OF THE TERM EFFICIENCY
The term market efficiency " was first used in the context of securities markets by
Fama (1965, p.4.), who defined it as
"a market where there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers
actively competing with each other tying to predict future market 	 -
values of individual securities, and where important current information
is almost freely available to all participants.
In an efficient market, on average, competition among investors will ensure the full
effect of new information about the intrinsic value of securities will instantaneously
be impounded in actual prices.
An important aspect in this definition was the term information. Around the same
time, Samuelson (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) have provided an economic
formalization to Roberts'(1959) reasoning, proving that under stationarity conditions
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successive price changes in competitive markets are independent.
The early empirical literature was increasingly conducted under the belief that it was
researching the inferences of competitive equilibrium in stock markets, in the context
of information use. However, it did so without using formal models of the type of
equilibrium which can be seen in the data by researchers. For instance, the Ball and
Brown (l96) study of public earnings announcements bore no direct correspondence
with the Mandeibrot and Samuelson random walk models. However, the first attempt
to a formal model of public information came with Fama (1970).
By extending the information set beyond past prices to include publicly-available
information such as stock splits or earnings FFJR (Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll)
pioneered an ingenious research design. Publicly-available information is formally
defined as information freely available to all investors. Transactions costs are being
ignored in the economic models being developed. A testable inference of such models
is that, if there is zero cost in reproducing public information then expected gains from
public information would also be zero. Security prices therefore should adjust to
information at the first tade after it becomes publicly available. Hence, at the time of
the announcement, abnorn-ial returns should be encountered completely by the owners
of securities.
In conast, competitive markets allowed investors to gain from producing private
information which is not publicly available. Analyses of whether competitive returns
are earned from private information production would be hard to discharge, because
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they would require among other things, estimates of the cost of information
production. Hence the early empirical literature of market efficiency, focused only on
public information whose cost of production is known to be approximately zero. It
is in this spirit that early researchers sought to demonsu-ate that the stock market can
be described in terms of simple economic models of competition. Thus this model of
competitive market behaviour opened up a legitimate area of economic research.
3.4. FAMA'S MODELS AND ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF
EFFICIENCY
Fama (1970) continued the process of formalizing the concept of "efficiency" in
econoi-rijc terms. He stated that "to a large extent the empirical work in this area
preceded the development of the theory", and then he defined an efficient market as
one "in which prices always 'fully reflect' available information" and argued that the
sufficient conditions for efficiency to obtain are: "there are no transactions costs in
trading securities, all available information is costlessly available to all market
participants, and all agree on the implications of current information for the current
price and distributions of future prices of each security".
Fama's attention was to formalize the "fully reflect" notion in terms closer to those
of equilibrium pricing theory. He was showing that a market is called "efficient" if
investors who possess information nevertheless earn only a competitive expected
return from investing: that is, the information does not alter their expected returns.
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This part is the basis of his definition, equating securities' conditional (on the
information Set) and unconditional expected returns. The unconditional expected part
of return, that would be earned without possessing information, is not directly
observable. Its proxy typically has been the "market model", which researchers have
associated, however loosely, with the CAPM. The market model residual or prediction
error is the difference between the observed return, which by sample construction is
conditional on the information set being studied, and the model's proxy for the
"correct" return. The efficient market prediction then is that the sample average post
announcement residual is zero. The research therefore, can be interpreted as comparing
observed returns, which by sample consuction are conditional on announced
information, with some economically "correct" value, using the market model to
provide the empirical proxy for "correct" returns.
Crediting Harry Roberts, Farna distinguished three nested information sets: past prices,
publicly-available information, and all information including private information.
Then, accordingly he distinguished between the "weak", "semi-song" and "strong"
forms of efficiency. While this was the first recognition that efficiency must be
defined with respect to a particular information set, it unfortunately was couched in
terms of statistical rather than economic properties of information. Especially, the
distinctions were not explicitly based on Costs of producing information, which are
necessary for the economics of competitive markets to predict different returns to
public and private information. The statistically based classification scheme possibly
distracted attention away from the important issue of the costs of obtaining and
processing information and thus from the fundamental economics involved. This
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demonstrates that the theory of efficient markets had not yet shed its statistical origins.
Fama's (1970) modelling seems to have served the purpose of early empirical
researchers well. They took it for granted that this was a precise enough statement of
what they were looking for in the data which it also stimulated a definitional debate
that continued for almost two decades. The modeffing and even the concept of
"efficiency began to attract criticism, possible fuelled by;
1. The emergence of information economics as an important field,
populated by researchers placing more emphasis on logical coherence
than did the "empiricists",
2. The logical scrutiny of the "efficiency" consm.ict that arose
naturally from researchers seeking explanations for the early
empirical anomalies; and 	 -
3. Reactions to Fama's (1970) review. In historical sequence,
Rubinstein (1975), Beja (1976), LeRoy (1976), Fama (1976),
Grossman (1976), Jensen (1978), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980),
Beaver (1981), Jordan (1983) and Latham (1986), among
others, contributed to the debate.
LeRoy criticized Fama's definition on the grounds that it was empty/tautological,
because it allowed any feasible set of return distributions to be consistent with
"efficiency". The quality of conditional and unconditional expected returns is logically
feasible in a market that gets them both wrong. However, it could be argued that this
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criticism missed the spirit of Fama's original definition, in which the unconditional
expected return seemed intended to represent its "correct" equilibrium value. However,
LeRoy's criticism did demonsate that the definition could be tightened. Fama (1976)
responded with a revised definition explicitly requiring that "the market correctly uses
all available information" and thus the joint disibution of future prices established
by the market is identical to the "correct" distibution implied by all available
information at the time. This definition requires empirical researchers to state or imply
something about the "correct" disibudon of future prices, that is, to test efficiency
joint with an hypothesis about market equilibrium, the CAPM having been the
prevalent example. However, it is hard to explain how empirical research under any
definition of market "efficiency" could do otherwise. Most subsequent empirical work
in the area adopted Fama's revised definition of market efficiency.
Around the same time a sequence of related papers gave tighter specification to the
equilibrium being contemplated in market "efficiency". For example, Rubinstein
(1975) provided alternative definitions and their properties. Sharpe suggested a
development of one of these to Beja (1976) and this in turn was refined by Beaver
(1981) as:
"market efficiency with respect to an information item means that
prices act as if everyone knows that information". More formally,
Beaver (1981) stated:
A securities market is efficient with respect to a signal if and only if the configuration
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of security prices (P 1 } is the same as it would be in an otherwise identical economy
(i.e. with an identical configuration of preferences and endowments) expect that every
individual receives the same signal.
Beaver also provided a more comprehensive definition of efficiency, defined with
respect to the system that produces the obseied signal and therefore, with respect to
the set of all feasible signals. He termed it "information system efficiency", as distinct
from "signal efficiency".
Latham (1986) explained that is logically feasible for a piece of information to cause
offsetting revisions in individual investors' portfolios, without any net effect on excess
demand and hence, on prices. For instance, information feasibly could cause two
investors to make precisely offsetting buy and sell decisions. He thus, described
efficiency relative to some information set "if revealing it to all agents would change	 -
neither equilibrium prices nor portfolios." The advantage of this defmition is its
potential for linking with the theory and empirical studies on trading volume, investor
heterogeneity, information production and the microstructure of the trading
mechanism.
The notion of efficiency could also be seen in the works of Grossman (1976),
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Jordan (1983), among others, who sought an
"efficiency" construct that is compatible with incentives to produce information.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) observed that, under Farna's (1970) definition in which
"at any time prices fully reflect all available information", there is rio incentive for any
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individual to produce information. They suggested a reformulation of efficiency as a
noisy rational expectations equilibrium, with supply-induced noise interfering with the
inference of information from prices. Prices then cannot fulfil Fama's "fully reflect all
information" criterion: without noise, no information is produced, due to lack of
incentive; and with noise, prices cannot fully reflect information. Their model says
that Fama's definition cannot possible describe any real or hypothetical market.
While clearly there is no incentive to incur costs in reproducing information that
already is freely and publicly available, there do remain incentives to produce private
information in a competitive world. For instance, consider the relation between
reported earnings and prices. It is clear from Ball and Brown (1968) that there are
gains from obtaining private information on earnings before the market does-that is,
before it becomes publicly available. Security analysts hence, incur costs in forecasting
earnings or in obtaining information that subsequently will be reflected in earnings.
However, such information cannot be fully reflected in security prices and remain
privately valuable, which highlights the inadequacy of Farna's (1970) original
definition that Grossman and Stiglitz observed.
The problem in part is due to Farna's (1970) statistically based classification of
information sets. If the subdivisions had been based on the cost of production of
information which could be zero in the case of the so-called "weak" and "semi-song"
forms of the efficient market hypothesis and positive in the so-called "song"formn,
then the subsequent confusion might not have arisen. Whereas, Fama referred to prices
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reflecting all available information, the fundamental competitive economics predicts
only that prices reflect all publicly available information. Grossman and Stiglitz'
argument, therefore, points out once more the inadequacy of Fama's (1970) original
definition, which they cited, though in fairness to Fama it should be noted that his
(1976) revision by then was free of these problems.
In addition, the Grossman-Stiglitz framework does not captured many institutional
mechanisms, to solve the incentive problem for producing information that is to be
placed in the public domain. First, firms voluntarily contract to produce and disclose
information to the public, including stockholders. Watts and Zimmerman (1983)
displayed that such undertakings have been included in corporate charters, and
therefore, have been part of companies's contracts with their shareholders, for six
centuries. Ball (199) shows that companies have motivation to voluntarily produce
and disclose information to the factor market including actual and potential
shareholders, creditors, managers and employees and the product market, which
includes, actual and potential consumers, as a contracting efficient solution. This
amounts to public disclosure, the incentive being contracting cost minimization by the
firm. Secondly, stock exchange listing requirements, which are a contract between
listed firms and the exchange and hence, also are part of listed companies's contracts
with shareholders and others, typically require companies to disclose important
information to the market as a whole (i.e.the public). Presumably, stock exchanges
have motivation to enact these requirements and listed companies have incentives to
comply. Thirdly, directors have fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders that
encompass a broad range of disclosure provisions, and these are enforced by the courts
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to form part of the contact between companies and shareholders. There appear to be
no first-order "free rider" incentive problems under any of these institutional solutions:
1. Provided the market is efficient as in Fama (1976), the response of the
companies's own stock price to the publicly disclosed information will
be captured entirely by its existing shareholders, since all post
disclosure buyers will pay a fully reflecting price, and
2. Existing shareholders incur the per-share costs of the information
production and disclosure.
Similarly, propositions hold for contacting costs. Fourthly, statutory disclosure laws
and regulations, which are superimposed on the above mentioned voluntary disclosure
mechanisms, require companies to produce and disclose information (Foster, 1981).
The Grossman-Stiglitz model captured none of this institutional details. Thus, it
allows no role for institutions or institutional practices, and then, investors are
assumed to behave independently, making individual information production decisions.
Information is disclosed to the public indirectly and with noise, through their wading.
These important institutional solutions to the disclosure incentive problem has been
omitted in this model. In reality, public disclosure occurs under sophisticated
institutional arrangements and is consistent with both Fama's (1976) revised definition
of efficiency and the underlying concept of a competitive securities market.
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Nonetheless, the fundamental limitation of efficiency have been highlighted in this
literature: namely its reliance on a pure exchange theory, completely silent of how
information is produced, acquired and processed by companies, analysts and investors.
In this regard, the efficient markets's theory echoes the tendency to ignore supply in
finance theory.
The theory of efficient markets has also ignored another potentially important aspect,
namely, the cost to investors of acquiring and processing information. Information
costs are neither new to economists nor inconsistent with competitive markets, for
example, see, Coase (1937), Hayek (1945), Simon (1955,1957) and Stigler (1961).
Nevertheless, information acquisition and processing costs have received scant
attention in the theory and empirical research on stock market efficiency, even though,
the subject of the theory is the market reaction to information.
The initial event studies considered only publicly available information which is
widely disseminated in the financial press, on the wire services, to analysts and to
other investors. Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) investigated stock splits and Ball
and Brown (1968) studied earnings. The cost to individual investors of acquiring
public domain informaon was assumed to be negligible. The information also was
assumed to be simple to use, with negligible processing Cost. TI there are competitive
returns to negligible information costs which expressed as a percentage of market
value, of the firm or of a typical share holding in the firm, then they will have a
negligible effect on expected returns and will be lost in the noise of exogenous price
variability.
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The estimated abnormal returns will be overstated, in research designs which simulate
trading strategies with substantial information acquisition and processing costs, the
direction of the bias is consistent with the anomalies evidence, but little more can be
said without knowing more about either theory or evidence about the magnitude of
information processing and acquisition costs and their effects on gross (pre-cost)
expected returns. Information costs determine gross expected returns with investor
heterogeneity, however, it does not seem so clear. Do lower information cost investors
earn infra-marginal returns?.
Another defmition of the theory is its mechanical characterization of markets as
machines driven by objective information engines. Investors beliefs play no role,
information is a homogenous commodity. Publicly-available information is not
processed in different ways by different investors and therefore it has identical
implications for all.
The early work of efficient markets model avoided such issues as heterogeneity of
investors. While resictive in its assumptions, the mechanical homogeneous
information model allowed powerful insights into price behaviour that had not hitherto
been feasible. Its early success was due in part to the wealth of research opportunities
afforded by the abundant information available for correlating with stock prices.
Nonetheless, Hayek (1945) analysed the role of markets when information is
decentralized i.e. legally held by individuals, and challenged the mechanistic efficiency
model as a way of characterizing a competitive stock market. This analysis was the
forerunner to a now burgeoning literature dealing with heterogeneity of investor
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information and beliefs. Many empirical studies have been done by many researchers
such as, Beaver's (l96) work on trading volume at earnings announcements, and
Grossman's and Stiglitz's (1976) work on noise-trading models. The incremental
contribution of these models to empirical work largely remains unseen.
The early work on stock market efficiency was carried out under the economic
tradition of assuming that competitive markets act as if they are costless to operate.
In response of this, Jensen (1978, p.96) offered an alternative definition of market
efficiency in terms of transaction costs as follows:
A market is efficient with respect to an information set if it is not
possible to make economic profits by trading on the basis of that
inforiTlation set." By economic profits, we mean the risk adjusted
returns net of all costs. (emphasis added)
A similar definition is implied when authors fall to reject efficiency in the presence
of significant post-announcement abnormal returns, on the grounds they are less than
transactions costs.
An attractive feature of this approach is that it explicitly introduces the economics of
the market trading mechanism. The approach also appears to offer a solution to how
large an anomaly one can tolerate before rejecting efficiency as an hypothesis.
Despite its attractive features, the transactions cost approach has several short-
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comings. First, it begs the central question of the magnitude of transactions costs that
the researcher will tolerate while still calling a market efficiency. To illustrate, observe
that in the limit, under this definitions, there could be no feasible inefficient market
in a world of infinite transactions costs because no trading rules could generate
positive after-cost profit. This seems absurd: surely we want to describe no market
with infinite transactions costs as efficient. Under this definition, the likelihood that
a given set of prices and events will lead to researchers describing the market as
efficient increases with the level of transactions costs. Institution and the logic of
competitive price theory suggest the opposite.
Second, transactions costs cannot predict the sign or the magnitude of average
abnormal returns calculated from transacted prices. Transactions costs can inhibit
trading and therefore, delay the response of prices to announcements, which can
generate short term abnormal returns, bounded by the magnitude of transactions costs,
which take the sign of the information in the announcement. However, conditional on
post announcement trade taking place, there can be no predicted price bias in an
efficient market. Transactions costs of x% then might allow price errors of ± x% to
remain, independent of the sign of the information, but they cannot explain a
systematic bias of that magnitude. Since most event studies and related efficiency tests
study abnormal return averages, transaction costs are not obviously relevant to
interpreting their results.
Third, describing efficiency in terms of transactions costs can produce as many
definitions as there are investors, because transactions costs vary across investors. At
one extreme, brokers or specialists typically face small costs. At the other extreme,
one can imagine many classes of people who face large transactions costs whose
transactions costs are to be used in judging the market to be efficient. A possible
solution might be to state efficiency in terms of the lowest cost trader. The reasoning
here is that in equilibrium all investors must satisfy their own marginal conditions, and
then, lower cost traders will continue trading on smaller price errors, after higher cost
traders have ceased trading, so only price errors in the order of the lowest transactions
costs should remain. But this approach can degenerate into ignoring transactions costs
entirely. First, some specialists and institutional investors face transactions costs that
are very low, relative to statistically detectable effects on abnormal returns, perhaps
in the order of one tenth of one percent. Second, investors transact for reasons other
than exploiting price errors, e.g.individuals investing/disinvesting for future/present
consumption, or institutions doing so on their behalf. For such investors, the marginal
cost of also incorporating information into their transaction decisions can be zero or
negligible. Hence, describing efficiency in terms of the global-minimum cost of
transacting does not give a clear alternative to ignoring costs at the outset.
All factors considered, the case appears weak for the looser definition of efficiency,
in which transactions costs play a role. Nonetheless, the accurate role of transactions
costs in the theory of market efficiency remains an unsettled issue.
A closely related, but distinguishable, issue is the effect of market rnicrostructure,
which is the market mechanism for determining transactions prices on the relevance
to researchers of recorded prices. Like transactions costs, trading-mechanism effects
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present the researcher with a dilemma. Trading mechanisms certainly are not costlessly
to operate, so transacted prices are unlikely to be completely independent of
institutional arrangements. This seems particularly likely for small capitalization and
low price stocks, and low turn over stocks and stock exchanges. In contrast with
transactions costs, it seems unreasonable to interpret price behaviour induced by the
trading mechanism as indicating market inefficiency, because recorded prices are not
those at which the simulated trading strategies could have been executed at the close
of trading. Keim's (1989) trading mechanism explanation for the "turn of the year"
effect is consistent with this view. Yet taking this view to its limit leads to seemingly-
unreasonable conclusions here also, such as efficiency being an increasing function of
bid-ask spreads, other things remaining equal. The precise role of trading
mechanism/market microstructure effects in the theory of market efficiency once again
is not apparent.
It is difficult to find any evidence that the term efficiency was carefully selected, by
researchers, from among alternatives at the outset. It seems to have "just caught on".
The term is curiously appropriate, for reasons discussed below.
First, when the term arose it offered a convenient juxtaposition with the then
commonly-held view [see, Roberts (1959, quoted above)] that share price behaviour
was neither systematic nor capable of orderly economic description (certainly not
using words like rational). The terms efficiency suggested the opposite.
Second, the term dovetailed nicely with its traditional use in Statistics, connoting the
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property of minimum-variance. If prices adjust instantaneously to all public
information, then at any point in time there will be no future price reaction to it. Thus,
of all feasible prices, those established in such a market offer the minimum-variance
distribution of future returns, conditional on public information. In contrast, an
inefficient market at any point in time need not have completed its price reaction to
public information (it might have over or under reacted) and hence there would be a
component of future price variation that is a response to old information. Present
prices then would not be minimum-variance, or efficient, with respect to public
information.
Third, the term suggested a linkage with the broader economic concept of efficiency.
Fama (1970, p.33) introduced his influential literature review by drawing this link.
For example, if firms optimal investment (and reinvestment) decisions depend on the
prices at which security claims to their existing investments sell, then market errors
in pricing securities could lead to sub-optimal resource allocation decisions. While
informational efficiency is not sufficient for allocative efficiency, the linkage provided
intuitive appeal.
Finally, in adopting the term efficient, as an alternative to Samuelson's (1965) earlier
use of the generic term competitive market, FFRJ gave empirical researchers
temporary respite from the full baggage of the theory of competitive markets.
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3.5. CONCLUSION
The idea germinated in Roberts (1959) and Fama (1965), that the actions of competing
maximizing investors explain the random walks observed in stock prices, quickly giew
into the theory of efficient markets. The theory characterizes a market as being in
competitive equilibrium with respect to some set of information. Public-domain
information occupied a central role, primarily because it simplified the theory's
predictions about expected returns from using information (zero, consistent with public
information's private Cost) and because it fit best with the early theory's assumption
of objective information. Thus, the concept of efficiency can be seen as a restrictive
model of competitive price behaviour, particularly adapted to researching the flow of
public information to be market, with attendant strengths and weaknesses. Various
versions of the model formulate the competitive equilibrium in terms of properties of
either: (1) prices; (2) prices and portfolios; (3) traded prices, allowing for market
microstructure effects; or (4) trading rule profitability, after deducting trading costs.
Like au theories, market efficiency is an attempt to abstract and describe salient
features of reality, so it inevitably characterizes securities markets in an imperfect
fashion. In spite of its restrictive assumptions concerning processing costs and the
nature of investors' beliefs, the work on the theory of efficient markets successfully
opened stock markets to economic thought. This notion of efficiency will be the
subject of investigation in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.
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IV. cONvENTI(:)NAL TESTS (:)F WEAK FORM EFFICIENCY:
THE RANDOM WALK TESTS OF ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE
4.1. INTRODuCTI(:)N
The past fifteen years have witnessed spectacular growth in both the size and relative
importance of emerging equity markets in developing counties. High economic
growth, the pursuit of liberalisation policies within these countries and trends towards
financial markets globalisation provided the environment in which equity markets
could thrive. In addition, Western equity fund managers were attracted to these
markets by the potentially high rates of returns offered and the desire to pursue
international diversification. As these capital markets have developed considerable
attention has been given to the question of whether they function efficiently. The issue
of efficiency is of great significance to both foreign investors and the allocation of
scarce resources within these countries. The question of whether these markets price
securities efficiently is ultimately an empirical issue and it is this which has attracted
most attention in the literature.
The issue of efficiency in emerging markets has been widely investigated in recent
years. Research has focused on either the conventional form of efficiency (Fan-ia,
1970) or on examining the question of whether anomalies exist. Overall results are
mixed. For example, Barnes (1986) reports the Kuala Lumpur stock market to be
inefficient, Butler and Malaikab (1992) find evidence of inefficiency in the Saudi
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Arabian stock market, but not in the Kuwaid market and Panas (1990) concluded that
market efficiency could not be rejected for Greece.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, tests of efficient market hypothesis have
become synonymous with tests of the random walk hypothesis. The random walk
hypothesis is a statement that price changes are in some way random and so prices
wander ('walk') in an entirely unpredictable way. Consequently, forecasts based on
today's price cannot be improved by also ensuring the information in previous prices.
There are many ways to phrase the random walk hypothesis in statistical terms. A
number of definitions have been published. In every case the best forecast of
tomorrow's price requires today's price but not previous prices. Bachelier (1900) in
a most remarkable thesis implied that price changes have independent and normal
disthbutions. Fama (1965) removed the assumption of normal distributions. The
hypothesis is then that price changes are independent and have identical distributions.
Granger and Morgenstern (1970, pp.71-3) do not require the price changes to be
identically distributed. The random walk hypothesis is defined by constant expected
price changes and zero correlation between the price changes for any pair of different
days.
This chapter using data from the ISE seeks to examine the issue of efficiency adopting
the conventional tests used in previous literature. This is intended to act as a
benchmark for the next chapter and to enable comparisons with other studies. The
chapter proceeds as follows: Section (4.2) describes the methodology and tests used
in the chapter. This is followed by section (4.3> where the data used is explained and
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the empirical results are presented. The main findings of the chapter are summarized
in section (4.4).
4.2. METHC)D(:)L0GY
Empirical tests of the random walk hypothesis have been published for nearly all the
world's financial markets. The earlier studies include important investigations by
Working (1934), Kendall (1953), and Fama (1965). Working showed that several
series of commodity futures prices stongly resembled an artificial series obtained by
simulating a random walk. Kendall, after analysing wheat prices, cotton prices and
share indices, concluded that investors ought to assume that prices followed random
walks. Fama studied the prices of all 30 stocks in the Dow Jones Indusial Average
index in considerable detail. His results show that US stock prices either follow
random walks or something very similar.
Fama's paper rightly had a significant impact on academic research. After (1965),
many researchers assumed that prices followed random walks and then sought answers
to other questions about optimal investment decisions. Tests of the random walk
hypothesis continued to be done with conclusions that tended to agree with Fama's.
According to Fama (1965) the random walk hypothesis involves two separate
hypotheses:
I.	 Successive price returns are independent; and
2.	 The returns series conform to some specified type of probability
distribution
Several random walk test statistics have been used in previous studies to test the first
part of the above mentioned hypothesis. The most popular techniques used are the
following:
1. Autocorielation tests
2. Spectral Analysis Tests
3. Runs tests
With respect to the second part of the random walk hypothesis traditionally
researchers have tested the following hypotheses:
H0 :	 The returns are characterized by the normal distribution
H 1 : The returns are not generated from a normal distribution
These hypotheses are examined through basic tests of normality. These tests of
normality are based on the sample skewness and sample kurtosis.
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4.2.1. AuToc(:)RRELATI0N c(:)EFFIcIENT TESTS
The correlation between two random variables obtained from stationary process is
called the autocorrelation. The random walk hypothesis implies zero autocorrelation
among returns. The autocorrelation coefficient (rk) gives a measure of the relationship
between the value of a random variable in time t and its value (k) periods earlier. The
population autocorrelation coefficient (Rk) is estimated using the sample
serial correlation coefficient (ri).
For the variable (U), (=log P1^ 1 - log F1), the serial correlation coefficient for lag (k)
is the correlation between pairs of terms (k) units apart, viz
Cov- (U, Utk)
.rk =
	
	 (4.1)
o ( U ) a(U1)
which can be approximated by
- Cov ( Ut , CTtk)	 (4.2)
- ________
where (Uk) is a log price relative,
k=l,2,...,(n-1)	 or in more analytical terms.
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1	 1 'ç-n-k	 1
n-k	 UJ	 Ub+k]
.rk =
1n-k (U--
	
U) 2lEnk (Ucfk —_-2— E 	 j+k)2]n
(4.3)
In practice and also for theoretical convenience it makes sense for simplicity to
modify these definitions to some extent. Instead of measuring the first (n-k)U's about
their mean, we may measure about the mean of the whole set of observations; and
similarly for the values at the end. Hence, writing
(O
for
'c_z2
Z_l].	
'
we might put as follows (Kendall and Stuart, 1976).
flçn-k
Z.j1 ( Ut—U) (Ut+k—U)	 (4.4)
rk=
Hegarman and Richmond (1973) suggested an approach as the following estimate of
the slope coefficient in the regression model for large samples,
(4.5)
7
In this model, () is the effect of the return from (t-k-l) to (t-k) on the return from
(t-k) to (t-k+1). (ct) is the average continuously compounded monthly return on the
security if @) is zero, which is implied by serial independence. If the disibution of
(U1) has finite variance, then for large samples, the standard error of (rk) may be
computed as
(4.6)
(Fama (1965), Cooper (1982), Wong and Kwong (1984)). We will test whether (rk)
is significantly different from zero, by comparing (rk) with the statistic J2a1. If
I rkI^2 1 0 1, then (rk) is not significantly different from zero. If (r k)>2JY1, then it iS
significantly different from zero, which means that there exists a linear dependence
among (U1), (U1.J.
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4.2.2. SPECTRAL ANALYSIS TESTS
Spectral methods are applied to test for seasonal and for cyclical patterns in stock
market price series. Spectral analysis provides a characterisation of the autocorrelation
function in terms of its Fourier transform, the spectral density function. A stochastic
process may adequately be described by the mean, variance, and autocorrelation
function in the time domain, and in the frequency domain by the Fourier transform of
the autocorrelation function, the power spectrum (Sharma and Kennedy, 1977).
Spectral analysis decomposes a time series into a number of components, each
associated with a frequency or period. The frequency of variation is the reciprocal of
the period. Frequency indicates the number of cycles per unit of time, and the period
describes the length of the time required for one complete cycle.
This Section examines the transformation of changes in the log of share prices which
defines the correspondence in the log of share prices which defines the correspondence
between the time domain and the frequency domain. This allows to pinpoint any
cyclical or seasonal patterns and to measure their relative importance in a way which
the simple statistical methods of time series analysis cannot.
This spectral decomposition of a time series yields a spectral density function and
measures the relative importance of each of the frequency bands in terms of its
contribution to the overall variance of the time series. Essentially, spectral analysis is
an examination of the variance of a time series with respect to frequency components
(Leuthold, 1972).
It should be recognised that spectral methods are an alternative to studying
autocorrelations. Granger and Newbold (1977) describe the spectral theory relevant to
economic studies. Praetz (1979) discuss practical problems encountered when testing
returns for a flat spectral density. Spectral methods are mainly used to comprise
autocorrelation results (Taylor, l96).
Spectral analysis can be noted as two special types of spectra. If the spectrum is flat,
indicating that every component is present to an equal amount, the series is merely
a sequence of uncorrelated readings, a so-called 'purely random or white noise series'.
That means, if the random walk model is in fact true, then:
= 1ogP+1 - 1ogP,	 (4.7)
where (Pt) is the closing price series in time (t), the model suggested that (X.) has
mean zero and is uncorrelated with (X^k), all k+O. The (X,) series is called white
noise. If the spectrum has a clear peak at some frequency, this results in a 'cycle'
appearing in the series. In practice, estimated spectra are rarely of either of these
shapes, rather being very high at zero and very low frequencies (long periods) and
consistently failing in value as frequency increases, expect for possible peaks at the
seasonal frequencies ('typical spectral shape').
Spectral analysis has been used in testing necessary conditions for market efficiency,
in the context of commodity markets, future markets, securities markets, money
markets, and foreign exchange market. The subject is to decide if the estimated
spectrum departs from a population spectrum which is a constant independent of
frequency or price always follow a random waLk.
Prior studies on share prices have been carried out by Granger and Mongenstern
(1963, 1970), Praetz (1973, 1979), Cooper (1982), arid Hevas (1984). Bond prices
have been studied by Granger and Rees (1968). Also Larson (1964), Roll (1972),
Leuthold (1972), Dusak (1973), and Cargifl and Rauser (1975) have studied on the
commodity or future prices. The main references on applied spectral analysis in social
science are those by Harvey (1975), and Praetz (1979). The Fourier transformation
which expresses f(w) in terms of the ;(k) and w, ie.,
=-Y._r(k)exp(-iwk),	 (4.8)
where (w) is frequency measured in radians per unit time, f(w) is a continuous
function of (w) called the theorical power spectrum and (i) is the square root of (-1),
and ;(k) is the covariance between (X,) and QC).
Since we are dealing with a real process, the autocovariance function will be
symmetric about (lc=0), and likewise the power speciim will be symmetric about
(w0). Expression (1) can, thus be expressed as
f(w) = j—(az +2E.j'r(k)cos wk]	 0^w^it (4.9)
Estimation of the spectrum corresponding to a theorical f(w) often uses a finite set of
values, denoted (wi), j=O,l,...,m, as it is imposable to estimate overall values of (w),
(O^w^ir). A very commonly used set of values is an equation spaced set (Praetz 1979)
defined by (w = jit/m). For the size of (m), conventional wisdom suggests (mn/5)
to (n/6), where (n) data points are available. Therefore spectral estimates are of the
form,
f(w) = —?--Cp..C(0) + 2E,.1 k c(k) COSWjk]	 (4.10)2it
where,
En-kC(k)=_..1(x-5 (X+k-x)	 (4.11)
(n—k)
ie. : C(k) is the autocovariance coefficient of order (k).
a set of weighting coefficients.
m : an arbitrary integer to be chosen by the user representing the maximum lag.
w : a Set of real numbers with IwI^ir
(j=O, I ,2,...,rn).
If an appropriate set of weights is not used, the estimates f(w) are not consistent
estimates of f(w). Therefore weights Pk are used for consistent estimates of f(w).
There are several weights functions used, and the commonly used set of windows are
the 2nd Tukey-Hanning weights and the 2nd Parzen weights (Jenkins 1961).
1. The 1st Bartlett weights 	 = 1.
2. The 2nd Bartlett weights j.i = 1-k/rn.
3. The 1st Tukey-Hanning weights
= 1-2a+2a cosit k/rn
	
(a=0.23 suggested)
4. The 2nd Tukey-Hanning weighs
p =1/2 (1 + cos irk/rn),	 IkI<m
JkJ^m
5. The 1st Parzen weights pk = 1-k2 / m2
6. The 2nd Parzen weights
= 1-6k2 (1-Jkl/mn)/m2	 0^ 1k J^m/2
= 2 (1-k/rn)	 rn/2^IkI<m
=0
	
JkJ^m
7. Daniell Pk = Sin kh/kh	 (k=O,l,...,n)
After having obtained the spectral estimates, the next step is to examine whether or
not they represent a significant deviation from a white noise time series. It has been
shown that for a sequence of uncorrelated normal variances, the periodogram is
proportional to a Chi-square variate with two degrees of freedom, Praetz (1979).
Spectral estimates will be asymptotically Chi-squared with equivalent degrees of
freedom (EDF) a function of the weights (Jk) used. More specifically, for the 2nd
Tukey-Hanning weight and for the 2nd Parzen weight, they are,
DF24-	 (4.12)
for the 2nd Tukey-Hanning weights
E.DF=3	 (4.13)
for the 2nd Parzen weights.
The significance of the spectral ordinates, therefore, can be estimated by getting
confidence interval at a level (a) of significance. The confidence intervals used are
of the form (Howrey (1968), Praetz (1979), Gottman (1981), Hevas (1984)).
1-a = P(f(w)v1 ^ f(w) ^ f(w)V21	 (4.14)
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or
EDF.fW
^	 (4.15)
where
EDF,l-.!	 (4.16)2
1.	 EDF
is the lower limit, and
EDF,.!	 (4.17)2
2	 EDF
is the upper limit.
As the flat spectrum can be simplified to (f(w) = 02/2it) for all (w) by the equation
(4.9), actual spectral estimates are compared whether they deviate from the flat
spectrum. In this case, (02) can be replaced by the sample variances (Praetz, 1979).
Thus, the actual test is to consider the number of estimates that lie outside the
confidence interval and compare them with the expected number of observations to
lie Out of the confidence intervals. Praetz (1979) has shown that for a 95% spectral
confidence limits (ctO.05), the expected value is (s), the number of estimated spectral
ordinates, is given by
E(s) = O.05(m+1)	 (4.18)
The only problem with this approach is to judge whether the difference, s-E(s),
presents a serious deviation from a white noise or not. Any answer on this relays
explicitly on the researcher's personal judgment (Hevas, 1984).
The hypothesis under this test is as follows:
H0 :	 The spectral density is constant.
H 1 :	 The spectral density is not constant.
4.2.3. RUNS TESTS
A 'Run' is defined as a sequence of price changes of the same sign. There are three
different kinds of price change which are positive (+), negative (-) and zero (0). As
a result, there are three kind of runs. The number of runs over any given period is the
number of sign changes plus one. The larger is the positive serial dependence in price
changes, the smaller will be the expected number of runs. The expected number of
runs (m) is compared with the actual number of runs (R) and the standardised
normalised variable (k) tests the statistical significance of (R-m):
R -7
_____	
(4.19)
am
m = N(N+1)-1n12	 (4.20)
N
rn : the expected number of runs in the series,
N : the total number of price changes or differences (Ut),
n, : the number of price changes of each sort ((i1) for positive changes, (i=2) for
negative changes, (1=3) for no changes).
The standard error of (m) is
_______n13-N3
	 (4.21)11
=	 N2(N-1)
The computation of (m) is based on two assumptions: that the sample proportions of
positive, negative and zero price changes are good estimates of the population
proportions and that successive price changes are independent (Wong and Kwong,
1984).
For large (N), the sampling disibution of (m) is approximately normal. Because the
disthbution of (k) is N(O,l), then the critical value of (k) at the 5% level of
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significance is ± 11.961. Wherever k^ 1.96 I, then the sign movement in the same
direction. In such cases, the random walk hypothesis is rejected, otherwise it is
accepted.
The runs tests are used to test the following hypothesis:
H0 :	 The successive price returns of a company's shares on the ISE are
random.
H 1 :	 The successive price returns of a company's shares on the ISE are not
random.
The hypotheses are designed to test randomness of successive price returns.
4.2.4. DISTRIBUTION OF SHARE PRICES
Considerable interest has been generated in the nature of the disiribution of returns of
equity shares, especially, because of the effect it may have on tests of efficiency. The
aim is to determine whether successive rates of return for the Istanbul Stock Exchange
are characterised by a Normal disibution. An important atibute of normal
disibution is that a known proportion of observations fall within a given number of
standard deviations from the mean. This chapter investigates the following question:
Are returns on shares on the ISE characterised by the normal distribution? To answer
this question the following hypotheses are tested:
Hi) :	 The returns on shares on the ISE are characterised by the normal
distribution.
H 1 :	 The returns on shares on the ISE are not characterised by the normal
distribution.
These hypotheses are tested using the following tests:
Skewness Coefficients
Skewness statistics are used to assess the symmetry of distributions. The skewness
coefficient is defined by the following equation:
b = ___	 (4.22)
where
= ?. y 1 x ,	 (4.23)
n
and
sz =
	
	 I	 (4.24)
n-i
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If the disibution of a return series is symrneic about its mean, as in the case of
normal disibution then the skewness coefficient should be close to zero.
Kurtosis
The sample kurtosis is defined as follows:
k =	 '1Z1..1(xt_)4/s4.	 (4.25)
Normal distributions have kurtosis equal to (3). High values of (k) are caused by more
observations several standard deviations away from the mean than predicted by normal
distributions.
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4.3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.3.1. DATA
In this chapter we use data on all companies waded on the ISE from 1988 to 1993.
The sample for individual companies is subdivided into 5 groups. The first group
includes all companies listed on the ISE during 1988 and uading between 1988-1993.
This group Consist of 48 companies; the second group includes companies wading
between 1989-1993 and consists of 4 companies; the third group includes all
companies listed in 1990 and were tading until 1993. This group consists of 42
companies; the forth group of companies used in this investigation consists of 21
companies were listed on the ISE during 1991 and were uading until 1993; the final
group includes all companies listed during 1992 and were Irading until 1993. The
total number of companies in this group is 13. The rationale for this division of the
companies is to investigate whether regulatory and other institutional changes had an
impact on the efficient pricing of these securities and whether the length of trading
impacts on the pricing of securities. In other words, we try to investigate if there is
a learning curve for the market and investors in pricing risky assets. AU of the
investigations are carried out using daily closing prices, supplied by the ISE.
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4.3.2. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A.	 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table (4. IA) provides the mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis coefficients
for the returns series for all sub-samples under investigation. For almost all companies
the coefficients of skewness and kurtosis suggest significant departures from normality
for the returns series. However, further investigation suggested that most departures
from normality were due to a few outliers.
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Table 4.1
SAMPLE PERIOD I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STOCK RETURNS
No	 Mean	 Std. dcv	 Skewness	 Kurtosis -3
	
-0.5E-3	 0.057	 -8.254	 152.731
2	 -0.7E-3	 0.054	 -2.366	 24.824
3	 0.5E-3	 0.058	 -6.831	 88.867
4	 -O.2E-3	 0.073	 -13.843	 306.477
5	 0.2E-3	 0.054	 -5.004	 63.074
6	 0.1E-3	 0.055	 -5.310	 67.670
7	 0.1E-3	 0.059	 -5.538	 73.792
8	 0.1E-3	 0.056	 4.128*	 49.502*
9	 -0.2E-3	 0.046	 -0.141	 0.787
10	 -0.6E-3	 0.069	 -9.768	 169.954
11	 0.6E-3	 0.054	 -4.497	 64.503
12	 0.002	 0.073	 _15.797*	 389.931
13	 -0.3E-3	 0.064	 -5.274	 76.511*
14	 0.2E-3	 0.073	 -15.582	 403.378
15	 0.001	 0.054	 -4.046	 58.102
16	
-0.5E-3	 0.062	 -2.848	 37•379*
17	 0.003	 0.058	 -2.747	 28.355
18	 0.6E-3	 0.050	 -S.290	 81.124
19	 0.8E-3	 0.057	 -6.813	 110.452
20	 0.001	 0.052	 4.223*	 48.558
21	
-0.001	 0.049	 -2.431	 20.919
22	 -0.7E-3	 0.059	 -7.155	 151.166
23	 0.1E-3	 0.063	 -4.024	 50.724
24	 0.002	 0.048	 -1.272	 10.378
25	 0.001	 0.0062	 -8.162	 147.781
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TABLE 4.1
Sample period I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STOCK RETURNS
No	 Mean	 Std. dev	 Skewness	 Kurtosis -3
26	 -0.3E-3	 0.059	 -2.998	 39.496
27	 0.6E-3	 0.068	 -10.077	 190.497
28	 0.001	 0.055	 -2.994	 43.475
29	 -0.002	 0.058	 -4.100	 62.818
30	 0.7E-3	 0.061	 -12.713	 298.716
31	 -0.002	 0.061	 -6.710	 129.139
32	 -0.001	 0.063	 -5.807	 72.513
33	 0.2E-3	 0.055	 -3.627	 46.353
34	 -0.2E-3	 0.062	 6.420*	 86.571
35	 0.7E-4	 0.071	 -15.611	 429.890
36	 0.001	 0.066	 12.979*	 321.514
37	 -0.3E-3	 0.055	 3.356*	 37.169
38	 -0.003	 0.077	 -6.265	 82.203
39	 -0.002	 0.066	 7.309*	 105.116*
40	 0.002	 0.058	 -0.470	 2.640
41	 -0.002	 0.068	 -1.490	 20.884
42	 -0.001	 0.058	 -3.402	 38445
43	 0.002	 0.051	 -1.468	 14.824
44	 0.4E-3	 0.052	 3.656*	 39.907
45	 0.86 1	 0.057	 -3.784	 44.524*
46	 0.5E-4	 0.060	 -6.206	 118.259*
47	 -0.4E-3	 0.061	 -5.953	 77.917*
48	 7.918	 0.973	 0.310	 -1.369
Nines: denotes statistically signifleant at the 5% level.'
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TABLE 4.1
Sample period II
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STOCK RETURNS
No	 Mean	 Std. dcv	 Skewness	 Kurtosis -3
1	 0.002	 0.075	 -9.549	 154.798
2	 0.002	 0.055	 -1.514	 13.596
3	 0.9E-3	 0.051	 -0.375	 2.221
4	 0.002	 0.052	 -1.722	 15.532
TABLE 4.1
Sample period UI
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STOCK RETURNS
	
No	 Mean	 Std. dcv	 Skewness	 Kurtosis -3
1	 0.9E-3	 0.047	 -0.804	 7.467
	
2	 -0.9E-3	 0.045	 -2.578	 26.888
	
3	 0.00 1	 0.048	 -0.805	 7.450
	
4	 0.9E-3	 0.053	 -2.692	 36.924
	
5	 -0.6E-3	 0.066	 -7.351	 97.830
	
6	 -0.5E-3	 0.07 1	 -4.993	 69.456
	
7	 -0.001	 0.047	 -2.402	 18.086
	
-0.001	 0.074	 -10.225	 185.935
	
9	 -0.004	 0.067	 -4.746	 65.216
	
10	 -0.001	 0.065	 -8.368	 127.000*
	
11	 0.2E-3	 0.070	
7975*	 143.600
	
12	 0.9E-4	 0.067	 -7.661	 108.248
	
13	 -0.9E-3	 0.058	 -6.263	 72.760
	
14	 -O.9E-3	 0.068	 -6.084	 83.754
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TABLE 4.1
Sample period III
	 -
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STOCK RETURNS
No	 Mean	 Std. dcv	 Skewness	 Kurtosis -3
15	 -0.3E-3	 0.056	 -2.687'	 180.713'
16	 0.001	 0.049	 -0.680	 4.940
17	 -0.003	 0.074	 -5.174'	 56.075'
18	 -0.1E-3	 0.058	 -3.556'	 42.191'
19	 0.003	 0.043	 -0.047	 1.596'
20	 -0.002	 0.078	 -11.586'	 229.174'
21	 -0.9E-3	 0.094	 -15.811'	 340.816'
22	 -0.00 1
	
0.062	 -3.637'	 40.427'
23	 0.3E-3	 0.060	 -4.327'	 46.497'
24	
-0.001	 0.049	 -0.028	 1.515'
25	 -0.001	 0.054	 -1.608'	 16.915'
26	 -0.3E-3	 0.057	 -0.176	 .	 0.869'
27	
-0.002	 0.067	 -3.385'	 37.380'
28	 -0.002	 0.053	 -2.097'	 37.380'
29	
-0.001	 0.051	 -0.981	 15.884'
30	 0.001	 0.051	 0.124	 10.417'
31	 0.6E-3	 0.058	 -0.138	 0.427'
32	 -0.7E-3	 0.070	 -5.571'	 0.336'
33	 -0.5E-3	 0.049	 -1.934'	 71.590'
34	 -0.004	 0.093	 -14.682'	 14.758'
35	 -0.002	 0.068	 -2.573'	 326.933
36	 -0.002	 0.071	 -10.028'	 27.354'
37	 0.2E-3	 0.057	 -1.495'	 194.019'
38	 0.001	 0.054	 -3.662'	 13.866'
39	 -0.IE-3	 0.049	 -2.839'	 26.492'
40	 -0.001	 0.070	 -6.072'	 95.66 1'
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TABLE 4.1
Sample period III
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STOCK RETURNS
No	 Mean	 Std. dev	 Skewness	 Kurtosis -3
41	 -0.002	 0.053	 -2.083	 25.763
42	 0.E-3	 0.049	 -0.795	 7.582
TABLE 4.1
Sample period IV
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STOCK RETURNS
	
No	 Mean	 Std. dev	 Skewness	 Kurtosis -3
	
1	 -0.005	 0.157	 -21.805	 536.828
	
2	 -0.004	 0.148	 -18.185	 454.077
	3	 -0.001	 0.074	 -8.561
	
4	 0.IE-3	 0.058	 -2.808	 31.522
	
5	 0.00 1	 0.069	 -6.203	 82.552
	
6	 -0.001	 0.067	 -4410	 41.687
	
7	 0.004	 0.055	 -8.449	 153.581
	
8	 -0.003	 0.124	 -17.311	
367.020
	
9	 0.003	 0.050	 -1.616	
16.779
	
10	 0.003	 0.035	 0.097	
3.436
	
11	 -0.003	 0.065	 -5.185	
61.882
	
12	 0.002	 0.051	 -0.068	 0.811
	
13	 -0.8E-3	 0.045	 -3.742	
40.248*
	
14	 0.002	 0.062	 -5.320	 71.877
	
15	 0.003	 0.057	 -1.566	 13.471
	
16	 -0.6E-4	 0.065	 -6.425	 77.916
9
TABLE 4.1
Sample period IV
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STOCK RETURNS
No	 Mean	 Std. dev	 Skewness	 Kurtosis -3
17	 0.8E-3	 0.05 1	 0.009	 0.654*
18	 -0.001	 0.065	 -5.884'	 75.911*
19	 -0.002	 0.057	 -2.704'	 26.122*
20	 0.004	 0.044	 0.282	 0.789*
21	 -0.001	 0.062	 -1.044'	 16.012*
TABLE 4.1
Sample period V
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STOCK RETURNS
No	 Mean	 Stcl. dev	 Skewness	 Kurtosis -3
1	 -0.002	 0.058	 -2.894'	 27.910*
2	 0.4E-3	 0.042	 0.084	 0.8 10'
3	 0.010.	 0.033	 1.520*	 4.025*
4	 0.002	 0.050	 -3.101 *	 28.818*
5	 0.002	 0.048	 0.072	 0.357'
6	 0.004	 0.059	 -6.026'	 73.193*
7	 0.003	 0.048	 -3.522'	 39.598'
8	 -0.001	 0.073	 -5.198'	 48.955'
9	 0.9E-3	 0.040	 -0.323	 2.478
10	 0.004	 0.075	 4121'	
37533*
11	 0.7E-3	 0.069	 -9.490'	 127.627'
12	 0.002	 0.041	 -2.043'	 27.210'
13	 0.006	 0.092	 -7.371'	 81.884'
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B. AUTOCORRELATION COEFFICIENT TESTS
Table (4.2) provides estimates of the autocorrelation coefficients for individual stock
log prices for periods 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. All autocorrelation coefficients are statistically
significant at the 5% level of significance, suggesting that the series are not stationary.
This implies that the mean values of the series change frequently as time progresses.
This makes statistical analysis very difficult.
TABLE 4.2
Sample period I
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Log Prices
	
No	 No obs	 Lag I	 Lag 2	 Lag 3	 Lag 4	 Lag 5
1	 1372	 0.995'	 0.990'	 0.985'	 0.980'	 0.975*
	
2	 1372	 0.997'	 0.994*	 0.991'	 0.988*	 0.985*
	3	 1501	 0.995'	 0.990'	 0.985'	 0.980*	 0.975*
	
4	 1501	 0.996'	 0.992'	 0.987'	 0.983*	 0.979*
	
5	 1501	 0.994'	 0.988*	 0.982*	 0.976*	 0.969*
	
6	 1501	 0.9948	 0.987'	 0.979'	 0.972*	 0.964'
	
7	 1501	 0.994'	 0.987'	 0.981'	 0.974'	 0.967*
	
8	 1501	 0.992'	 0.984'	 0.977'	 0.970'	 0.963'
	
9	 1372	 0.991'	 0.981*	 0.971'	 0.960*	 0.950'
	
10	 1501	 0.998'	 0.996'	 0994'	 0.991'	 0.989'
	
11	 1501	 0.994'	 0.986'	 0.980'	 0.974'	 0.967'
	
12	 1501	 0.997'	 0.994'	 0.991'	 0.988'	 0.985'
	
13	 1372	 0.995'	 0.990'	 0.985'	 0.980'	 0.975'
	
14	 1501	 0.996'	 0.992'	 0.988'	 0.984'	 0.980'
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1TABLE 4.2
Sample period I
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Log Prices
No	 No obs Lag 1	 Lag 2	 Lag 3	 Lag 4	 Lag 5
15	 1292	 0.992'	 0.983'	 0.975*	 0.967*	 0.960*
16	 754	 0.994*	 0.989'	 0.983*	 0.978'	 0.972'
17	 965	 0.985'	 0.968'	 0.952'	 0.935'	 0.917'
18	 1501	 0.996'	 0.991'	 0.987'	 0.982'	 0.978'
19	 1501	 0.997'	 0.993'	 0.990'	 0.986'	 0.982'
20	 1501	 0.998'	 0.996'	 0.993'	 0.991'	 0.989'
21	 1372	 0.994'	 0.987'	 0.981'	 0.975'	 0.969'
22	 1372	 0.998'	 0.995'	 0.992'	 0.990'	 0.987'
23	 1372	 0.991'	 0.981'	 0.971'	 0.960'	 0.949'
24	 1501	 0.996'	 0.992'	 0.989'	 0.985'	 0.981'
25	 1375	 0.995'	 0.989'	 0.983'	 0.977'	 0.97 1'
26	 1372	 0.994'	 0.987'	 0.980'	 0.974'	 0.967'
27	 1501	 0.998'	 0.996'	 0.994'	 0.993'	 0.990'
28	 1372	 0.995'	 0.990'	 0.985'	 0.980'	 0.975'
29	 1316	 0.997'	 0.993'	 0.989'	 0.985'	 0.981'
30	 1501	 0.997'	 0.995'	 0.992'	 0.989'	 0.987'
31	 1372	 0.996'	 0.991'	 0.987'	 0.983'	 0.978'
32	 1372	 0.997'	 0.993'	 0.989'	 0.986'	 0.982'
33	 1501	 0.994'	 0.988'	 0.982'	 0.976'	 0.970'
34	 1372	 0.992'	 0.983'	 0.974'	 0.966'	 0.958'
35	 1372	 0.996'	 0.993'	 0.989'	 0.985'	 0.980'
36	 1501	 0.997'	 0.994'	 0.990'	 0.987'	 0.984'
37	 1372	 0.997'	 0.995'	 0.992'	 0.990'	 0.987'
38	 1372	 0.997'	 0.994'	 0.991'	 0.987'	 0.984'
39	 1372	 0.996'	 0.992'	 0.989'	 0.985'	 0.982'
40	 1371	 0.987'	 0.973'	 0.958'	 0.944'	 0.930'
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TABLE 4.2
Sample period I
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Log Prices
No	 No obs Lag 1
	
Lag 2
	 Lag 3
	 Lag 4	 Lag 5
41	 1372	 0.995'	 0.990'	 0.984*	 0.979*	 0.974*
42	 1368	 0.997'	 0.994'	 0.991'	 0.988'	 0.985*
43	 1501	 0.998'	 0.995'	 0.993'	 0.991'	 0.988'
44	 1501	 0.996'	 0.990'	 0.986'	 0.980'	 0.975'
45	 1501	 0.995'	 0.990'	 0.986'	 0.981'	 0.975'
46	 1372	 0.998'	 0.996'	 0.994'	 0.991'	 0.989'
47	 1051	 0.995'	 0.989'	 0.983'	 0.977'	 0.972'
48	 1051	 0.997'	 0.993'	 0.989'	 0.985'	 0.981'
TABLE 4.2
Sample period II
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Log Prices
No	 No Obs Lag 1
	
Lag 2
	 Lag 3
	 Lag 4	 Lag 5
1	 1114	 0.994'	 0.987'	 0.980'	 0.972'	 0.964'
2	 985	 0.987'	 0.973'	 0.958'	 0.943'	 0.927'
3	 980	 0.996'	 0.992'	 0.987'	 0.983'	 0.978'
4	 1114	 0.997'	 0.993'	 0.989'	 0.986'	 0.982'
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TABLE 4.2
Sample period In
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Log Prices
	
No	 No Obs Lag 1	 Lag 2	 Lag 3	 Lag 4	 Lag 5
I	 883	 0.993'	 0.986'	 0.979*	 0.973*	 0.967'
	
2	 726	 0.994'	 0.989'	 0.984'	 0.979'	 0.974'
	
3	 877	 0.992'	 0.985'	 0.978'	 0.972'	 0.965'
	4	 851	 0.984*	 0.967'	 0.949'	 0.931*	 0.912*
	
5	 880	 0.993*	 0.986'	 0.980*	 0.973*	 0.967*
	
6	 754	 0.982*	 0.963*	 0.943'	 0.922*	 0.902*
	
7	 737	 0.997*	 0.993*	 0.990*	 0.987*	 0.983'
	
8	 863	 0.996'	 0.992'	 0.988*	 0.984*	 0.98 1*
	
9	 754	 0.992'	 0.985'	 0.978*	 0.97 1*	 0.964'
	
10	 873	 0.996'	 0.991'	 0.986*	 0.981*	
0975*
	11	 754	 0.994*	 0.988*	 0.983'	 0.977'	 0.97 1*
	
12	 883	 0.994'	 0.988'	 0.981*	 0.975*	 0.968'
	
13	 754	 0.990'	 0.981'	 0.973'	 0.965'	 0.957'
	
14	 754	 0.990'	 0.979'	 0.969'	 0.959'	 0.949'
	
15	 754	 0.992'	 0.982'	 0.972'	 0.964'	 0.954'
	
16	 754	 0.978'	 0.957'	 0.937'	 0.917'	 0.899'
	
17	 753	 0.996e	 0.991'	 0.987'	 0.982'	 0.980'
	
18	 722	 0.992'	 0.984'	 0.977'	 0.969'	 0.962*
	
19	 790	 0.995'	 0.989'	 0.983'	 0.978'	 0.972'
	
20	 685	 0.981'	 0.960'	 0.941'	 0.922'	 0.902'
	
21	 773	 0.993'	 0.986'	 0.979'	 0.971'	 0.963'
	
22	 754	 0.989'	 0.979'	 0.969'	 0.959'	 0.949'
	
23	 783	 0.990'	 0.98 1'	 0.972'	 0.963'	 0.954'
	
24	 754	 0.992'	 0.985'	 0.978'	 0.973'	 0.967*
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TABLE 4.2
Sample period III
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Log Prices
No No obs
	 Lag 1	 Lag 2	 Lag 3
	 Lag 4	 Lag 5
25	 754	 0.993*	 0.986*	 0.979*	 0.973*	 0.967*
26	 754	 0.981'	 0.964'	 0.949*	 0.933*	 0.918*
27	 669	 0.992'	 0.983'	 0.975'	 0.966*	 0.958*
28	 754	 0.993'	 0.985*	 0.978'	 0.971*	 0.963*
29	 739	 0.995'	 0.990*	 0.985'	 0.980*	 0.974*
30	 754	 0.975'	 0.951'	 0.929'	 0.904*	 0.876'
31	 754	 0.988*	 0.976*	 0.964*	 0.952*	 0.942'
32	 754	 0.990'	 0.979'	 0.967'	 0.956'	 0945'
33	 754	 0.990'	 0.982'	 0.974'	 0.967'	 0.960'
34	 753	 0.998'	 0.995'	 0.993'	 0.991'	 0.988'
35	 754	 0.993'	 0.985'	 0.976'	 0.967'	 0.958'
36	 754	 0.973'	 0.945'	 0.918'	 0.892'	 0.868'
37	 821	 0.992'	 0.984'	 0.976'	 0.968'	 0.961*
38	 883	 0.994'	 0.989'	 0.984'	 0.979*	 0.974'
39	 785	 0.991'	 0.982'	 0.974'	 0.967'	 0.957'
40	 637	 0.980'	 0.961'	 0.941'	 0.920'	 0.899'
41	 871	 0.996'	 0.991'	 0.987'	 0.982'	 0.978'
42	 754	 0.992'	 0.984'	 0.977'	 0.969'	 0.962'
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TABLE 4.2
Sample period IV
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Log Prices
No	 No obs	 Lag I
	 Lag 2
	 Lag 3
	
Lag 4	 Lag 5
1	 709	 0.995'	 0.988*	 0.982*	 0.977*	 0.971*
2	 709	 0.996'	 0.990*	 0.985'	 0.980*	 0975*
3	 556	 0.993'	 0.984*	 0.975*	 0.967*	 0.958'
4	 586	 0.985'	 0.967*	 0.948'	 0.927*	 0.907*
5	 524	 0.994'	 0.986'	 0.979'	 0.97 1*	 0.964'
6	 483	 0.990'	 0.981'	 0.971'	 0.960'	 0.949'
7	 705	 0.993'	 0.986*	 0.979*	 0.973'	 0.966*
8	 657	 0.987'	 0.975*	 0.965'	 0.955'	 0.945*
9	 646	 0.991'	 0.980*	 0.970*	 0.960*	 0.950'
10	 439	 0.987'	 0.973'	 0.959'	 0.944'	 0.929'
11	 549	 0.991'	 0.981'	 0.971'	 0.962*	 0.952'
12	 504	 0.986'	 0.972'	 0.960'	 0.949'	 0.937'
13	 571	 0.986*	 0.972'	 0.960'	 0.949'	 0.939'
14	 627	 0.995'	 0.989'	 0.982'	 0.976'	 0.969*
15	 646	 0.989'	 0.977'	 0.964*	 0.952'	 0.940'
16	 642	 0.99 1*	 0.983'	 0.974'	 0.966'	 0.956'
17	 456	 0.969'	 0.945'	 0.915'	 0.886'	 0.857'
18	 543	 0.991'	 0.981'	 0.972'	 0.962'	 0.953'
19	 612	 0.994'	 0.987'	 0.980'	 0.973'	 0.966'
20	 542	 0.991'	 0.982'	 0.974'	 0.966'	 0.958'
21	 607	 0.987'	 0.974'	 0.960'	 0.948'	 0.936'
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TABLE 4.2
Sample period V
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Log Prices
No	 No obs	 Lag 1
	 Lag 2	 Lag 3
	
Lag 4	 Lag 5
1	 323	 0.978'	 0.952*	 0.928'	 0.906*	 0.885*
2	 351	 0.984'	 0.967*	 0.949'	 0.931'	 0.910'
3	 142	 0.982'	 0.964'	 0.945'	 0.925'	 0.905'
4	 222	 0.953'	 0.906'	 0.866'	 0.826'	 0.785'
5	 212	 0.961'	 0.916'	 0.878'	 0.837'	 0.797'
6	 290	 0.985'	 0.970'	 0.954'	 0.939'	 0.924'
7	 292	 0.952'	 0.903'	 0.860'	 0.818'	 0.771'
8	 330	 0.964'	 0.928'	 0.893'	 0.861'	 0.835'
9	 296	 0.951'	 0.900'	 0.858'	 0.807'	 0.749'
10	 197	 0.943'	 0.871'	 0.789'	 0.709'	 0.635'
11	 262	 0.984'	 0.963'	 0.944'	 0.925'	 0.905'
12	 497	 0.991'	 0.983'	 0.973'	 0.963'	 0.952'
13	 196	 0.949'	 0.908'	 0.871'	 0.836'	 0.806'
Given the non-stationarity of the stock log price series, autocorrelation coefficients
are estimated for all individual stock return series for periods 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The results
are presented in table (4.3). As can be seen from the table, for 25 out of 48 stocks in
period 1, for 4 out of 4 stocks in period 2, for 8 out of 42 in period 3, for 8 out of 21
companies in period 4, and for 3 out of 13 companies in period 5, the autocorrelation
coefficients are significant at the 5% level of significance for lag one. This could be
interpreted as evidence against the random walk hypothesis and hence market
efficiency for companies in period I and 2. On the other hand most companies in
period 3, 4 and 5 could be considered to be efficiently priced.
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TABLE 4.3
Sample period I
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Returns
No No obs
	
Lag I
	
Lag 2	 Lag 3	 Lag 4	 Lag 5
1	 1371	 0.030	 -0.038	 -0.040	 0.019	 0.037
2	 1371	 0.004	 -0.011	 0.016	 -0.048	 0.013
3	 1500	 0.046	 0.002	 0.016	 -0.020	 0.003
4	 1500	 0.059'	 -0.017	 0.005	 -0.007	 0.020
5	 1500	 0.078'	 -0.023	 0.030	 0.042	 0.035
6	 1500	 0.116'	 0.008	 -0.008	 -0.004	 -0.034
7	 1500	 0.057'	 -0.006	 0.006	 -0.001	 0.018
8	 1500	 0.058'	 -0.039	 -0.041	 -0.021	 -0.017
9	 1371	 0.053'	 0.012	 -0.017	 0.042	 0.021
10	 1500	 0.010	 -0.029	 0.021	 0.016
11	 1500	 0.110'	 -0.058'	 -0.058'	 0.016	 -0.017
12	 1500	 0.018	 -0.001	 0.2E-3	 -0.004	 0.026
13	 1371	 0.051	 0.009	 -0.014	 -0.042	 0.005
14	 1500	 0.031	 -0.022	 0.023	 0.SVJ	 S.S32S
15	 1291	 0.050	 -0.014	 -0.046	 -0.021	 -0.003
16	 753	 0.021	 -0.009	 0.016	 0.013	 0.031
17	 964	 0.098'	 0.014	 0.037	 0.089*	 0.033
18	 1500	 0.039	 -0.037	 -0.016	 0.025	 0.015
19	 1500	 0.073'	 -0.004	 0.002	 0.030	 0.021
20	 1500	 0.071'	 -0.003	 0.024	 0.016	 -0.018
21	 1371	 0.044	 -0.023	 -0.7E-3	 -0.018	 0.009
22	 1371	 0.086'	 -0.030	 -0.030	 0.033	 -0.031
23	 1371	 0.069'	 0.019	 0.040	 -0.002	 0.008
24	 1500	 0.094'	 -0.007	 -0.008	 -0.002	 0.025
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TABLE 4.3
Sample period I
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Returns
No No obs
25
	
1374
26
	
1371
27
	
1499
28
	
1371
29
	
1315
30
	
1500
31
	
1371
32
	
1371
33
	
1500
34
	
1371
35	 1366
36
	
1500
37
	
1371
38
	
803
39
	
1371
40
	
751
41
	
673
42
	
1367
43	 1500
44
	
1500
45	 1500
46	 1371
47
	
1500
48
	
1132
Lag 1
0.067*
0.071'
0.054'
0.085*
0.092*
0.007
0.042
0.041
0.047
0.037
-0.00 1
0.052'
0.021
0.057
0.026
0.174'
0.057
0.088'
0. 148'
0.087*
0.040
0.097'
0.042
0.164'
Lag 2
-0.002
-0.0 16
-0.007
-0.008
0.027
-0.029
-0.023
-0.003
-0.032
0.004
0.036
0.027
-0.007
-0.013
0.004
0.067
0.03 1
0.0 17
0.036
-0.02 1
-0.0 16
0.005
-0.0 13
0.083'
Lag 3
0.0 12
-0.030
0.0 13
-0.0 10
0.030
-0.027
0.002
-0.028
-0.038
-0.021
0.034
0.032
-0.021
0.034
-0.059'
-0.008
-0.039
0.0 16
0.3E-3
0.027
0.007
0.006
-0.032
0.0 12
Lag 4
0.029
0.016
0.035
-0.009
0.003
0.043
0.014
0.013
-0.008
-0.00 1
0.061'
0.002
-0.038
0.032
-0.0 12
-0.005
-0.031
-0.053
-0.004
0.048
0.048
0.025
-0.007
-0.005
Lag 5
0.002
-0.008
0.0 11
-0.006
-0.0 15
0.027
0.009
-0.018
-0.007
0.021
0.027
-0.003
0.072'
-0.002
-0.028
-0.049
-0.070
-0.019
-0.058'
0.029
-0.0 16
0.027
-0.02 1
-0.02 1
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TABLE 4.3
Sample period II
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Returns
No	 No obs	 Lag I	 Lag 2	 Lag 3
	
Lag 4	 Lag 5
1	 1113	 0.135	 0.038	 0.025	 0.019	 0.009
2	 984	 0.084	 0.023	 0.022	 0.060	 0.008
3	 979	 0.073	 0.013	 0.031	 0.007	 -0.019
4	 1113	 0.093	 0.008	 -0.0 10	 0.025	 0.040
TABLE 4.3
Sample period LU
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Returns
No	 No obs	 Lag 1	 Lag 2	 Lag 3
	
Lag 4	 Lag 5
1	 882	 -0.025	 -0.063	 0.040	 -0.0 18	 0.006
2	 725	 -0.058	 -0.07 1	 -0.045	 0.027	 0.03 1
3	 876	 -0.026	 -0.062	 0.040	 -0.016	 0.007
4	 850	 0.104	 0.011	 0.022	 0.011	 -0.003
5	 879	 0.030	 -0.030	 0.005	 -0.05 1	 -0.002
6	 753	 0.055	 0.018	 -0.007	 0.012	 -0.004
7	 736	 0.051	 0.003	 0.006	 0.061	 -0.003
8	 862	 0.059	 0.002	 0.001	 -0.029	 -0.001
753	 -0.009	 -0.024	 -0.020	 0.040	 0.029
10	 872	 0.136*	 0.019	 0.010	 0.020	 -0.030
11	 753	 -0.002	 0.025	 -0.029	 0.036	 0.027
12	 882	 0.031	 0.021	 0.033	 -0.044	 -0.002
13	 753	 -0.062	 -0.068	 -0.024	 0.022	 0.029
14	 753	 0.067	 -0.017	 -0.009	 0.002	 0.009
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TABLE 4.3
Sample period III
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Returns
No	 No obs	 Lag I	 Lag 2	 Lag 3	 Lag 4	 Lag 5
15	 753	 0.057	 -0.020	 -0.010	 0.020	 -0.045
16	 753	 -0.057	 -0.035	 -0.035	 0.005	 -0.024
17	 752	 0.068	 0.007	 -0.009	 0.011	 -0.030
18	 721	 0.046	 -0.089'	 0.6E-3	 0.003	 0.067
19	 789	 0.038	 0.045	 -0.1E-3	 0.024	 0.018
20	 684	 0.065	 -0.0 18	 -0.003	 0.030	 -0.05 1
21	 772	 0.028	 -0.026	 0.033	 0.034	 0.043
22	 753	 -0.072'	 -0.011	 -0.024	 0.046	 0.022
23	 782	 0.021	 -0.011	 -0.028	 0.036	 0.048
24	 753	 -0.058	 -0.046	 -0.200'	 0.008	 0.024
25	 753	 -0.035	 -0.041	 -0.067	 0.020	 0.014
26	 753	 -0.056	 -0.060	 -0.022	 -0.069	 -0.026
27	 668	 -0.017	 0.025	 -0.032	 0.001	 0.033
28	 753	 0.056	 0.028	 -0.065	 0.022	 -0.008
29	 738	 0.021	 0.024	 0.005	 0.050	 -0.111'
30	 753	 -0.023	 -0.055	 0.045	 0.054	 0.043
31	 753	 0.048	 -0.019	 -0.074'	 -0.095'	 -0.032
32	 753	 0.120'	 0.018	 -0.032	 -0.048	 -0.003
33	 753	 -0.144'	 0.007	 -0.018	 -0.050	 0.020
34	 752	 0.075'	 0.04 1	 0.028	 -0.027	 -0.0 19
35	 753	 0.133'	 0.101'	 0.019	 0.034	 0.004
36	 753	 0.032	 -0.028	 -0.006	 -0.052	 0.019
37	 820	 -0.022	 -0.011	 -0.008	 -0.031	 -0.044
38	 882	 0.023	 -0.050	 0.004	 0.012	 -0.028
39	 784	 -0.008	 -0.2E-3	 -0.028	 0.045	 0.021
40	 636	 -0.022	 -0.018	 -0.034	 0.002	 -0.007
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TABLE 4.3
Sample period HI
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Returns
No	 No obs	 Lag 1	 Lag 2	 Lag 3	 Lag 4	 Lag 5
41	 870	 0.122	 0.059	 -0.033	 0.014	 -0.041
42	 753	 -0.02 1	 -0.002	 -0.023	 0.071	 0.7E-3
TABLE 4.3
Sample period IV
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Returns
No	 No obs	 Lag 1	 Lag 2	 Lag 3	 Lag 4	 Lag 5
1	 708	 0.027	 -0.020	 -0.042	 -0.002	 -0.036
2	 708	 -0.024	 -0.002	 -0.030	 -0.002	 -0.021
3	 555	 0.107	 0.031	 -0.006	 -0.009	 -0.014
4	 585	 0.145	 0.080	 0.025	 -0.007	 0.004
5	 523	 0.110	 0.037	 -0.002	 -0.010	 -0.026
6	 482	 -0.004	 0.110	 0.037	 0.071	 -0.045
7	 704	 0.013	 -0.013	 -0.073	 0.007	 -0.027
8	 656	 -0.044	 -0.057	 -0.021	 -0.043	 -0.060
9	 645	 0.121	 0.025	 0.014	 0.020	 0.021
10	 438	 0.132	 0.045	 0.115*	 0.057	 -0.045
11	 548	 0.064	 -0.071	 0.029	 -0.018	 -0.014
12	 503	 0.020	 -0.088	 0.028	 0.110*	 -0.005
13	 570	 -0.017	 -0.113	 -0.059	 -0.004	 -0.014
14	 626	 0.141*	 0.078	 0.008	 -0.019	 -0.026
15	 643	 0.080*	 0.032	 -0.022	 0.009	 0.040
16	 641	 0.032	 -0.048	 0.030	 0.058	 0.009
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TABLE 4.3
Sample period IV
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Returns
No	 No obs	 Lag I	 Lag 2	 Lag 3
	 Lag 4	 Lag 5
16	 641	 0.032	 -0.048	 0.030	 0.058	 0.009
17	 455	 -0.148	 0.123	 -0.051	 0.032	 -0.086
18	 542	 -0.020	 0.055	 -0.048	 0.024	 0.098*
19	 611	 0.066	 0.034	 0.030	 -0.016	 -0.015
20	 541	 0.058	 0.065	 0.053	 0.007	 -0.026
21	 606	 -0.003	 0.013	 -0.030	 -0.069	 -0.039
TABLE 4.3
Sample period V
Autocorrelation Coefficients For Individual Stock Returns
No	 No obs	 Lag 1	 Lag 2	 Lag 3
	
Lag 4	 Lag 5
1	 322	 0.108	 -0.060	 -0.030	 -0.048	 -0.5E-3
2	 350	 0.094	 0.037	 -0.074	 0.06 1	 0.095
3	 142	 -0.036	 0.068	 0.117	 0.003	 0.116
4	 221	 -0.016	 -0.114	 0.054	 0.051	 -0.005
5	 211	 0.194*	 0.002	 0.1E-3	 -0.056	 -0.041
6	 289	 0.051	 -0.019	 0.059	 -0.030	 -0.052
7	 291	 -0.070	 -0.107	 0.065	 0.048	 0.082
8	 329	 -0.016	 0.011	 -0.030	 -0.075	 -0.059
9	 295	 -0.002	 -0.109	 0.112	 -0.002	 0.005
10	 196	 0.233*	 0.171*	 0.018	 -0.039	 -0.012
11	 261	 0.122*	 -0.007	 -0.045	 0.002	 -0.03 1
12	 496	 0.036	 0.091*	 0.138*	 0.024	 0.051
13	 195	 0.083	 -0.SE-3	 -0.006	 -0.056	 0.006
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C.	 SPECTRAL ANALYSIS
Spectral analysis is an alternative to studying autocorrelations. It is particularly
appropriate when cycles in returns are the preferred alternative to random behaviour.
The null hypothesis is that the spectral density is constant and thus returns follow a
random walk process and are not predictable. Table (4.4) presents the spectral Zero
frequency and Weex Cycle tests.
Table 4.4
Sample period I
SPECTRAL TEST STATISTICS
NO	 ZERO FREQUENCY	 WEEX CYCLE
1	 l.939	 1.816
2	 2.221	 -0.310
3	 0.641	 -0.123
4	 2.036*	 0.05 1
5	 1.302	 0.104
6	 -0.370	 -0.031
7	 0.992	 -1.036
8	 0.403	 0.349
9	 1.145	 -0.861
10	 0.216	 0.044
11	 1.182	 -0.320
12	 -0.361	 -0.775
13	 1.646	 1.447
14	 0.853	 -0.109
15	 0.247	 0.570
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Table 4.4
Sample period I
SPECTRAL TEST STATISTICS
	
NO	 ZERO FREQUENCY	 WEEX CYCLE
	
16	 -0.245	 0.011
	
17	 0.249	 -0.626
1	 2.360'	 1.416
	
19	 0.703	 -0.295
	20	 1.051	 -0.768
	
21	 0.227	 -0.08 1
	
22	 0.849	 0.649
	
23	 0.965	 -1.160
	
24	 2.649'	 1.477
	
25	 2.639'	 -1.054
	
26	 1.154	 0.338
	
27	 1.694	 -0.063
2	 0.902	 1.379
	
29	 0.018	 -0.208
	
30	 1.893'	 1.221
	
31	 0.820	 1.327
	
32	 -0.825	 -1.368
	
33	 0.087	 -0.59 1
	
34	 0.098	 -0.509
	
35	 1.100	 0.447
	
36	 0.470	 -0.348
	
37	 0.529	 -0.126
	
38	 -0.093	 0.020
	
39	 -1.693	 0.000
	
40	 -0.385	 -0.158
	
41	 -0.236	 -0.171
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Table 4.4
Sample period I
SPECTRAL TEST STATISTICS
NO	 ZERO FREQUENCY	 WEEX CYCLE
42	 -0.371	 -0.037
43	 -0.874	 -0.409
44	 1.611	 0.836
45	 1.806	 1.625
46	 1.402	 0.452
47	 1.829	 -0.325
48	 1.541	 -1.743
Table 4.4
Sample period H
SPECTRAL TEST STATISTICS
NO	 ZERO FREQUENCY	 WEEX CYCLE
1	 1.110	 0.107
2	 0.224	 0.442
3	 1.031	 -0.676
4	 3•449*	 0.167
115
Table 4.4
Sample period III
SPECTRAL TEST STATISTICS
	
NO	 ZERO FREQUENCY	 WEEX CYCLE
	
0.104	 -1.741
	
2	 -1.194	 -0.105
	
3	 -0.713	 0.398
	
4	 1.792	 -0.498
	
5	 -0.268	 -0.106
	
6	 0.187	 -0.511
	
7	 -0.028	 -0.469
	
8	 0.162	 -0.668
	
9	 1.513	 -1.038
	
10	 0.753	 0.823
	
11	 2.152*	 1.787
	
12	 0.497	 0.573
	
13	 -1.308	 -0.551
	
14	 0.145	 -0.030
	
15	 0.163	 0.202
	
16	 -0.514	 -0.618
	
17	 0.002	 -0.213
	
18	 -0.023	 0.685
	
19	 -0.191	 0.179
	
20	 -0.157	 0.089
	
21	 0.236	 1.108
	
22	 1.619	 -0.640
	
23	 0.280	 -0.634
	
24	 -0.254	 -0.138
	
25	 0.941	 -0.75 1
	
26	 -1.317	 0.121
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Table 4.4
Sample period III
SPECTRAL TEST STATISTICS
NO	 ZERO FREQUENCY	 WEEX CYCLE
27	 -0.705	 1.483
28	 0.696	 0.35 1
29	 0.263	 -0.720
30	 0.414	 -1.503
31	 -0.115	 -0.179
32	 -0.834	 0.545
33	 0.589	 0.220
34	 0.766	 -0.505
35	 0.523	 -0.989
36	 -0.769	 -0.039
37	 1.738	 -0.237
38	 1.165	 -0.512
39	 0.026	 -1.173
40	 0.000	 -0.121
41	 2.538	 -0.803
42	 0.727	 -1.069
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Table 4.4
Sample period IV
SPECTRAL TEST STATISTICS
	
NO	 ZERO FREQUENCY	 WEEX CYCLE
1	 -0.560	 0.290
	
2	 -0.502	 -0.211
	
3	 -0.398	 0.259
	4	 0.504	 -0.696
	
5	 1.544	 0.533
	
6	 0.486	 -0.128
	
7	 -0.603	 0.587
	8	
-0.735	 0.014
	
9	 0.950	 0.802
	
10	 2.087*	 -1.131
	
11	
-0.622	 -0.116
	
12	 2.054'	 0.058
	13	 0.655	 0.391
	
14	 1.288	 -0.721
	
15	 0.660	 1.053
	16	 0.097	 0.926
	
17	 -1.452	 -1.562
	
18	
-0.538	 0.512
	
19	 1.817	 -1.212
	
20	 0.223	 0.095
	
21	 -0.456	 -0.958
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Table 4.4
Sample period V
SPECTRAL TEST STATISTICS
	
NO	 ZERO FREQUENCY	 WEEX CYCLE
	
1	 -1.014	 -0.819
	
2	 1.399	 -0.575
	3	 2.036	 -1.116
	
4	 -0.727	 -0.40 1
	
5	 2.617	 -0.474
	
6	 -0.409	 -0.62 1
	
7	 -0.506	 0.93 1
	
8	 -0.902	 -1.193
	
9	 -0.568	 0.024
	
10	 -0.441	 -1.227
	
11	 0.533	 0.278
	
12	 2.447	 0.420
	
13	 0.287	 -0.765
For most of the companies in all periods under investigation both Zero Frequency and
Weex Cycle tests indicate acceptance of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of
significance. The evidence then suggests that the density function is constant and the
random walk hypothesis is accepted. These results seem to contradict the earlier
finding, based on autocorrelations, that most companies in periods 1, 2 and 3 are
statistically independent and thus inefficient. Perhaps such contradictory results reflect
the power of these test statistics.
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D. RUNS TESTS
As returns have a non-normal distibution non-parameic tests of random walk could
be more appropriate. The only non-parametric statistic to date is the total number of
runs. The null hypothesis here is that the series under investigation are generated by
a strict white noise process. The rejection of the null hypothesis would imply
dependence in returns and hence predictability and inefficiency. Table (4.5) presents
the results from the run test for all companies under investigation.
Table 4.5
Sample period I
RUN TEST
NO	 RUNS	 RUNS	 STANDARD RUNS TEST
OBSERVED EXPECTED DEVL&TION STATISTIC
1	 835.0	 872.1	 17.2	 -2.15
2	 820.0	 906.9	 17.4	 -5.01
3	 913.0	 956.5	 18.0	 -2.41
4	 901.0	 979.7	 18.1	 -4.34
5	 909.0	 963.2	 18.1	 -3.00
6	 867.0	 938.5	 18.0	 -3.96
7	 892.0	 952.8	 18.0	 -3.37
8	 867.0	 949.7	 18.0	 -4.59
9	 814.0	 915.0	 17.4	 -5.79
10	 917.0	 989.1	 18.2	 -3.97
11	 889.0	 963.7	 18.1	 -4.14
12	 903.0	 975.9	 18.1	 -4.04
13	 835.0	 908.2	 17.4	 -4.21
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Table 4.5
Sample period I
RUN TEST
NO	 RUNS	 RUNS	 STANDARD RUNS TEST
OBSERVED	 EXPECTED DEVIATION STATISTIC
14	 847.0	 955.5	 18.0	 -6.01
15	 762.0	 813.1	 16.7	 -3.06
16	 514.0	 795.8	 15.7	 -17.96
17	 683.0	 909.0	 17.4	 -13.01
18	 922.0	 995.3	 18.2	 -4.03
19	 896.0	 961.7	 18.0	 -3.64
20	 916.0	 971.3	 18.1	 -3.06
21	 820.0	 856.4	 17.2	 -2.11
22	 781.0	 890.9	 17.3	 -6.36
23	 785.0	 913.1	 17.4	 -7.35
24	 860.0	 951.0	 18.0	 -5.05
25	 792.0	 879.9	 17.3	 -5.09
26	 809.0	 907.7	 17.4	 -5.68
27	 850.0	 984.0	 18.1	 -7.39
28	 753.0	 911.1	 17.4	 -9.09
29	 773.0	 866.9	 17.0	 -5.53
30	 875.0	 957.7	 18.0	 -4.58
31	 826.0	 903.6	 17.4	 -4.47
32	 830.0	 892.9	 17.3	 -3.64
33	 889.0	 981.1	 18.1	 -5.08
34	 831.0	 902.7	 17.3	 -4.13
35	 679.0	 901.6	 17.3	 -12.88
36	 850.0	 987.2	 18.1	 -7.57
37	 857.0	 904.7	 17.4	 -2.75
38	 647.0	 875.5	 16.9	 -13.50
39	 646.0	 901.3	 17.3	 -14.78
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Table 4.5
Sample period I
RUN TEST
NO	 RUNS	 RUNS	 STANDARD RUNS TEST
OBSERVED	 EXPECTED DEVIATION STATISTIC
40	 634.0	 858.0	 16.7	 -13.43
41	 566.0	 805.7	 15.8	 -15.13
42	 726.0	 906.1	 17.3	 -10.38
43	 876.0	 971.0	 18.1	 -5.25
44	 892.0	 949.9	 18.0	 -3.21
45	 933.0	 982.4	 18.1	 -2.73
46	 801.0	 892.2	 17.3	 -5.27
47	 882.0	 978.9	 18.1	 -5.35
48	 773.0	 998.3	 18.2	 -12.37
Notes: denotes statistically insignificant at the
	 level.
Table 4.5
Sample period H
RUN TEST
NO	 RUNS	 RUNS	 STANDARD RUNS TEST
OBSERVED EXPECTED DEVIATION STATISTIC
1	 622.0	 718.4	 15.5	 -6.20
2	 570.0	 624.6	 14.6	 -3.74
3	 574.0	 652.6	 14.7	 -5.34
4	 669.0	 723.3	 15.6	 -3.48
See notes on Table (4.5) Sample Period I.
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13.1
12.2
12.9
12.9
13.0
12.9
12.9
12.9
-I.
512.6
435.0
484.9
497.6
486.4
499.9
502.1
502.8
-1 95*
-3.38
1.77*
-0.75
1.26*
-4.66
-2.96
-2.54
-r.JJ .'J
487.0
394.0
462.0
488.0
470.0
440.0
464.0
470.0
Table 4.5
Sample period III
RUN TEST
	
No	 OBSERVED	 RUNS	 STANDARD RUNS TEST
EXPECTED DEVIATION	 STATISTIC
	
1	 565.0	 571.7	 13.9	 0.48*
	
2	 434.0	 478.5	 12.6	 -3.54
	3	 536.0	 575.9	 13.8	 -2.88
	
4	 503.0	 540.9	 13.6	 -2.80
	
5	 517.0	 570.8	 13.8	 -3.89
	
6	 422.0	 502.1	 12.9	 -6.21
	
7	 434.0	 472.5	 12.4	 -3.10
	
8	 516.0	 545.9	 13.7	 -2,19
	
9	 474.0	 499.4	 12.9	 -1.97
	
10	 481.0	 543.8	 13.7	 -4.58
	
11	 466.0	 481.0
	
12	 496.0	 588.5	 14.0	 -6.62
	
13	 478.0	 501.0	 12.9	 -1.78
	
14	 427.0	 496.2	 12.8	 -.539
	
15	 360.0	 471.5	 12.4	 -9.03
	
16	 491.0	 500.7	 12.9	 -0.75
	17	 421.0	 466.1	 12.7	 -3.54
	18	 iU2fl fl	 A1O 1	 12.6	 -3.90
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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Table 4.5
Sample period HI
RUN TEST
No	 OBSERVED	 RUNS	 STANDARD RUNS TEST
EXPECTED DEVIATION	 STATISTIC
27	 424.0	 444.0	 12.1	 -1.65
28	 443.0	 487.7	 12.8	 -3.50
29	 422.0	 490.3	 12.7	 -5.35
30	 466.0	 502.8	 12.9	 -2.85
31	 435.0	 501.7	 12.9	 -5.18
32	 411.0	 495.8	 12.8	 -6.63
33	 425.0	 484.5	 12.6	 -4.72
34	 431.0	 494.4	 12.8	 -4.95
35	 418.0	 500.3	 12.9	 -6.39
36	 470.0	 489.6	 12.8	 -1.53
37	 504.0	 547.7	 13.5	 -3.24
38	 532.0	 580.4	 13.9	 -3.48
39	 493.0	 517.4	 13.1	 -1.86
40	 406.0	 424.2	 11.8	 1.54*
41	 500.0	 570.0	 13.8	 -5.08
42	 460.0	 502.1	 12.9	 -3.27
See notes on Table (4.5) SampLe Period I.
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Table 4.5
Sample period IV
RUN TEST
	
NO	 RUNS	 RUNS	 STANDARD	 RUNS TEST
	
OBSERVED EXPECTED DEVIATION
	 STATISTIC
	
441.0	 456.7	 12.4	 -1.27
	
2	 422.0	 451.4	 12.3	 -2.39
	
3	 205.0	 350.0	 10.6	 -13.63
	
4	 299.0	 377.6	 11.1	 -7.07
	
5	 198.0	 324.4	 10.2	 -12.40
	
6	 192.0	 252.6	 8.5	 -7.13
	
7	 421.0	 459.4	 12.3	 -3.11
	
8	 292.0	 410.5	 11.5	 -10.30
	
9	 356.0	 399.7	 11.8	 -3.70
	
10	 202.0	 254.0	 8.9	 -5.85
	11	 328.0	 350.6	 10.9	 -2.08
	
12	 300.0	 332.2	 10.5	 -3.07
	
13	 334.0	 362.9	 10.9	 -2.66
	
14	 361.0	 388.4	 11.6	 -2.35
	
15	 365.0	 402.2	 11.8	 -3.15
	
16	 396.0	 407.6	 11.8	 0.98*
	
17	 300.0	 299.7	 9.9	 0.03
	
18	 346.0	 360.1	 10.9	 1.29*
	
19	 272.0	 362.0	 10.6	 -8.47
	
20	 305.0	 361.6	 10.9	 -5.18
	21	 389.0	 404.6	 11.6	 1.35*
See notes on Table (4.5) Sample Period I.
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Table 4.5
Sample period V
RUN TEST
	
NO	 RUNS	 RUNS	 STANDARD RUNS TEST
OBSERVED	 EXPECTED DEVIATION STATISTIC
	
1	 193.0	 208.6	 8.3	 -1.87'
	
2	 208.0	 218.4	 8.7	 1.21*
	
3	 63.0	 65.6	 4.6	 -0.58'
	
4	 142.0	 145.0	 6.9	 -0.44'
	
5	 111.0	 141.5	 6.8	 -4.49
	
6	 185.0	 182.8	 7.9	 0.27*
	
7	 184.0	 194.7	 8.0	 -1.33'
	
8	 200.0	 219.1	 8.5	 -2.25
	
9	 194.0	 193.4	 7.9	 0.08'
	
10	 104.0	 130.8	 6.5	 -4.10
	
11	 162.0	 168.2	 7.5	 -0.82'
	
12	 311.0	 331.1	 10.5	 -1.92'
	
13	 85.0	 105.4	 5.7	 -3.61
See notes on Table (4.5) Sample Period I.
As can be seen from the above tables, for most companies in periods 1, 2, 3 and 4 the
null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level of significance, suggesting that returns are
not generated from a strict white noise process. This implies that returns are dependent
and predictable and hence inefficiently priced. The negative sign for all run test
coefficients implies positive dependence. On the other hand for most companies in
period 5 the null hypothesis is accepted.
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4.4. CONCLUSION
Whether capital markets are informationally efficient is ultimately an empirical
question. The issue of efficiency in emerging markets has been widely investigated in
recent years, with mixed results. Most previous studies examined the issue of
efficiency using conventional tests. This chapter seeks to examine whether companies
listed on the ISE are weak-form efficient using some of the conventional tests that
appeared in the literature.
All results, presented in the chapter, taken together seem to suggest that companies
listed on the ISE are not efficiently priced in the weak-form. This apparent
inefficiency could obviously lead to misallocation of resources. However as mentioned
in the introduction of the thesis most of these conventional tests could be misleading
since there are not capable of capturing the institutional and investor behaviour found
in emerging markets. These issues are the subject matter of the next chapter.
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ENDN( )TES
For the rest of the thesis a denotes statistically significant at the 5% level unless
otherwise stated.
1 2
V. MARKET EFFICIENCY, THIN TRADING AND NON-LINEAR
BEHAVIOUR
5.1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter has, using conventional tests for efficiency, shown that the ISE
could be classified as inefficient. However, if the evidence on efficiency/inefficiency
is to be reliable it is essential that the methodology adopted in statistical tests takes
account of the institutional features and trading conditions of the market under
investigation. Only then can we address the more important issue of what makes
markets informationally efficient or inefficient. An understanding of this issue wifi
help to determine the appropriate regulatory framework for the establishment of
efficiently functioning equity markets.
In this chapter using data from the Istanbul Stock Exchange we seek to examine the
issue of efficiency when institutional features specific to the market under
investigation are taken into account. Specifically, we adopt a testing methodology
which enables us to recognise the possible presence of non-linear behaviour and
correct for the effects of thin trading. In addition, by investigating efficiency on a
yearly basis we are able to examine the impact of the market maturing and regulatory
changes on the trading behaviour and efficiency of the market. The chapter is
organised as follows. The next section examines some fundamental aspects of
efficiency and emerging market behaviour and outlines the methodology adopted in
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this chapter. Section (5.3) discusses the major features of the Istanbul Stock Exchange
(ISE) and its evolution over time. In section (5.4) the data and results are presented.
This is followed by a conclusion and summary.
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5.2. ISSUES OF MARKET EFFICIENCY, THIN TRADING AND
NON-LINEAR BEHAVIOUR
The issue of market efficiency is often investigated by examining whether prices in
equity markets exhibit patterns which allow future prices to be predicted and, thus,
abnormal profits to be achieved. For a market to be efficient no such patterns should
exist and prices should follow a random walk, or the less restrictive martingale
process. Implicit in these specifications of an efficient price series is the assumption
that investors are rational. Rationality implies firstly that investors are risk averse,
secondly, that they are unbiased in their forecast and thirdly they respond
instantaneously to new information. These three assumptions lead to a linear
relationship which is used to test market efficiency. If these assumptions are not valid
and if the return generating process is non-linear and a linear model is used to test
efficiency then the hypothesis of independence of successive price changes may
wrongly be accepted. This can arise because non-linear systems such as chaotic
systems exhibit similar patterns to a random walk process. If however, the system is
non-linear the series may be predictable.
There are several reasons why non-linearities may be observed in fmancial markets.
First, the characteristics of the market microstructure may lead to non-linearities
because of difficulties in carrying out arbitrage transactions. For example, differing
microstructures between stock markets and derivative markets may give rise to non-
linear dependence. Stoll and Whaley (1990) show that price discovery takes place in
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futures markets and then the information is carried to the stock market through the
process of arbitrage. Delays in transacting the stock market leg of the arbitrage means
that the immediate response in the mispricing would only be partial, reflecting the
change in the futures price alone. This may induce further arbitrage activity and could
actually result in overshooting of the arbitrage bounds. Furthermore, short sales
restrictions in stock markets may lead to delays in executing arbitrage transactions,
this in turn may cause non-linear behaviour.
Second, non-linearities may be explained in terms of non-linear feedback mechanisms
in price movements. When the price of an asset gets too high self-regulating forces
usually drive the price down. if the feedback mechanism is non-linear then the
correction will not always be proportional to the amount by which the price deviates
from the asset's real value. Consider, for example, the logistic map whereby a series
evolves according to the following function:
= aX11 (1 - X, 1 ) =
	
- aX 1	(5.1)
This function maps the value at time (t-1) into the value at time (t). The second term
in the equation is a negative non-linear feedback term which competes with the linear
term in stabilising the series. It has the kind of features one might expect in self-
regulatory markets. For example, whenever the price of an asset deviates from its
fundamental value then market forces will drive the price back to its equilibrium level.
If the corrective measure taken by the market is not proportional to the original
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deviation then the feedback mechanism is said to be non-linear. It is not unreasonable
to expect such non-linear corrections in financial markets. Such effects could be
explained by the market psychology, where investors and markets over-react to bad
news and under-react to good news (see, for example, DeBondt and Thaler
(195,l97) and DaCosta (1994)). There are many participants in financial markets
with many complex sets of human relationships, motivations and reactions. It would
be a miracle if these complexities always averaged out to give an aggregate linear
feedback.
Third, non-linearities could arise because of the presence of market imperfections such
as transactions costs. Although information arrives randomly to the market, market
participants respond to such information with a lag, due to transactions costs. In other
words, market participants do not trade every time news comes to the market. Rather
they trade whenever it is economically profitable leading to clustering of price
changes. Fourth, when announcements of important factors are made less often than
the frequency of observations non-linearities may be observed. For example, monthly
money supply announcements will cause non-linearities in daily and weekly series, but
not in quarterly series.
A fifth reason relates to the fact that, as mentioned above, capital market theory is
based on the notion of rational investors. It is assumed that investors are risk averse,
unbiased when they set their subjective probabilities and they always react to
information as it is received. The implication is that the data generating process is
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linear. In practice however, investors may well be risk lovers when taking a gamble
to minimise their losses. Moreover they may have too much faith in their own
forecasts, thus introducing bias into their subjective probabilities. In addition, they may
not react to information instantaneously but delay their response until other investors
reveal their preferences. The above points not only question the rationality of the
individual investor but of the market as a whole since the market is an aggregation of
individuals. Therefore, linear models may not be adequate in explaining the market
behaviour.
The existence of non-linearities is supported empirically in mature markets. For
example, Savit (1988) suggests that asset returns may not follow a stochastic process.
Rather they might be generated by deterministic chaos in which case the forecasting
error grows exponentially so that the process appears stochastic. Scheinkman and
LeBaron (1989) find some support for the hypothesis that stock returns foll6w a non-
linear dynamic system. Similarly, in an extensive study on the stock, bond and
currency markets Peters (1991) presents evidence of non-linearities.
Given that non-linearities have been observed in highly liquid developed markets it
may be expected that they will also be observed in emerging markets characterised by
continuous change. One of the most important aspects of change in emerging markets
relates to the regulatory framework which impacts on the functioning of markets
through factors such as restrictions on short sales, trading conditions, information
disclosures by companies and listing requirements. In addition, emerging markets are
typically characteriseci by thin trading, wide spreads, possibly unreliable information,
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over reaction and uninformed investors, higher transactions costs and insider trading.
It, therefore, is reasonable to expect that conventional tests of market efficiency based
on the linear model (for example, autocorrelation, runs tests, frequency distribution
and spectral analysis) may wrongly lead to the acceptance or rejection of the null
hypothesis. The logistic map with an error term, or a similar specification, may
therefore provide a useful approximation for testing for efficiency, since it allows for
non-linearities, but if the non-linear term is found to be insignificant the model
collapses to the random walk.
In testing for efficiency in emerging markets it is not sufficient to recognise the
possible presence of non-linearities, it is also necessary to take account of the thin
trading which typically characterises these markets. Thin trading introduces serial
correlation. Therefore observed dependence is not necessarily evidence of
predictability, but rather may be a statistical illusion brought about by thin trading.
Failure to recognise this makes inferences drawn from tests unreliable. A final issue
in relation to testing efficiency in emerging markets relates to the fact that these
markets are characterised by continuous change in the regulatory structure. Given that
the regulatory framework may impact on the efficiency of markets it is necessary to
examine efficiency at different stages of development to reflect changes in regulations.
To summarise, tests of market efficiency must take account of the characteristics of
the market under investigation. For emerging markets this requires the recognifion that
there may be non-linearities, thin trading and a changing regulatory framework. It is
only by directly incorporating these issues into tests of efficiency in emerging markets
that we can address the more important issue of identifying the forces which lead to
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markets being efficient or inefficient.
5.3. METHODOLOGY
This chapter investigates the efficiency of the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) using
equation (5.1) (the logistic map) as the basis for investigation to take account of the
possibility of their being non-linearities in the price series. The main purpose of using
this approach is not to determine the precise nature of any non-linearities, but rather
to ascertain whether any non-linearities exist. The following equation is estimated:
R, = cx()
 + a1 R, 1 +	 + 8	 (5.2)
where (R.) is the return at time (t), calculated as the difference of log prices and
(n=2,3). For the efficient markets hypothesis to hold we would expect (ca1=cç=0)
and (8.) is a white noise process.
As mentioned above, emerging markets are characterised by thin trading. Thin (or
infrequent) trading occurs when stocks do not trade at every consecutive interval. A
number of studies have investigated the impact of thin trading and discussed its
consequences (see, for example, Fisher (1966), Dimson (1979), Cohen et a! (1978,
1979), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Stoll and Whaley (1990) and Miller, Muthuswamy
and Whaley (1994)). Infrequently traded shares can affect the results of empirical
studies on efficiency by introducing serious bias into the results of the empirical work.
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The major source of bias is that prices recorded at the end of a time period have a
tendency to represent an outcome of a transaction which occurred earlier in, or prior
to, the period in question. Thus, thin trading induces autocorrelation in the time series
of returns for a series which would otherwise exhibit serial independence. The
methodology adopted here to deal with this problem is that proposed by Miller et al
(1994). This methodology basically suggests that to remove the impact of thin trading
a moving average model (MA) that reflects the number of non-trading days should be
estimated and then returns be adjusted accordingly. However, given the difficulties in
identifying the non-trading days, Miller et al have shown that it is equivalent to
estimate an AR(l) model from which the non-Irading adjustment can be obtained'.
Specifically, this model involves estimating the following equation:
R, = a, + a2R, 1 + e1	 (5.3)
Using the residuals from the regression adjusted returns are estimated as follows:
R,	
=	 e,	 (5.4)
(1 - a)
Where (R"') is the return at time (t), adjusted for thin trading.
The above model assumes that the non-trading adjustment required to correct returns
is constant throughout the period. While this may be a realistic assumption for highly
liquid developed markets, for emerging markets it is more likely that the required
adjustment will vary through time. Therefore, in this chapter equation (5.3) is
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estimated recursively. In testing for efficiency equation (5.2) is estimated using
corrected returns calculated recursively from equation (5.4). In addition to testing for
efficiency over the period 1988-1993, tests are also carried out on a yearly basis to
examine the impact of the regulatory changes which took place over this period.
5.4. THE ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE
As mentioned in chapter 2, The Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) in its current form was
formally inaugurated in late 1985, commencing operations in 1986. Major changes in
the regulatory structure have taken place on a frequent basis since that date.
Specifically, in 1989 trading conditions for international investors were improved
significantly; free repatriation of dividends, investment capital and capital gains were
allowed and taxes on capital gains and dividends were suspended. In addition, a
regulation was passed which came into effect in 1990, requiring listed companies to
have their financial statements audited by members of the Association of Accountants
and Auditors. The impact of these changes contributed to the increase in the
percentage of domestic savings being invested in the stock exchange from 3% in 1990
to 13% in 1991.
Further deregulation was introduced in 1992, which enabled the issuance of new
instruments and took measures against insider trading. In addition, short sales
restrictions were abolished in 1992 and a computerised system of trading was
introduced. The Capital Market Law which came into effect in May 1992 sought to
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1988
1989
1990
1991
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501
713
705
389
457
1992
1993
530
904
4,017
3,715
3,991
10,571
7,031
5,777
4,888
1 .66E+7
3.75E+7
9.09E+7
create new capital market instruments, channel savings into the security sector and
boost investor confidence by making insider trading a criminal offence and improving
transparency. Further changes expanded the role of quarterly reporting in order to give
greater detail on companies' performance.
During the period of these changes and in subsequent years the volume of trading on
the ISE increased substantially as shown in table (5.1). In addition, the table shows
the mean and standard deviation of returns on the ISE Composite Index. The index,
the composition of which is reviewed every six months, consists of the 75 most highly
traded companies. These companies account for 93% of the total market value.
TABLE 5.1
YEARLY STATISTICS FOR ISE INDEX LEVEL 1988-1993
YEAR	 VOLUME OF	 MEAN VALUE	 STANDARD
TRADING	 OF INDEX	 DEVIATION OF
INDEX
(Source: Istanbul Stock Exchange)
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As can be seen from table (5.1) the mean level of the index rose from 530 in 1988 to
4,017 in 1990 (a 659% increase) and to 10,571 in 1993 (1,898% higher than in 1988).
This gives some indication of the magnitude of the performance of the exchange. The
standard deviation, which may be taken as a measure of volatility and riskiness of the
market, increased from 1988 to 1990 and then declined. The perceived riskiness of the
market appears to have declined since 1991. Table (5.1) also demonstrates the
spectacular increase which has taken place in the volume of trading between 1988 and
1993. However, while the volume of trade increased almost sixfold between 1988 and
1990, there was an almost eighteen fold increase in volume between 1990 and 1993.
Further evidence of the maturing of the market is provided by the fact that the number
of trading members of the exchange rose from 47 in 1986 to 176 by the end of 1993.
The prima facia evidence from table (5.1) suggests that the changes in regulation and
liberalisation of the market increased interest in the equity market and, by making
information more reliable, helped bring about a reduction in the perceived riskiness
of the market. However, the crucial question from the point of view of resource
allocation is whether these changes have affected the efficient functioning of the
market. It is this issue which will now be addressed.
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5.5. DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.5.1. DATA
In this chapter we use data on all companies traded on the ISE from 1988 to 1993 and
the ISE Composite Index for the period 1988 to 1993. The sample for individual
companies is subdivided into 5 groups. The first group includes all companies listed
on the ISE during 1988 and trading between 1988-1993. This group consist of 48
companies; the second group includes companies trading between 1989-1993 and
consists of 4 companies; the third group includes all companies listed in 1990 and
were trading until 1993. This group consists of 42 companies; the forth group of
companies used in this investigation includes all companies listed on the ISE during
1991 and were trading until 1993 and consists 21 companies; the final group includes
all companies listed during 1992 and were trading until 1993. The total number of
companies in this group is 13. The rationale for this division of the companies is to
investigate whether regulatory and other institutional changes had an impact on the
efficient pricing of these securities and whether the length of trading impacts on the
pricing of securities. In other words, we trying to investigate if there is a learning
curve for the market and investors in pricing risky assets. The second part of the
empirical section of the chapter focuses on the stock market Index for the following
reasons: first, the index represents more than 90% of the value of trade on the ISE;
second, if inefficiency is found in the index then it would be possible to form a
portfolio which replicates the index and trade profitably on this; third, given the
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composition of the index it will be possible to identify the impact of regulatory
changes on the market as a whole, something which may not be possible when
individual company analysis is used. All of the investigations are carried out using
daily closing prices, supplied by the ISE.
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5.5.2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. COMPANY ANALYSIS
TABLE 5.2A
Sample period I
RANDOM WALK TEST WITHOUT NON-LINEARITIES FOR UNADJUSTED
RETURNS
R =a	 .+e.it	 iO	 ij	 st-j	 it
J=1
No	 a0	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
1	 0.001	 0.120	 0.781	 2.351	 0.898
	
(1.27)	 (5.22)
2	 0.001	 0.024	 0.132	 0.764	 1.500
	
(0.4)	 (1.03)
3	 0.003	 O.047	 1.068	 0.960	 1.778
	
(3.30)	 (2.76)
4	 0.002	 0.051	 9.751	 11.732*	 0.874
	
(2.11)	 (3.34)
5	 0.002	 0.071	 0.061	 0.006	 1.514
	
(1.91)	 (3.57)
6	 0.002*	 0.098	 6.173	 6.879*	 2.042
	
(2.12)	 (5.37)
7	 0.002	 0.049	 17.053*	 18.448*	 1.805
	
(2.19)	 (2.58)
8	 0.002	 0.052	 11.465*	 10.583*	 1.736
	
(1.93)	 (2.56)
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Table 5.2a
Sample period I
No	 cx	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
9	 0.1E-3	 0.069	 3.256	 3.391	 2.581
(0.09)	 (2.61)
10	 O.002	 0.020	 6.271	 7.378*	 1.377
(2.07)	 (1.20)
11	 0.002	 0.095*	 0.781	 2.351	 0.898
(1.89)	 (4.52)
12	 0.004	 O.058	 0.132	 0.764	 1.500
(4.19)	 (2.50)
13	 0.001	 0.043	 0.040	 0.049	 1.117
(1.06)	 (2.02)
14	 0.003	 0.147	 8.321	 7.209*	 0.908
(2.46)	 (7.04)
15	 0.002	 0.059	 13.313	 10.977	 0.908
(1.91)	 (2.54)
16	 0.3E-3	 0.028	 12.672	 14.977*	 0.547
(0.14)	 (0.87)
17	 0.003	 0.074	 11.551	 11.733*	 0.941
(2.13)	 (2.67)
18	 0.002	 0.021	 1.318	 0.373	 1.088
(2.36)	 (1.03)
19	 0.004	 0.002	 18.045	 14.314*	 1.390
(3.87)	 (0.09)
20	 0.003	 0.071	 8.439*	 6.582*	 2.113
(3.07)	 (3.59)
21	 0.001	 0.048	 13.456'	 13.737'	 2.648
(0.98)	 (2.17)
22	 0.4E-3	 0.074*	 11.222'	 14.151'	 0.625
(0.35)	 (3.56)
23	 0.002	 0.081'	 2.072	 5.932'	 1.623
(1.39)	 (3.74)
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Table 5.2a
Sample period I
No	 a9	 cx1	 %2(1)1	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
24	 0.003'	 0.085'	 2.733	 5.426*	 1.529
(2.64)	 (3.61)
25	 0.003'	 0.088'	 3.625	 2.327	 1.073
(2.80)	 (4.73)
26	 0.9E-3	 0.097'	 9.529'	 17.393'	 0.994
(0.69)	 (3.84)
27	 0.003'	 0.094'	 33.613'	 36.157'	 1.009
(2.97)	 (4.74)
28	 0.003'	 0.093'	 0.621	 0.213	 0.797
(2.17)	 (3.97)
29	 0.9E-4	 0.123'	 1.322	 2.169	 1.461
(0.08)	 (5.70)
30	 0.003'	 0.126'	 2.923	 2.214	 0.713
(2.65)	 (5.90)
31	 0.5E-3	 0.039	 3.786	 3.174	 0.846
(0.39)	 (1.87)
32	 0.002	 0.055'	 12.766'	 11.032'	 1.975
(1.32)	 (2.86)
33	 0.002	 0.056'	 5.826c	 6.807'	 1.712
(1.58)	 (2.75)
34	 0.002'	 0.035	 5.190'	 2.898	 1.649
(2.13)	 (1.84)
35	 0.002	 0.019	 16.723'	 0.151	 0.398
(1.68)	 (1.09)
36	 0.004'	 0.054'	 6.256'	 1.992	 0.652
(3.19)	 (3.22)
37	 0.002	 0.006	 10.614'	 2.102	 1.503
(1.29)	 (0.28)
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Table 5.2a
Sample period I
No	 cx1)	 a,	 X2(1)'	 X2(l)2
38	 0.3E-3	 0.052'	 2.541	 1.591	 1.129
(0.18)	 (2.07)
39	 0.001	 0.028	 31.357'	 31.385'	 1.330
(1.05)	 (1.52)
40	 0.002	 0.187'	 0.052	 8.150'	 1.161
(1.08)	 (5.50)
41	 -0.9E-3	 0.069'	 0.146	 0.301	 1.913
(0.44)	 (2.24)
42	 0.9E-3	 0.094'	 8.011'	 10.856'	 1.596
(0.76)	 (4.29)
43	 0.003'	 0.139'	 2.351	 8.798'	 1.020
(2.23)	 (6.00)
44	 0.002'	 0.086'	 3.685	 3.513	 2.148
(2.15)	 (4.26)
45	 0.003'	 0.067'	 2.840	 3.242	 2.230
(2.37)	 (3.26)
46	 0.002	 0.010'	 15.407'	 15.653'	 0.978
(1.43)	 (4.86)
47	 0.002'	 0.038'	 4.138'	 8.085*	 1.878
(2.15)	 (2.05)
48	 0.003'	 0.188'	 0.002	 2.960	 1.163
(2.07)	 (6.78)
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Table 5.2a
Sample period II
No	 cc)	 a1	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
1	 0.005	 0.120*	 19.226	 24.100*	 1.108
(3.69)	 (6.63)
2	 0.002	 0.084*	 3.813	 9.048*	 0.794
(1.52)	 (2.87)
3	 0.002	 0.079*	 2.470	 10.175*	 2.836
(1.40)	 (2.64)
4	 0.003	 0.099*	 1.261	 3.158	 1.768
(2.24)	 (3.57)
Table 5.2a
Sample period ifi
No	 a0	 a	 X2(1)'	 2(1)2	 %2(l)3
1	 0.002	 -0.013	 2.492	 3934*	 0.950
(1.13)	 (-0.42)
2	 0.2E-3	 -0.039	 0.770	 1.071	 0.553
(0.14)	 (-1.23)
3	 0.002	 0.009	 1.958	 4.183*	 1.902
(1.39)	 (0.30)
4	 0.002	 0.135*	 0.018	 0.227	 0.610
(1.01)	 (4.53)
5	 0.003*	 0.025	 6.525*	 3.853*	 1.249
(2.49)	 (1.18)
6	 0.002	 0.060*	 2.944	 9.164*	 0.966
(1.05)	 (2.16)
7	 0.001	 0.049	 1.266	 4.806*	 1.192
(0.91)	 (1.64)
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Table 5.2a
Sample period III
No	 a,	 a,	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
8	 0.002	 0.072'	 9.733'	 14.237*	 0.832
(1.25)	 (3.36)
9	 -0.8E-3	 0.002	 0.193	 0.070	 0.777
(-0.45)	 (0.06)
10	 0.002	 0.097'	 13.477*	 9.548'	 0.907
(1.06)	 (4.43)
11	 0.003	 -0.006	 0.064	 0.046	 0.567
(1.33)	 (-0.22)
12	 0.003'	 0.039	 3.724	 4.969*	 0.987
(2.16)	 (1.77)
13	 0.002	 -0.045	 0.053	 0.103	 1.060
(1.37)	 (-1.85)
14	 0.002	 0.076'	 7.216'	 7.160'	 0.937
(1.18)	 (2.90)
15	 0.002	 0.070e	 0.853	 2.722	 0.606
(0.85)	 (2.27)
16	 0.003	 -0.061	 0.121	 3.053	 1.925
(1.79)	 (-1.82)
17	 0.001	 0.067'	 11.734'	 9.378'	 1.708
(0.66)	 (2.81)
18	 0.002	 0.048	 3.930'	 0.465	 0.751
(1.32)	 (1.58)
19	 0.003'	 0.042	 4.709'	 11.301'	 0.720
(1.97)	 (1.22)
20	 0.8E-3	 0.063'	 5.293'	 7.333'	 0.498
(0.43)	 (2.60)
21	 0.004'	 0.029	 3.635	 3.139	 0.575
(2.31)	 (1.78)
22	 0.6E-3	 -0.068'	 0.099	 0.082	 0.815
(0.31)	 (-2.28)
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Table 5.2a
Sample period III
No	 cc,	 CX,	 %2(1)l	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
23	 0.003*	 -0.017	 7•454*	 1.935	 1.170
(2.13)	 (-0.61)
24	 -0.002	 -0.043	 0.354	 5.820*	 0.921
(-0.98)	 (-1.22)
25	 -0.8E-3	 -0.033	 3.657	 4.338	 0.66 1
(-0.47)	 (-0.99)
26	 0.5E-3	 -0.051	 0.613	 3.244	 1.118
(0.22)	 (-1.42)
27	 -0.001	 0.006	 2.269	 0.333	 0.963
(-0.67)	 (0.18)
28	 -0.2E-3	 0.053	 0.334	 0.007	 1.914
(-0.01)	 (1.74)
29	 -0.3E-3	 0.024	 0.852	 0.225	 0.56 1
(-0.18)	 (0.70)
30	 0.001	 -0.023	 0.186	 8.228*	 1.022
(0.75)	 (-0.64)
31	 0.8E-3	 0.052	 6.127	 0.593	 0.691
(0.39)	 (1.45)
32	 0.002	 0.105*	 9.7908	 12.3398	 0.842
(0.89)	 (3.87)
33	 0.001	 0.176*	 0.266	 1.283	 0.980
(0.90)	 (-5.71)
34	 -0.002	 0.046	 0.026	 0.27 1	 0.575
(0.89)	 (2.22)
35	 -0.7E-3	 0.1758	 0.044	 1.723	 0.981
(-0.03)	 (5.53)
36	 0.7E-3	 -0.008	 3939*	 5.911	 0.460
(0.39)	 (-0.31)
37	 0.002	 -0.018	 0.427	 0.016	 1.421
(1.06)	 (-0.60)
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Table 5.2a
Sample period III
No	 a0	 a1	 X2(1)1	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
38	 0.003	 0.010	 0.678	 0.611	 1.213
(2.19)	 (0.36)
39	 0.002	 0.018	 0.115	 1.162	 1.084
(1.18)	 (0.60)
40
	
0.2E-3	 -0.026
	
3.465
	 4.929*	 0.427
(0.11)	 (-0.83)
41	 -0.6E-3
	
0.127
	
0.623
	
1.270	 0.619
(-0.36)	 (4.22)
42
	
0.00 1	 -0.03 1
	
0.089
	
1.604	 0.561
(0.63)	 (-0.91)
Table 5.2a
Sample Period IV
No	 a1	 2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
1	 0.002	 0.0 18	 4.467*	 0.043	 0.448
(1.28)	 (1.85)
2	 0.1E-3	 -0.022	 4.089	 0.890	 0.427
(0.06)	 (-1.86)
3	 0.003	 0.156	 26.163*	 33.786*	 0.370
(1.69)	 (5.53)
4	 0.002	 0.151*	 2.065	 7.131*	 0.348
(0.73)	 (4.24)
5	 0.006*	 0.102	 11.195*	 15.150*	 0.512
(2.67)	 (3.44)
6	 0.004	 0.028	 2.443	 4.514*	 0.761
(1.75)	 (0.86)
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Table 5.2a
Sample Period IV
No	 cx1)	 X2(l)1	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
7	 0.006*	 -0.026	 4.623'	 5.956'	 0.340
(3.91)	 (-0.94)
8	 0.002	 -0.019	 8.005'	 2.784	 0.338
(1.10)	 (-1.34)
9	 0.004w	 0.120'	 4.413*	 4.560'	 0.431
(2.11)	 (3.35)
10	 0.003	 0.129'	 0.361	 4.629'	 20.040'
(1.60)	 (2.71)
11	 -0.1E-3	 0.051,	 1.501	 0.515	 0.895
(-0.07)	 (1.70)
12	 0.002	 0.012	 5.561'	 0.015	 0.594
(0.87)	 (0.28)
13	 0.001	 -0.082'	 2.045	 8.773*	 0.426
(0.74)	 (-2.19)
14	 0.004	 0.096'	 6.378'	 3.751	 0.615
(1.10)	 (3.17)
15	 0.004'	 0.094'	 8.197'	 9.643'	 0.929
(2.18)	 (2.66)
16	 0.003	 0.036	 1.228	 0.595	 1.135
(1.89)	 (1.38)
17	 0.7E-3	 -0.150'	 0.015	 1.140	 47.205'
(0.32)	 (-3.21)
18	 0.002	 -0.035	 4.429'	 2.822	 0.669
(1.08)	 (-1.63)
19	 0.1E-3	 0.099'	 4.889'	 14.791'	 0.676
(0.09)	 (2.92)
20	 0.004	 0.070	 0.060	 12.254'	 0.624
(1.93)	 (1.64)
21	 -0.3E-3	 0.002	 0.380	 2.478	 1.193
(-0.16)	 (0.06)
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Table 5.2a
Sample period V
No	 cx1	 2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(l)3
1	 0.4E-3	 0.107	 0.747	 0.377	 0.467
(0.17)	 (2.17)
2	 0.8E-3	 0.136	 3.659	 0.001	 1.098
(0.42)	 (2.63)
3	 0.009	 0.042	 0.056	 0.045	 0.488
(3.33)	 (0.53)
4	 0.003	 0.007	 0.636	 7.848*	 0.617
(1.10)	 (0.14)
5	 0.002	 0.221	 0.790	 4.190*	 0.008
(0.70)	 (3.26)
6	 0.005	 0.079	 1.041	 1.023	 0.512
(2.31)	 (1.99)
7	 0.004	 -0.133	 2.134	 5.481*	 0.470
(2.20)	 (-3.22)
8	 0.004	 0.135	 1.989	 4954*	 1.005
(1.43)	 (3.31)
9	 0.004	 0.132*	 0.283	 6.180*	 3.082
(2.02)	 (2.74)
10	 0.006	 0.120	 0.018	 2.771	 0.441
(1.65)	 (2.80)
11	 0.004	 0.052	 15.416*	 10.929*	 0.348
(1.87)	 (1.58)
12	 0.003	 0.014	 3.900	 0.053	 0.390
(1.62)	 (0.36)
13	 0.006	 0.143	 3.801	 1.900	 0.319
(1.50)	 (2.06)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t statistics.
denotes significance at the 5% level.
denotes a test for serial correlation;
2 denotes a test for a linear functional form and
denotes a test for heteroscedasticity
I 2 & 3 are distributed x2(.) under the null hypothesis.
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Table 5.2b
Sample period I
RANDOM WALK TEST WITH NON-LINEARITIES FOR ADJUSTED
RETURNS
5
R 1 , = a10 + Ea R. . + a ,6 R 1 .. 1 + a 7R 1 + g.It'i	 'i-ij-1
No	 a0	a1	 a.	 2(1)1	 X2(1)2	 X2(I)3
1	 0.001	 0.132'	 0.143	 0.022	 3.366	 0.893
(1.23)	 (4.98)	 (0.95)
2	 0.8E-3	 0.034	 0.082	 0.668	 0.5E-4	 0.486
(0.65)	 (1.32)	 (0.87)
3	 0.003e	 0.066'	 0.191	 0.004	 0.069	 1.769
(2.73)	 (2.66)	 (1.04)
4	 0.002	 0.116'	 0.065'	 0.123	 0.286	 0.877
(1.63)	 (4.68)	 (3.36)
5	 0.002	 0.067'	 0.279	 1.796	 5.723'	 1.500
(1.41)	 (2.52)	 (0.56)
6	 0.002	 0.137'	 0.133'	 1.145	 0.075	 2.052
(1.69)	 (5.81)	 (2.61)
7	 0.002	 0.117'	 0.206'	 0.432	 0.302	 1.774
(1.54)	 (4.74)	 (4.31)
8	 0.002	 0.099'	 0.200e	 0.141	 0.046	 1.716
(1.35)	 (3.97)	 (3.25)
9	 0.2E-3	 -0.013	 10.113'	 0.3E-3	 0.103	 2.539
(0.21)	 (-0.33)	 (2.71)
10 0.002	 0.069'	 0.073'	 0.253	 0.612	 1.371
(1.76)	 (2.83)	 (2.71)
11	 0.002	 0.133'	 0.153'	 2.315	 2.718	 1.098
(1.46)	 (5.27)	 (2.71)
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Table 5.2b
Sample period I
No	 cx1	 a1	 a	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
12	 0.004'	 0.087*	 0.275'	 0.009	 0.651	 0.808
(3.56)	 (3.52)	 (3.72)
13	 -O.2E-3	 0.031	 0.646'	 1.593	 0.754	 1.097
(-0.14)	 (1.16)	 (2.50)
14	 0.002	 0.190'	 0.184'	 0.036	 0.094	 0.651
(1.93)	 (7.74)	 (3.32)
15	 0.002	 0.109'	 0.232'	 1.449	 1.241	 0.887
(1.31)	 (4.04)	 (3.59)
16	 -0.001	 0.091'	 0.354'	 0.455	 0.048	 0.593
(-0.53)	 (2.57)	 (3.90)
17	 0.003	 0.137'	 0.402'	 3.801	 0.853	 0.902
(1.17)	 (4.35)	 (4.10)
18	 0.001	 0.007	 0.717'	 3.955'	 1.868	 1.063
(1.12)	 (0.28)	 (2.77)
19	 0.002	 0.141'	 0.475'	 0.615	 4.220'	 1.447
(1.84)	 (5.88)	 (3.13)
20	 0.001	 0.101'	 0.924'	 0.533	 0.249	 2.006
(1.22)	 (4.15)	 (4.32)
21	 0.1E-3	 0.097	 0.408'	 1.295	 0.691	 2.565
(0.14)	 (0.10)	 (3.71)
22	 -0.001	 0.119'	 0.621'	 0.679	 0.202	 0.644
(-0.84)	 (4.68)	 (3.02)
23	 0.001	 0.118'	 0.141'	 3.012	 6.082'	 1.564
(0.96)	 (4.51)	 (2.51)
24	 0.002	 0.105'	 0.345'	 0.143	 0.006	 1.472
(1.80)	 (4.20)	 (2.33)
25	 0.002	 0.112'	 0.381'	 0.593	 1.226	 1.067
(1.93)	 (4.64)	 (2.29)
26	 -0.8E-3	 0.128'	 0.612'	 0.686	 0.054	 1.006
(-0.59)	 (4.86)	 (4.19)
154
Table 5.2b
Sample period I
No	 cc))	 cc1	 cc	 X2(1)1	 X2(1)2	 x2(l)3
27	 0.002'	 0.182*	 0.275'	 3.437	 1.194	 1.176
(2.19)	 (7.59)	 (6.16)
28	 0.003'	 0.098'	 0.032	 0.758	 8.186'	 0.788
(2.05)	 (3.77)	 (0.46)
29	 0.7E-3	 0.138'	 -0.061	 0.529	 4.402'	 1.445
(0.06)	 (5.27)	 (-0.97)
30	 0.002'	 0.148'	 0.137'	 0.138	 0.961	 0.711
(2.31)	 (6.28)	 (6.13)
31	 0.2E-3	 0.066'	 0.065	 1.193	 19.757'	 0.840
(0.23)	 (2.56)	 (1.77)
32	 0.001	 0.114'	 0.159'	 1.463	 2.018	 2.004
(0.86)	 (4.36)	 (3.32)
33	 0.001	 0.086'	 0.151'	 0.364	 0.204	 1.705
(1.15)	 (3.62)	 (2.43)
34	 0.002	 0.065'	 0.076	 3.542	 15.853'	 1.635
(1.87)	 (2.50)	 (1.70)
35	 0.002	 0.104'	 0.077'	 0.035	 c3.ccc.	 3.3€'
(1.37)	 (3.96)	 (4.30)
36	 0.002'	 0.098'	 0.472'	 0.042	 6.258'	 0.633
(2.06)	 (3.96)	 (3.58)
37	 0.7E-3	 0.057'	 0.270'	 0.188	 1.223	 1.466
(0.62)	 (2.16)	 (3.57)
38	 0.9E-4	 0.082'	 0.061	 0.799	 6.101'	 1.137
(0.05)	 (2.36)	 (1.26)
39	 0.5E-3	 0.130'	 0.211'	 0.059	 0.039	 1.285
(0.45)	 (5.09)	 (5.65)
40	 -0.6E-3	 0.209'	 0.787'	 3.484	 4.436'	 1.199
(-0.30)	 (6.04)	 (2.84)
41	 -0.8E-3	 0.074'	 0.023	 0.038	 0.604	 1.907
(-0.38)	 (2.26)	 (0.23)
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Table 5.2b
Sample period I
No	 ci.)	 a	 a	 X2(1)1	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
42	 0.1E-3	 0.145'	 0.254'	 0.633	 2.605	 1.56
(0.13)	 (5.61)	 (3.66)
43	 0.002	 0.163'	 0.329'	 2.296	 3.535	 1.076
(1.43)	 (6.61)	 (2.77)
44	 0.002	 0.112'	 0.135	 0.353	 0.639	 2.120
(1.76)	 (4.57)	 (1.87)
45	 0.001	 0.082'	 0.598'	 0.018	 0.506	 2.170
(1.03)	 (3.27)	 (2.36)
46	 -0.5E-4	 0.167'	 0.692'	 2.000	 0.956	 1.037
(-0.04)	 (6.57)	 (3.42)
47	 0.002	 0.085'	 0.128'	 1.611	 3.711	 1.872
(1.74)	 (3.42)	 (2.84)
48	 -0.4E-3	 0.136'	 1.445'	 0.069	 0.009	 1.148
(-0.25)	 (4.13)	 (3.67)
Table 5.2b
Sample period H
No	 cc0	 a1	 a,,	 X2(1)1	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
1	 0.004'	 0.225'	 0.145'	 0.043	 5.403'	 1.148
(2.92)	 (8.09)	 (4.93)
2	 0.001	 0.118'	 0.440'	 2.360	 3.515	 0.791
(0.64)	 (3.79)	 (3.79)
3	 0.1E-3	 0.114'	 0.702	 3.637	 0.614	 2.378
(0.11)	 (2.83)	 (1.73)
4	 0.002	 0.114'	 0.233	 1.177	 5.507'	 1.7 17
(1.69)	 (3.99)	 (1.77)
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Table 5.2b
Sample period III
No	 cx')	 cx1	 c	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
1	 0.003	 0.026	 0.465'	 0.579	 0.639	 0.937
(1.23)	 (0.80)	 (2.12)
2	 -0.7E-3	 -0.065	 1.711	 0.586	 1.166	 0.535
(-0.49)	 (-1.66)	 (1.64)
3	 0.001	 0.025	 0.436'	 0.026	 0.301	 1.893
(0.67)	 (0.79)	 (2.04)
4	 0.001	 0.141'	 0.047	 1.013	 2.277	 0.600
(0.91)	 (4.30)	 (0.47)
5	 0.002	 0.091'	 0.527*	 0.142	 4.614*	 1.187
(1.47)	 (2.85)	 (3.10)
6	 -0.3E-3	 0.116'	 0.735'	 9.081'	 0.588	 0.814
(-0.17)	 (3.43)	 (2.55)
7	 -0.7E-3	 0.064	 2.717'
	 0.901	 3.481	 1.119
(-0.49)	 (1.68)	 (2.24)
8	 0.001	 0.163'	 0.119'
	 0.615	 0.030	 0.861
(0.91)	 (S.0c)	 (3.19)
9	 -0.9E-3	 0.008	 0.021	 0.125	 0.040	 0.775
(-0.48)	 (0.24)	 (0.32)
10	 -0.1E-3	 0.175'	 0.719'	 1.930	 0.032	 0.872
(-0.07)	 (5.44)	 (3.20)
11	 0.003	 -0.011	
-0.009	 0.067	 0.335	 0.587
(1.34)	 (-0.31)	 (-0.21)
12	 0.002	 0.094'	 0.417'	 0.283	 0.608	 0.968
(1.33)	 (2.92)	 (2.19)
13	 0.1E-3	 -0.070	 1.192'	 1.406	 1.079	 1.047
(0.07)	 (-1.92)	 (2.76)
14	 0.002	 0.137'	 0.147	 0.429	 2.118	 0.913
(0.82)	 (3.95)	 (2.67)
15	 0.8E-3	 0.988'	 0.188	 2.592	 2.603	 0.602
(0.51)	 (2.79)	 (1.64)
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Table 5.2b
Sample period HI
No	 cc)	 cxi	 c	 X2(1)I	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
16	 0.003	 -0.092'	 0.753'	 0.339	 0.185	 1.889
(0.74)	 (-2.16)	 (1.89)
17	 0.3E-3	 0.140*	 0.183*	 2.722	 0.291	 1.744
(0.22)	 (4.16)	 (3.06)
18	 0.002	 0.093*	 0.218*	 0.042	 6.141*	 0.761
(0.89)	 (2.61)	 (2.37)
19	 0.001	 0.093'	 1.004'	 0.373	 0.526	 0.802
(0.58)	 (1.98)	 (2.09)
20	 0.4E-3	 0.141'	 0.085'	 0.015	 0.569	 0.482
(0.22)	 (3.76)	 (2.71)
21	 0.003	 0.086'	 0.252'	 0.104	 0.440	 0.482
(1.74)	 (2.49)	 (2.21)
22	 0.6E-3	 -0.065	 -0.018	 0.149	 2.522	 0.579
(0.31)	 (-1.78)	 (-0.14)
23	 0.002	 0.037	 0.204'	 2.258	 0.815	 0.817
(1.62)	 (1.06)	 (2.47)
24	 -0.005'	 -0.040	 1.349'	 5.963'	 7.720'	 1.158
(-2.55)	 (-1.15)	 (3.56)
25	 -0.002	 -0.004	 0.315e	 0.108	 0.006	 0.693
(-0.93)	 (-0.11)	 (2.08)
26	 0.5E-3	 -0.074	 1.800	 0.160	 4.359'	 1.127
(0.25)	 (-1.41)	 (0.60)
27	 -0.00 1	 -0.006	 -0.052	 6.308'	 0.044	 0.963
(-0.57)	 (-0.17)	 (-0.57)
28	 -0.4E-3	 0.068	 0.131	 0.795	 0.032	 1.904
(-0.21)	 (1.93)	 (0.84)
29	 -0.9E-3	 0.019	 -0.089	 1.294	 0.450	 0.561
(-0.05)	 (0.54)	 (-0.44)
30	 -0.002	 0.035	 1.323'	 2.222	 0.068	 1.302
(-0.86)	 (0.58)	 (2.88)
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Table 5.2b
Sample period Ill
No	 cc)	 cx1	 cc,	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
31	 0.5E-3	 0.168'	 -2.413'	 2.463	 2.075	 0.661
(0.25)	 (2.71)	 (-2.29)
32	 0.7E-3	 0.187*	 0.209'	 0.020	 1.140	 0.851
(0.38)	 (5.26)	 (3.53)
33	 -O.4E-3	 -0.178'	 0.913'	 0.313	 0.131	 0.945
(-0.21)	 (-4.84)	 (2.15)
34	 -0.004	 0.05 1	 0.68 1	 0.783	 0.290	 0.562
(-1.68)	 (1.40)	 (1.81)
35	 -0.004	 0.171'	 1.226'	 0.288	 0.530	 1.008
(-1.73)	 (4.70)	 (2.94)
36	 0.3E-3	 0.055	 0.087'	 2.159	 1.803	 0.455
(0.19)	 (1.53)	 (2.43)
37	 0.7E-3	 -0.037	 0.442	 2.564	 0.012	 1.389
(0.35)	 (-1.05)	 (1.29)
38	 0.001	 -0.027	 0.986'	 1.066	 3.209	 1.151
(0.86)	 (-0.81)	 (2.84)
39	 -0.5E-3	 -0.002	 1.329'	 4.815'	 0.050	 1.062
(-0.31)	 (-0.06)	 (2.50)
40	 -0.004	 -0.8E-4	 1.368'	 0.105	 0.2E-3	 0.414
(-1.60)	 (-0.02)	 (2.94)
41	 -0.001	 0.150'	 0.206	 1.015	 2.684	 0.629
(-0.69)	 (4.58)	 (1.77)
42	 -0.001	 -0.077	 1.111'	 0.253	 2.393	 0.549
(-0.64)	 (-1.93)	 (2.36)
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Table 5.2b
Sample period IV
No	 a0 	 a1	 cc1	 X2(1)I	 X2(1)2	 %2(1)3
1	 0.002	 0.072*	 0.016	 1.128	 0.060	 0.453
(1.22)	 (2.31)	 (1.83)
2	 0.2E-4	 -0.004	 0.007	 2.843	 3.011	 0.427
(0.01)	 (-0.17)	 (0.94)
3	 0.002	 0.322'	 0.297	 0.167	 0.878	 0.569
(1.00)	 (8.24)	 (6.00)
4	 0.00 1	 0.200'	 -0.432'	 4.366*	 2.856	 0.378
(0.62)	 (4.84)	 (-2.31)
5	 0.002	 0.208'	 0.979'	 4.077'	 4999*	 0.487
(1.00)	 (5.28)	 (3.20)
6	 0.003	 0.063	 0.116	 0.572	 4.629'	 0.747
(1.50)	 (1.44)	 (1.19)
7	 0.006'	 0.035	 0.134'	 0.308	 0.952	 0.338
(3.60)	 (0.95)	 (2.46)
8	 0.002	 0.065	 0.039'	 0.556	 0.495	 0.336
(0.93)	 (1.97)	 (2.81)
9	 0.003	 0.148'	 0.381'	 0.640	 0.186	 0.424
(1.47)	 (3.89)	 (2.14)
10	 0.002	 0.124'	 0.477	 1.273	 6.234'	 16.503'
(1.18)	 (2.59)	 (0.81)
11	 -0.1E-3	 0.068	 -0.058	 1.279	 0.273	 0.889
(-0.01)	 (1.73)	 (-0.66)
12	 0.002	 0.081	 -7.000	 4.877'	 0.949	 0.614
(0.83)	 (1.01)	 (-1.02)
13	 0.9E-3	 -0.077	 0.066	 5.422'	 9.099'	 0.430
(0.66)	 (-1.90)	 (0.31)
14	 0.003	 0.154'	 0.174'	 0.758	 0.468	 0.610
(1.55)	 (4.01)	 (2.44)
15	 0.003	 0.138'	 0.532'	 0.003	 3.327	 0.908
(1.21)	 (3.65)	 (3.12)
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Table 5.2b
Sample period IV
No	 a.	 a	 a	 X2(1Y
	
X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
16	 0.003	 0.075'	 0.095	 0.146	 0.465	 1.142
(1.63)	 (2.02)	 (1.48)
17	 -0.004	 -0.155'	 1.848'	 0.971	 1.811	 0.134
(-1.60)	 (-3.33)	 (3.31)
18	 0.003	 -0.108'	 -0.188'	 0.212	 2.637	 0.674
(1.44)	 (-2.69)	 (-2.72)
19	 -0.005'	 0.145'	 2.298'	 2.867	 0.549	 0.660
(-2.48)	 (3.67)	 (5.72)
20	 -0.2E-3	 0.028	 2.034'	 0.046	 0.08 1	 0.487
(-0.09)	 (0.64)	 (3.52)
21	 -0.8E-3	 0.007'	 0.138	 0.008	 10.795'	 1.195
(-0.39)	 (2.00)	 (1.02)
Table 5.2b
Sample period V
No	 a0	 a1	 a	 2(1)'	 2(1)2	 2(1)3
1	 0.IE-3	 0.119'	 0.106	 1.879	 0.183	 0.458a
(0.05)	 (2.15)	 (0.61)
2	 0.9E-3	 0.136'	 -0.026	 3.665	 1.863	 1.104
(0.38)	 (2.63)	 (-0.04)
3	 0.009'	 0.078	 -0.420	 0.066	 0.009	 0.495
(3.32)	 (0.41)	 (-0.21)
4	 0.004	 -0.093	 -0.625'	 4.162'	 0.063	 0.607
(1.71)	 (-1.49)	 (-2.81)
5	 0.008	 0.083	 0.024	 1.333	 2.097	 0.302
(1.75)	 (1.20)	 (0.03)
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Table 5.2b
Sample period V
No	 cx1,	 cx1	 c	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
6	 0.006'	 0.041	 -0.109	 0.111	 0.088	 0.515
(2.48)	 (0.74)	 (-1.00)
7	 0.003	 -0.062	 0.414'	 1.528	 2.296	 0.566
(1.61)	 (-1.26)	 (2.65)
8	 -0.005	 0.107	 3.387'	 0.164	 0.226	 0.816
(-1.49)	 (1.94)	 (4.77)
9	 0.003	 -0.05 1	 21.347'	 5.266'	 4.788'	 2.764
(1.59)	 (-0.63)	 (2.73)
10	 0.006	 0.196'	 0.014	 0.021	 2.729	 0.445
(1.65)	 (2.73)	 (0.07)
11	 0.003	 0.217'	 0.251'	 6.585'	 1.374	 0.381
(1.27)	 (3.68)	 (3.34)
12	 0.001	 0.062	 0.595'	 0.595	 0.195	 0.358
(0.90)	 (1.55)	 (3.28)
13	 0.003	 0.119	 0.990	 2.379	 0.988	 0.485
(0.71)	 (1.66)	 (1.31)
Tables (5.2a) and (5.2b) show the results of the random walk test carried out for all
companies trading on the ISE between 1988 and 1993 using equation (5.2) for returns
unadjusted for thin trading. Table (5.2a) presents results excluding the non-linear term,
while table (5.2b) presents results when the non-linear term has been included.
Coefficient (a 1 ) in table (5.2a) is statistically significant at the 5% level, for 87
companies out of a total of 128 companies in the whole sample, returns are
predictable. This implies that overall the market is inefficient. Furthermore, the
diagnostic tests show that the hypothesis that the error term is a white noise process
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total number of companies in the groupinefficient companies
48
4
42
21
13
Sample
Sample 1
Sample 2
Sample 3
Sample 4
Sample 5
40 (83%)
4 (100%)
20(47%)
14(66%)
9 (69%)
is rejected for most of the companies. What is interesting from this set of results is
that the proportion of companies that are efficiently priced seems to have increased
from 1988 to 1993. The individual groups' results are as follows:
Thus, while 83% of the companies listed in 1988 where inefficient only 47% of the
companies listed in 1990 deemed to be inefficient. Therefore, it is quite possible that
the changes in regulation had a positive impact on the pricing of these securities.
Table (5.2b) shows that the introduction of a non-linear term leads to the error term
having white noise properties for almost all companies (for 85% of the companies)
in all sample periods. However, either coefficient (a 1 ) or (ct.) or both are statistically
significant for most companies.
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Sample
Sample I
Sample 2
Sample 3
Sample 4
Sample 5
inefficient companies
47 (9%)
4 (100%)
20(47%)
14(66%)
9(69%)
total number of companies in the group
48
4
42
21
13
The evidence presented here again imply predictability and inefficiency.
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TABLE 5.3a
Sample period I
RANDOM WALK TEST WITHOUT NON-LINEARITIES FOR UNADJUSTED
RETURNS
5
R = a +	 a R	 + a,6R,, + a17 R 1 , + E.it	 S L__l	 'i '1-) St
No	 a	 a,	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
1	 0.044'	 -0.044'	 0.544	 0.015	 0.756
	
(3.04)	 (-2.33)
2	 0.002'	 0.029	 0.025	 0.225	 1.507
	
(2.40)	 (0.14)
3	 0.004'	 0.038	 1.559	 1.850	 1.689
	
(3.50)	 (1.02)
4	 0.005'	 -0.028'	 12.360'	 20.398'	 0.590
	
(4.51)	 (-2.38)
5	 0.004'	 0.011	 0.922	 2.506	 1.460
	
(3.60)	 (0.20)
6	 0.002'	 -0.128	 10.513'	 7.862'	 2.095
	
(2.30)	 (-1.38)
7	 0.004'	 -0.035	 20.583'	 20.941'	 1.480
	
(3.44)	 (-1.92)
8	 0.004'	 -0.039'	 16.214'	 20.737'	 1.570
	
(3.39)	 (-1.98)
9	 0.003'	 0.104	 1.975	 2.959	 2.903
	
(3.20)	 (1.10)
10	 0.002'	 0.181'	 5.552'	 5.951'	 1.374
	
(2.40)	 (3.62)
11	 0.004'	 -0.075'	 9.204'	 10.373'	 1.134
	
(3.16)	 (-3.70)
	
12 0.002'	 0.009	 10.146'	 0.935	 0.829
	
(2.04)	 (0.64)
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Table 5.3a
Sample period I
No	 a)	 cx	 %2(1)1	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
13	 0.004	 0.297'	 0.002	 0.035	 1.080
(1.95)	 (5.39)
14	 0.002	 0.013*	 9.042'	 4.258*	 0.590
(1.96)	 (6.23)
15	 0.003e	 0.039a	 7.167'	 2.227	 0.945
(2.49)	 (1.68)
16	 0.002	 0.725'	 7.335	 9.971*	 0.474
(1.00)	 (2.43)
17	 -0.001	 -0.053	 11.548*	 4585'	 1.101
(-0.55)	 (-1.94)
18	 0.004'	 -0.016	 1.302	 O.E-3	 1.127
(4.32)	 (-0.78)
19	 0.004'	 0.106'	 18.045'	 14314*	 1.389
(2.05)	 (3.02)
20	 0.004'	 0.053	 10.863*	 15.773'	 1.834
(4.10)	 (0.64)
21	 0.003'	 0.025	 9.749'	 2.076	 2.618
(2.61)	 (1.11)
22	 0.001	 0.144	 5.689e	 5343'	 0.614
(1.40)	 (0.94)
23	 0.004'	 0.017	 1.865	 0.056	 1.541
(2.51)	 (0.79)
24	 0.003'	 0.089'	 3.424	 5.579'	 1.584
(2.80)	 (2.08)
25	 0.003'	 0.053'	 3.159	 3.321	 0.959
(2.21)	 (2.80)
26	 0.003'	 0.395'	 5.786'	 12.642'	 0.909
(2.50)	 (2.69)
27	 0.004'	 0.139	 45.529'	 36.451'	 1.176
(2.05)	 (1.96)
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Table 5.3a
Sample period I
No	 cx0	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
28	 0.003	 0.167	 2.401	 0.520	 0.949
(1.55)	 (0.89)
29	 0.003	 0.311	 3.267	 2.720	 1.655
(1.40)	 (1.81)
30	 0.003'	 0.069'	 0.855	 0.222	 0.642
(2.53)	 (3.16)
31	 0.004'	 -0.048'	 7.076'	 2.361	 0.754
(2.60)	 (-2.40)
32	 0.003'	 0.312	 12.430'	 11.520'	 0.002
(3.20)	 (0.43)
33	 0.003'	 0.041'	 7.065'	 3.141	 2.062
(2.54)	 (2.05)
34	 0.004'	 -0.067'	 5.822'	 5.782'	 1.220
(3.07)	 (-3.66)
35	 0.002	 -0.013	 19.998'	 0.018	 0.402
(1.6)	 (-0.79)
36	 0.002'	 0.253'	 93948	 3.353	 0.652
(2.30)	 (3.05)
37	 0.003'	 -0.023	 14.288'	 1.031	 1.599
(2.22)	 (-1.05)
38	 0.004'	 0.528	 0.216	 0.012	 1.057
(3.70)	 (1.87)
39	 0.003'	 0.178'	 27.378'	 26.981'	 1.454
(3.00)	 (1.98)
40	 0.002'	 0.467'	 0.327	 5.148'	 1.504
(2.30)	 (3.00)
41	 0.002	 0.361	 0.281	 0.857	 1.974
(1.00)	 (1.11)
42	 0.002	 0.041	 4.132'	 2.329	 1.694
(1.54)	 (1.85)
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Table 5.3a
Sample period I
No	 a1,	 cx1	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2
43	 0.003*	 0.031	 4.163'	 3.918*	 1.093
(2.50)	 (1.33)
44	 0.004*	 0.015	 6.639'	 6.850'	 1.852
(3.50)	 (0.47)
45	 0.004*	 0.065'	 2.088	 1.890	 2.355
(3.31)	 (3.14)
46	 0.003'	 -0.033	 17.348'	 17.984*	 0.928
(2.48)	 (-1.64)
47	 0.002'	 0.038'	 4.138'	 8.085'	 1.878
(2.15)	 (2.05)
48	 0.001	 0.107'	 0.006	 3.587	 1.255
(0.82)	 (3.80)
Table 5.3a
Sample period II
No	 cx1)	 a,	 2(1)'	 X2(1)2
1	 0.E-3	 -0.084'	 9.605'	 10.165'	 1.299
(0.34)	 (-4.64)
2	 -0.E-3	 -0.065'	 3.641	 6.233'	 0.872
(-0.22)	 (-2.24)
3	 0.E-4	 -0.146'	 9.748'	 12.320'	 2.726
(0.02)	 (-5.03)
4	 -0.E-4	 -0.070'	 1.820	 0.809	 1.858
(-0.03)	 (-2.68)
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Table 5.3a
Sample period Ill
	
No	 cLi)	 a	 x2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
I	 0.003'	 0.010	 3.739	 1.105	 0.934
	
(2.04)	 (0.31)
	
2	 0.032'	 0.076'	 0.043	 1.62 1	 0.577
	
(2.53)	 (2.27)
	
3	 0.003'	 0.032	 2.216	 4.804*	 1.821
	
(2.22)	 (1.06)
	
4	 0.003	 0.008	 0.239	 0.005	 0.63 1
	
(1.79)	 (0.25)
	
5	 0.003	 -0.019	 6.054'	 2.468	 1.192
	
(1.83)	 (-0.91)
	
6	 0.005	 -0.071	 1.147	 4.778'	 0.672
	
(1.99)	 (-1.58)
	
7	 0.003'	 -0.032	 2.585	 5.066*	 1.102
	
(2.11)	 (-1.03)
	
8	 0.E-3	 -0.039	 4.408*	 9.6718	 0.404
	
(0.05)	 (-2.06)
	
9	 0.007*	 0.042	 0.E-3	 0.003	 0.772
	
(3.64)	 (1.42)
	
10	 0.004'	 -0.062'	 9.752'	 0.952	 0.455
	(2.32)	 (-8.90)
	
11	 0.005'	 0.004	 0.180	 0.187	 0.564
	(2.63)	 (0.16)
	
12	 0.005'	 0.020	 2.706	 3.490	 1.076
	
(3.19)	 (0.88)
	
13	 0.004'	 0.020	 0.141	 0.034	 1.043
	
(2.79)	 (0.82)
	
14	 0.007'	 0.026	 8.921'	 10.318'	 0.830
	
(3.81)	 (1.02)
	
15	 0.003	 0.008	 2.388	 4.910'	 0.587
	
(1.81)	 (0.26)
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Table 5.3a
Sample period III
No	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
16	 0.003'	 0.064	 0.020	 0.153	 1.953
(2.27)	 (1.95)
17	 0.001	 -0.037	 9.875'	 7.457'	 1.827
(0.68)	 (-1.51)
18	 0.006'	 0.036	 2.938	 1.683	 0.716
(3.20)	 (1.20)
19	 0.002	 0.025	 0.082	 2.650	 0.601
(1.24)	 (0.70)
20	 0.003	 -0.045	 2.600	 4.771*	 0.500
(1.48)	 (-1.85)
21	 0.005e	 0.182	 2.868	 3.490	 0.570
(2.94)	 (1.06)
22	 0.005'	 -0.030	 0.233	 0.E-3	 0.784
(2.52)	 (-1.00)
23	 0.004'	 -0.069'	 10.527'	 0.732	 1.031
(2.56)	 (-2.60)
24	 0.002	 -0.021	 0.184	 2.452	 0.949
(1.16)	 (-0.58)
25	 0.005'	 -0.042	 2.529	 3.328	 0.637
(2.84)	 (-1.27)
26	 0.003	 0.036	 0.191	 2.123	 1.441
(1.68)	 (1.02)
27	 0.006'	 -0.008	 0.274	 0.381	 0.811
(2.98)	 (-0.28)
28	 0.004'	 0.041	 3.269	 7.993'	 0.906
(2.54)	 (1.63)
29	 0.002	 0.039	 0.065	 0.378	 0.674
(0.95)	 (1.12)
30	 0.003	 0.048	 3.096	 7.092'	 50.683'
(1.52)	 (1.30)
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Table 5.3a
Sample period III
No	 X)	 a1	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
31	 0.002	 0.032	 0.278	 0.803	 0.816
(1.00)	 (0.87)
32	 0.005	 -0.056	 9.726	 9.116*	 0.838
(2.21)	 (-2.05)
33	 0.004*	 -0.009	 1.253	 2.149	 1.015
(3.42)	 (0.27)
34	 -0.E-3	 -0.097	 0.771	 0.011	 0.516
(-0.09)	 (-5.88)
35	 0.004	 0.105	 2.347	 0.023	 1.218
(1.56)	 (3.17)
36	 0.004	 -0.064	 2.67 1	 4.578*	 0.466
(1.94)	 (-2.60)
37	 0.006	 0.024	 0.161	 0.258	 1.701
(3.24)	 (0.75)
38	 0.005	 -0.032	 0.924	 0.789	 1.277
(3.07)	 (-1.17)
39	 0.00(	 0.040	 0.565	 0.288	 1.052
(2.85)	 (1.34)
40	 0.006	 0.033	 1.743	 8.720'	 0.775
(2.63)	 (0.80)
41	 0.004'	 -0.006	 0.380	 2.051	 0.618
(2.24)	 (-0.20)
42	 0.004'	 -0.013	 0.095	 1.541	 0.599
(2.22)	 (-0.36)
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Table 5.3a
Sample period IV
No	 a1	 X2(1)1	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
0.010'	 -0.042'	 9.296'	 8.463'	 0.428
(6.71)	 (-6.31)
2	 0.E-3	 -0.022	 4.089'	 0.890	 0.427
(0.06)	 (-1.86)
3	 0.004	 -0.043	 17.240'	 15.199'	 0.523
(1.86)	 (-1.66)
4	 0.006'	 -0.088'	 3.523	 4.138'	 0.385
(2.27)	 (-3.63)
5	 0.012'	 -0.056	 11.926'	 9.811'	 0.386
(4.99)	 (-1.89)
6	 0.008'	 0.1050	 1.662	 3.670	 0.700
(4.03)	 (3.23)
7	 0.002	 -0.096'	 6.782'	 5.358'	 0.28 1
(1.33)	 (-4.33)
8	 0.004'	 0.032'	 0.117	 1.358	 0.326
(2.19)	 (2.02)
9	 0.004'	 0.003	 5.672'	 5.375'	 0.507
(2.07)	 (0.10)
10	 0.003	 0.073	 0.646	 5.460'	 0.168
(1.68)	 (1.58)
11	 0.006'	 -0.068'	 2.597	 1.683	 0.966
(2.97)	 (-2.43)
12	 0.007'	 0.012	 4.753'	 0.374	 0.513
(2.99)	 (0.26)
13	 0.004'	 -0.093'	 1.452	 9.468'	 0.493
(2.95)	 (-2.54)
14	 0.008'	 -0.036	 3.730	 0.511	 0.590
(3.66)	 (-1.28)
15	 0.003	 -0.014	 12.083'	 8.749'	 0.880
(1.10)	 (-0.41)
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Table 5.3a
Sample period IV
No	 X2(l)1	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
16	 O.007	 -0.004	 2.204	 0.970	 1.171
(4.12)	 (-0.17)
17	 0.E-3	 -0.004	 7.249	 0.004	 0.030
(0.06)	 (-0.08)
18	 0.006	 -0.l22	 0.127	 0.313	 0.831
(3.05)	 (-3.30)
19	 0.004	 0.028	 4.475	 9.161*	 0.673
(1.74)	 (0.82)
20	 -0.002	 -0.041	 4.084*	 6.813*	 1.452
(-1.18)	 (-0.99)
21	 0.005	 0.064	 0.496	 4•559*
	 1.202
(2.42)	 (1.84)
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Table 5.3a
Sample period V
No	 X2(1)1	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
1	 0.004	 0.032	 0.170	 0.014	 0.382
(1.32)	 (0.67)
2	 0.00W	 -0.11W	 1.387	 2.976	 2.746
(3.46)	 (-2.49)
3	 O.005	 0.15W	 3.842	 2.308	 0.077
(2.12)	 (2.00)
4	 O.006	 0.087	 3.082	 8.890*	 0.632
(2.35)	 (1.61)
5	 o.008e	 0.083	 1.082	 0.00 1	 0.304
(2.05)	 (1.21)
6	 -0.001	 0.049	 0.975	 1.854	 0.593
(-0.57)	 (1.23)
7	 0.006	 -0.034	 1.709	 2.359	 0.43 1
(3.41)	 (-0.84)
8	 0.015	 -0.077	 1.098	 1.973	 0.882
(4.91)	 (-0.37)
9	 0.005	 0.219	 0.506	 6.879*	 2.653
(2.73)	 (4.79)
10	 -0.033	 -0.183	 0.311	 0.355	 0.546
(-0.66)	 (-3.03)
11	 0.005	 0.019	 4.587	 1.953	 0.362
(1.84)	 (9.15)
12	 0.004	 -0.059	 7.183	 0.256	 0.392
(2.16)	 (-1.66)
13	 0.E-3	 0.125	 4•757*	 0.138	 0.141
(0.18)	 (1.78)
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Table 5.3b
Sample period I
RANDOM WALK TEST WITH NON-LINEARITIES FOR ADJUSTED
RETURNS
5
R 1 , = a10 +	 cx R	 + a D 2	 + C.if il-I	 + a itj.l
No	 a0	 a1	 a	 %2(1)I	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
I	 0.003	 0.079	 0.087	 0.103	 0.286	 0.751
(2.77)	 (3.00)	 (0.99)
2	 0.003	 -0.099	 -0.022	 0.011	 0.695	 1.507
(1.99)	 (-0.35)	 (-0.14)
3	 0.003	 0.008	 0.055	 0.035	 0.163	 1.690
(3.07)	 (0.33)	 (1.35)
4	 0.005	 0.062	 0.040	 0.135	 1.632	 0.593
(4.07)	 (2.69)	 (4.53)
5	 0.004	 0.7E-3	 0.007	 5.903	 4.724	 1.452
(2.76)	 (0.03)	 (0.03)
6	 0.003	 0.047	 -0.408	 1.815	 0.352	 2.115
(2.16)	 (1.95)	 (-1.98)
7	 0.002	 0.050	 0.598	 2.109	 0.070	 1.454
(1.73)	 (2.04)	 (4.38)
8	 0.0038	 0.020	 0.176e	 0.421	 3.136	 1.569
(2.69)	 (0.82)	 (3.92)
9	 0.004	 -0.084	 5.271	 0.147	 1.592	 2.838
(2.79)	 (-2.03)	 (1.62)
10	 0.002	 0.065	 0.066	 0.047	 1.206	 1.368
(1.81)	 (2.63)	 (2.44)
11	 0.004	 -0.021	 O.143	 0.118	 1.122	 1.368
(2.93)	 (-0.86)	 (3.78)
12	 0.001	 0.076	 0.283	 0.047	 0.762	 0.825
(1.36)	 (3.08)	 (4.03)
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Table 5.3b
Sample period I
No	 cI.)
13	 0.004'
(2.43)
14	 0.002
(1.46)
15	 0.003'
(2.01)
16	 0.003
(1.43)
17	 -0.002
(-1.13)
18	 0.001
(1.12)
19	 0.004'
(3.32)
20	 0.004'
(3.19)
21	 0.002
(1.71)
22	 0.001
(0.88)
23	 0.003'
(2.36)
24	 0.002
(1.62)
25	 0.002'
(1.99)
26	 0.002
(1.29)
27	 0.002'
(2)1)
cx1
-0.026
(-0.99)
0.174'
(7.04)
0.076*
(2.81)
0.022
(0.62)
0.020
(0.64)
0.007
(0.28)
0.060'
(2.55)
0.063'
(2.59)
0.067*
(2.61)
0.039
(1.51)
0.045
(1.71)
0.020
(0.79)
0.084'
(3.28)
0.064'
(2.43)
0.107'
(4.58)
0.332
(1.54)
0.180'
(3.28)
0.170'
(2.64)
0.250'
(3.17)
0.326'
(4.06)
0.7 17'
(2.77)
0.127'
(3.78)
0.18 1'
(4.00)
0.368'
(3.29)
0.053*
(3.53)
-0.111'
(-1.85)
0.3 13'
(2.36)
0.057
(1.79)
0.472'
(3.56)
0.47 5'
(4.67)
2.132
0.009
0.749
0.0 17
0.65 1
3.955*
3.5 19
0.096
0.489
0.803
0.342
0.036
0.388
0.778
1.117
X2(1)3
1.185	 1.061
1.344	 0.595
0.547	 0.921
0.8E-3	 0.501
4.956'	 1.212
1.868	 1.063
2.153	 1.389
1.692	 1.843
0.53 1	 2.524
2.55 1
	
0.622
0.104	 1.509
2.085	 1.522
1.934	 0.948
0.165	 0.898
2.528	 1.334
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Table 5.3b
Sample period I
No	 cc)	 c	 x2(1Y
	
X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
28	 0.001	 0.028	 0.681'	 3.532	 3.600	 0.914
(0.91)	 (1.06)	 (2.50)
29	 0.003'	 -0.025	 -0.055	 1.805	 0.711	 1.661
(2.14)	 (-0.94)	 (-1.31)
30	 0.002'	 0.082'	 0.097'	 0.003	 0.067	 0.638
(2.30)	 (3.44)	 (4.67)
31	 0.003'	 -0.009	 0.071'	 1.896	 2.978	 0.777
(2.27)	 (-0.37)	 (2.52)
32	 0.003'	 0.087'	 0.156'	 0.764	 0.645	 1.986
(2.10)	 (3.35)	 (3.40)
33	 0.002'	 0.067'	 0.131'	 2.323	 0.006	 2.050
(2.11)	 (2.85)	 (2.10)
34	 0.004'	 -0.033	 -0.042	 2.871	 1.857	 1.290
(2.98)	 (-1.41)	 (-1.93)
35	 0.1E-3	 0.048	 0.866'	 14.031'	 2.383	 0.382
(0.09)	 (1.84)	 (3.02)
36	 0.00 1	 0.050'	 0.437'	 0.503	 3.347	 0.636
(0.85)	 (2.02)	 (3.79)
37	 0.002	 0.035	 0.269'	 1.211	 0.736	 1.608
(1.46)	 (1.33)	 (3.97)
38	 0.004'	 0.033	 0.005	 1.104	 3.082	 1.056
(2.07)	 (0.97)	 (0.11)
39	 0.002	 0.095'	 0.189'	 0.3E-3	 1.111	 1.413
(1.64)	 (3.62)	 (5.15)
40	 0.7E-3	 0.053	 0.549'	 2.142	 1.500	 1.513
(0.28)	 (1.49)	 (2.26)
41	 0.003	 0.005	 -0.038	 0.222	 0.772	 1.974
(1.15)	 (0.14)	 (-0.27)
42	 0.001	 0.083'	 0.196'	 1.511	 0.1E-3	 1.673
(0.98)	 (3.18)	 (3.07)
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Table 5.3b
Sample period I
No	 CL0	 cx1	 X2(1)2	 %2(1)3
43	 0.002	 0.059	 0.297	 1.879	 4.280*	 1.064
(1.69)	 (2.34)	 (2.99)
44	 0.003e	 0.022	 0.149	 1.687	 0.036	 2.042
(2.45)	 (0.92)	 (2.80)
45	 0.002	 0.071	 0.612*	 0.500	 0.624	 2.290
(1.83)	 (2.76)	 (2.20)
46	 0.001	 0.042	 0.567	 1.573	 1.193	 0.952
(0.96)	 (1.65)	 (3.34)
47	 0.004	 0.051	 -0.061	 0.783	 0.695	 1.911
(3.71)	 (2.02)	 (-0.85)
48	 -0.002	 0.072	 1.061	 0.211	 0.056	 1.265
(-0.93)	 (2.23)	 (3.15)
Table 5.3b
Sample period H
No	 cç	 a1	 %2(1)1	 X2(1)2	 %2(1)3
1	 0.9E-4	 -0.016	 0.076*	 0.273	 7.129*	 1.266
(0.06)	 (-0.55)	 (3.18)
2	 -0.002	 -0.033	 0.312*	 0.537	 0.273	 0.923
(-0.85)	 (-1.02)	 (2.50)
3	 -0.002	 -0.082	 0.403	 1.991	 2.822	 4.290*
(-0.74)	 (-2.31)	 (1.90)
4	 -0.7E-3	 -0.059	 0.125	 0.792	 0.150	 1.878
(-0.41)	 (-1.93)	 (0.49)
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Table 5.3b
Sample period III
No	 cc	 cx	 cx.,	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
1	 0.002	 0.026	 0.465'	 0.579	 0.639	 0.937
(1.26)	 (0.80)	 (2.11)
2	 0.003'	 0.049	 1.163	 2.581	 2.221	 0.612
(2.63)	 (1.27)	 (1.44)
3	 0.002	 0.048	 0.466'	 0.018	 0.254	 1.802
(1.41)	 (1.54)	 (2.18)
4	 0.003	 0.001	 0.050	 0.102	 1.199	 0.632
(1.81)	 (0.03)	 (0.39)
5	 0.001	 0.042	 0.453'	 1.234	 4.246'	 1.158
(0.96)	 (1.30)	 (2.84)
6	 0.004	 -0.035	 -0.056	 0.309	 1.454	 0.681
(1.89)	 (-1.01)	 (-1.85)
7	 0.001	 0.002	 1.219'	 3.258	 0.192	 1.035
(0.66)	 (0.05)	 (2.59)
8	 0.002	 0.084'	 0.078'	 1.326	 1.056	 0.67 1
(0.87)	 (2.57)	 (4.29)
9	 0.007'	 0.04 1	 -0.004	 0.035	 1.329	 0.773
(3.57)	 (1.18)	 (-0.05)
10	 0.003	 0.004	 0.173'	 3.407	 1.880	 0.449
(1.80)	 (0.13)	 (2.97)
11	 0.005'	 0.014	 0.102'	 0.167	 0.573	 0.563
(2.58)	 (0.37)	 (1.99)
12	 0.004'	 0.066'	 0.102	 0.038	 0.655	 1.066
(2.80)	 (2.04)	 (1.97)
13	 0.003	 -0.020	 0.956'	 1.487	 0.014	 1.027
(1.70)	 (-0.54)	 (2.03)
14	 0.006'	 0.102'	 0.139'	 0.067	 0.227	 0.802
(3.20)	 (2.95)	 (3.22)
15	 0.003	 0.047	 0.214'	 3.220	 0.241	 0.589
(1.34)	 (1.33)	 (2.21)
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Table 5.3b
Sample period III
No	 cx1 ,	 cç	 2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 2(1)3
	16 0.002	 0.034	 0.984*	 0.397	 0.053	 1.863
	
(1.02)	 (0.78)	 (2.14)
17	 -0.001	 0.021	 O.701	 1.346	 0.005	 1.749
(-0.66)	 (0.61)	 (3.84)
	
18 0.005	 0.076*	 -O.247	 0.016	 3.656	 0.722
	
(3.03)	 (2.11)	 (-1.99)
	
19 0.002	 0.084	 -0.985	 0.996	 1.438	 0.606
	
(1.30)	 (1.66)	 (-1.83)
	
20 0.003	 0.022	 0.058*	 1.019	 0.271	 0.500
	
(1.24)	 (0.57)	 (2.18)
	
21 0.004	 0.045	 0.201	 1.435	 3.237	 0.622
	
(2.61)	 (1.34)	 (1.78)
	
22 0.005	 -0.035	 0.031	 1.216	 0.313	 0.782
	
(2.52)	 (-0.94)	 (0.21)
	
23 0.002	 -0.004	 0.679	 0.208	 0.025	 1.060
	
(1.25)	 (-0.10)	 (2.58)
	
24 0.002	 -0.035	 1.595	 1.808	 2.768	 0.816
	
(1.17)	 (-0.71)	 (4.15)
	
25 0.004	 -0.019	 0.268	 0.122	 0.001	 0.660
	
(2.27)	 (-0.55)	 (1.82)
	
26 0.003	 0.046	 -0.830	 0.249	 2.009	 1.444
	
(1.64)	 (0.88)	 (-2.50)
	
27 0.006	 0.005	 0.038	 2.197	 0.866	 0.810
	
(2.81)	 (0.15)	 (0.61)
	
28 0.004*	 0.003	 0.114*	 0.567	 0.015	 0.940
	
(2.32)	 (0.09)	 (2.83)
	
29 0.002	 0.037	 0.04I*	 0.438	 0.616	 0.700
	
(0.97)	 (1.02)	 (-2.01)
30 -0.3E-3	 0.030	 1.340	 0.017	 1.213	 3.738
(-0.16)	 (0.81)	 (2.67)
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Table 5.3b
Sample period III
No	 a0	 	 cc,	 %2(1)1	 Xz(1)z	 X2(1)3
	31 0.002	 0.144*	 -0.396'	 2.853	 0.447	 0.809
	
(0.89)	 (2.46)	 (-2.15)
	
32 0.004	 0.016	 0.148*	 1.981	 0.437	 0.855
	(1.66)	 (0.45)	 (3.03)
	
33 0.003	 -0.008	 1.193*	 0.425	 1.030	 0.938
	
(1.91)	 (-0.22)	 (2.39)
	
34 -0.002	 -0.1 15'	 0.373	 2.163	 0.457	 0.5 14
(-0.65)	 (-3.12)	 (1.25)
35 -0.6E-3	 0.064	 1.053*	 0.015	 0.168	 1.262
(-0.22)	 (1.68)	 (2.80)
	
36 0.003	 -0.014	 -0.038	 0.213	 1.616	 0.474
	
(1.81)	 (-0.39)	 (-1.87)
	
37 0.004'	 -0.009	 1.552	 3.252	 0.410	 1.664
	
(2.33)	 (0.26)	 (1.74)
	
38 0.003	 -0.073'	 1.638'	 1.256	 2.691	 1.239
	
(1.78)	 (2.15)	 (2.89)
	
39 0.002	 0.008	 3.607'	 0.474	 0.910	 0.980
	
(0.96)	 (0.19)	 (2.73)
	
40 0.002	 0.005	 1.442'	 1.675	 0.041	 0.382
	
(0.76)	 (0.13)	 (2.96)
	
41 0.004	 0.013	 0.141	 1.253	 0.585	 0.613
	
(1.88)	 (0.39)	 (1.43)
	
42 0.002	 -0.065	 3.793'	 0.419	 1.448	 0.577
	
(0.87)	 (-1.57)	 (2.46)
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Table 5.3b
Sample period IV
No	 c1,	 cx1	 a	 X2(1)'	 %2(1)2	 X2(1)3
1	 0.009'	 0.045	 0.016'	 1.369	 0.028	 0.437
(6.09)	 (1.49)	 (2.96)
2	 0.008'	 0.072'	 0.024*	 0.005	 0.021	 0.420
(4.49)	 (1.98)	 (2.21)
3	 0.004	 0.070	 -0.261'	 2.123	 0.221	 0.553
(1.53)	 (1.91)	 (-4.47)
4	 0.005'	 -0.022	 -0.026	 0.283	 2.262	 0.394
(2.08)	 (-0.53)	 (-1.93)
5	 0.011'	 0.036	 0.150*	 2.897	 1.369	 0.525
(4.68)	 (0.92)	 (3.30)
6	 0.008'	 0.133*	 0.107	 0.442	 4.711'	 0.673
(3.66)	 (3.09)	 (0.98)
7	 0.5E-4	 -0.044	 1.154'	 2.725	 2.596	 0.358
(0.03)	 (-1.18)	 (2.79)
8	 0.004'	 0.033	 -0.2E-8	 0.208	 1.884	 0.325
(2.18)	 (1.06)	 (-0.04)
9	 0.003	 0.039	 0.333'	 1.432	 0.416	 0.512
(1.44)	 (1.01)	 (2.32)
10	 0.003'	 0.007	 14.973	 0.959	 5.785'	 17.066
(1.69)	 (0.07)	 (1.28)
11	 0.006'	 -0.039	 -0.063	 1.357	 1.078	 0.973
(2.84)	 (-1.05)	 (-1.18)
12	 0.007'	 0.098	 -8.839	 3.063	 1.520	 0.417
(2.96)	 (1.26)	 (-1.35)
13	 0.004'	 -0.094'	 0.010	 4.817'	 10.978'	 0.493
(2.90)	 (-2.20)	 (0.20)
14	 0.007'	 0.009	 0.107'	 2.978	 0.152	 0.641
(3.10)	 (0.20)	 (2.30)
15	 0.8E-3	 0.033	 0.397'	 2.403	 0.104	 0.601
(0.40)	 (0.90)	 (3.00)
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Table 5.3b
Sample period IV
No	 a1)	 a,	 a	 %2(1)1	 Xz(1)2	 XZ(1)3
16	 0.006*	 0.029	 0.306	 0.224	 0.9E-4	 1.159
(3.30)	 (0.81)	 (1.20)
17	 0.4E-4	 -0.111	 16.423	 0.991	 2.652	 3.160
(0.02)	 (-1.11)	 (1.21)
18	 0.005	 -0.093	 0.078*	 5.310*	 7.780*	 0.857
(2.42)	 (-2.34)	 (2.47)
19	 0.003	 0.075	 -O.512	 0.506	 0.114	 0.664
(1.56)	 (1.84)	 (-2.03)
20	 -0.002	 0.042	 -8.896	 0.326	 1.818	 1.497
(-1.10)	 (0.65)	 (-1.67)
21	 0.005	 0.065	 0.035	 0.422	 7.995	 1.203
(2.28)	 (1.85)	 (0.24)
Table 5.3b
Sample period V
No	 c	 a,	 cx.,	 2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
1	 0.004	 0.035	 0.020	 1.404	 0.211	 0.380
(1.25)	 (0.64)	 (0.12)
2	 0.4E-3	 0.034	 0.170	 2.068	 0.739	 0.840
(0.20)	 (0.37)	 (0.23)
3	 0.004	 0.085	 1.712	 1.581	 4.165*	 0.420
(1.60)	 (0.93)	 (1.51)
4	 0.008	 -0.011	 -0.834	 0.481	 0.207	 0.703
(3.13)	 (-0.18)	 (-2.10)
5	 0.008	 -0.064	 12.125	 0.227	 2.609	 0.339
(2.17)	 (-0.53)	 (1.48)
6	 0.8E-3	 0.046	 -1.1 13	 0.365	 1.645	 0.595
(0.31)	 (0.74)	 (-1.75)
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Table 5.3b
Sample period V
No	 o	 c1	 a0	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
7	 0.005*	 0.028	 0.313	 0.788	 0.532	 0.436
(2.82)	 (0.55)	 (1.10)
8	 0.014	 -0.002	 0.101	 1.168	 2.055	 0.887
(4.31)	 (-0.03)	 (1.10)
9	 0.004*	 0.054	 19.590*	 1.024	 4.707*	 2.155
(2.46)	 (0.69)	 (2.60)
10	 -0.004	 0.187*	 0.105	 0.230	 0.065	 0.552
(-0.74)	 (-3.03)	 (0.34)
11	 0.004	 0.095	 -0.004	 3.744	 0.7E-3	 0.382
(1.63)	 (1.74)	 (-1.39)
12	 0.002	 0.009	 0.489	 0.427	 0.104	 0.415
(1.41)	 (0.22)	 (3.69)
13	 -0.7E-3	 0.126	 0.481	 4.076*	 0.023	 0.227
(-0.18)	 (1.79)	 (0.68)
Notes: See notes on table (5.2a)
Tables (5.3a) and (5.3b) show the results for returns corrected for the impact of thin
trading. The adjustment to returns to take account of thin trading appears to have
removed the apparent predictability for most of the companies shown in table (5.2a).
Specifically, 60% of the companies under investigation seem to be efficiently priced
as compared to 32% in table (5.2a). This set of results seems to point out that the
length of trading is an important factor that contributes to the efficient pricing of
securities. Almost 65% of the companies trading for more than 2 years seem to be
efficient. Furthermore, most diagnostic tests seem to allow acceptance of the
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total number of companies in the groupinefficient companies
48
4
42
21
13
Sample
Sample 1
Sample 2
Sample 3
Sample 4
Sample 5
19(40%)
4 (100%)
10(24%)
12(57%)
7 (54%)
hypothesis that the residuals follow a white noise process. Hence, the results suggest
that the random walk model is accepted and the market on average is informationally
efficient.
However, the inclusion of a non-linear term as shown in table (5.3b) leads to a rather
different conclusion. With the introduction of non-linearities for almost 70% of all
companies the hypothesis of no predictability is rejected at the 5% level, while the
error term seems to appear white noise. As mentioned before if the underlying process
generating returns comes from a non-linear system which looks like a random walk
then the use of a linear model may wrongly lead to the acceptance or rejection of the
hypothesis. Again the results seem to indicate that companies listed after the changes
in regulation are more likely to be efficient. However, to examine this issue further
the same investigation is carried out for the market index.
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Sample
Sample 1
Sample 2
Sample 3
Sample 4
Sample 5
inefficient companies
40 (3%)
4 (100%)
30 (71%)
12(57%)
4(31%)
total number of companies in the group
4
4
42
21
13
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B. MARKET INDEX ANALYSIS
TABLE 5.4a
RANDOM WALK MODEL WITHOUT NON-LINEARITIES FOR
UNCORRECTED RETURNS FOR THE ISE INDEX
R 1 = a() + a1 R, 1 +
a1	 x2(l )
	 X2(1)3
0.002
	
0.261
	 8.338*	 0.034	 0.072
(2.91)	 (10.39)
TABLE 5.4b
RANDOM WALK MODEL WITH NON-LINEARITIES FOR UNCORRECTED
RETURNS FOR THE SE N3EX
R, 
= 
a1) + a1 R, 1 +	 +
a0	 1	 a	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
0.002	 0.367*	 28.717*	 0.6E-4
	
0.373	 0.939
(2.88)	 (9.70)	 (-3.74)
Notes: See notes on table (5.2a
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Tables (5.4a) and (5.4b) show the results of the random walk test carried out for the
period 1 98 to 1993 using equation (5.2) for market returns unadjusted for thin
trading. Table (5.4a) presents results excluding the non-linear term, while table (5.4b)
presents results when the non-linear term has been included. Coefficient (a 1 ) in table
(5.4a) is statistically significant at the 5% level which implies predictability in returns,
and thus inefficiency. Furthermore, the diagnostic tests show that the hypothesis that
the error term is a white noise process is rejected. Specifically, the series is found to
be serially correlated.2
Table (5.4b) shows that the introduction of a non-linear term leads to the error term
having white noise properties. However, both coefficients (a 1 ) and (aD) are statistically
significant3 . This again implies predictability and inefficiency.
TABLE 5.5a
RANDOM WALK MODELS WITHOUT NON-LINEAR1TIES FOR
CORRECTED RETURNS
R1 =; + a 1 R, +
a0 	 1	 2(l)'	 2(1)2	 2(l)3
0.002	 -0.9E-4	 5.771'	 2.277	 1.455
(1.67)	 (-0.004)
1 8
TABLE 5.5b
RANDOM WALK MODELS WITH NON-LINEARITIES FOR CORRECTED
RETURNS
=A"	 + a1 R, +	 + C,
a0
	 1	 X2(1)'	 X2(1)2
	 2( 1)
0.002	 0.105'	 - 14.309'
	
0.722	 2.247
	
1.035
(1.69)	 (2.97)	 (-4.15)
Notes: (See table 5.2a)
Tables (5.5a) and (5.5b) show the results for returns corrected for the impact of thin
trading.The adjustment to returns to take account of thin trading appears to have
removed the apparent predictability shown in table (5.5a). Furthermore, all the
diagnostic tests allow acceptance of the hypothesis that the residuals follow a white
noise process4. Hence, the results suggest that the random walk model is accepted and
the market is informationally efficient. However, the inclusion of a non-linear term
as shown in table (5.5b) leads to a very different conclusion. In particular, with the
introduction of a non-linear component both coefficients (a1) and (c) are statistically
significant, while the error term is still white noise. This seems to indicate
predictability and inefficiency. As mentioned in section (5.1) if the underlying process
generating returns comes from a non-linear system which looks like a random walk
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YEAR
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
then the use of a linear model may wrongly lead to the acceptance or rejection of the
hypothesis.
TABLE 5.6a
RANDOM WALK TEST ON A YEARLY BASIS WITHOUT
NON-LINEARITIES FOR UNADJUSTED RETURNS
=	
+	 +
a0
-0.00 1
(-0.58)
0.007
(2.91)
-0.002
(-0.61)
-0.8E-3
(-0.28)
-0.002
(-1.01)
0.006
(2.78)
cx1
0.076
(1.20)
0.110
(1.77)
0.024
(0.38)
-0.099
(-1.60)
-0.095
(-1.58)
-0.111
(-1.73)
X2(1)'	 X2(1)2	 X2(1)3
1.904	 2.169	 0.148
3.724	 17.043*	 7.938*
0.462	 0.3 10	 0.858
0.051	 0.491	 1.511
	
0.360
	
0.305
	
0.008
	
0.187
	
0.417
	
0.012
Notes: Table (5 .2a)
Table (5.6a) shows the results on a yearly basis in the absence of non-linearities.
The results shows that the coefficient (a 1) is insignificantly different from zero at
the 5% level for all years, with most diagnostic tests indicating the error term is a
white noise process. Thus there appears to be no predictability and the market
appears to be efficient for all years. However, the introduction of non-linearities
produces a very interesting set of results as shown in table (5.6b). In particular, the
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inclusion of a non-linear term makes coefficient (as) statistically significant for
1988, 1989 and 1990, with the non-linear term being significant for 1988 and
1990. However, for 1991 onwards we observe no predictability. Hence, it appears
that the regulatory and institutional changes have brought about more volume of
trading, more and better quality information and more and perhaps better informed
investors. The result is that the market became efficient. Pre-1991 poor quality
information, institutional restrictions on trading and possibly less well informed
investors appear to have resulted in non-linear behaviour and inefficiency.
TABLE 5.6b
RANDOM WALK TEST ON A YEARLY BASIS WITh NON-LINEARITIES
FOR ADJUSTED RETURNS
R,	 ; + a1 R1 +	 +
YEAR	 cx1
1988	 -0.6E-3
(-0.34)
1989	 0.006'
(2.45)
1990	 -0.002
(-0.66)
1991	 -0.7E-3
(-0.25)
1992	 -0.003
(-1.21)
1993	 0.007'
(3.05)
Notes: See table (5.2a).
a1
0.425'
(4.45)
0.207'
(2.05)
0.183'
(2.01)
-0.084
(-0.82)
-0.083
(-1.29)
-0.066
(-0.85)
X2(l)1
-0.997'	 0.801
(-4.77)
-15.975	 1.492
(-1.39)
1.195*	 0.017
(2.39)
-1.904	 0.094
(-0.19)
0.615	 0.027
(0.57)
-1.33 1	 0.063
(-1.37)
2(1)3
	0. 75	 0.360
	
0.046	 0.001
	
0.404	 0.309
	
0.488	 1.202
	
1.737	 0.740
	
0.376	 0.050
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The main message from these results is that equity markets in general, and emerging
markets in particular, become informationally efficient when the right institutional and
regulatory framework is in place. Thus providing a regulatory framework which
encourages participation in the market, removes institutional restrictions and ensures
that high quality and reliable information is provided leads to markets being efficient.
5.5. CONCLUSION
This chapter investigates the issue of efficiency for Istanbul Stock Market. However,
unlike most previous studies on emerging markets the chapter recognises the
importance of taking into account the institutional features of the market when
examining pricing efficiency. In particular, it recognises that the market may be
characterised by non-linear behaviour, thin trading and market evolution through time.
Conventional tests of market efficiency such as autocorrelation tests, spectral analysis
and run tests are incapable of taking account of these features and as such may lead
to inappropriate conclusions being reached about the efficiency or otherwise of an
emerging market. In this chapter, we use an augmented logistic map model to test for
efficiency, which collapses to the random walk model if the non-linear terms are
found to be statistically insignificant. In addition, returns are adjusted for thin trading
as suggested by Miller et al (1994) and the chapter demonstrates the potential impact
of thin trading on tests of market efficiency. More importantly, however, efficiency
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is analysed on a yearly basis so that it is possible to determine how the evolution of
the market, including changes in the regulatory framework and the ability of investors
to evaluate information, impacts on the efficiency of the market. Through this
investigation we are able to shed light on the important question of why markets are
inefficient and what factors lead them to become efficient.
Using data from the Istanbul Stock Exchange from 1988 to 1993 the results show that
up to 1990 the market was inefficient, but the inefficiency manifested itself through
non-linear behaviour. It is likely that the non-linear behaviour is the result of the
features of the market at this time. In particular, information was not reliable as
companies did not have to audit their fmancial statements leading to a lag in
information being impounded into prices; there were restrictions on the repatriation
of capital which may have deterred foreign participation, thus, contributing to
illiquidity and low volume of trading; and there were no restrictions on insider trading
which will impact on the confidence and perceived riskiness of the market. The ISE
went through a period of very considerable liberalisation and regulatory change from
late 1989 to 1992 which directly addressed these shortcomings. The result of these
changes improved participation considerably, increased the volume of trading and
improved the reliability and timeliness of information. Unsurprisingly, the results show
that from 1991 onwards the market is not characterised by predictability and is
therefore informationally efficient. The implication of the research reported in this
chapter is that informationally efficient emerging markets are brought about by
improving liquidity, ensuring that investors have access to high quality and reliable
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information and minimising the institutional restrictions on trading. In addition, the
evolution in the regulatory framework of, and knowledge and awareness of investors
in, emerging markets may mean that they will initially be characterised by
inefficiency, but over time will develop into efficient and effectively functioning
markets which allocate resources efficiently.
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ENDN( )TES
As Miller et a! argue the effects of thin trading are more complex than is captured
by this simple model. However, our objective is not to develop a model which
precisely captures the impact of thin trading, but to recognise and take account of the
problem in our empirical analysis.
2 Standard errors for the coefficients in the table (5.2a) were obtained using the
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation estimates of the variance-
covariance matrix.
Tests were carried out to determine whether the findings of non-linearities were the
result of changes in volatility. A GARCH model was fitted to the data. However, the
results were unaffected by this specification. As a further test to verify this finding,
the residuals estimated from a GARCH process were regressed against non-linear
components. This showed that the non-linear terms were significant which further
suggests that the non-linearities were not due to volatility changes. The results are
available on request.
Serial correlation is significant at 10% level of significance.
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VI. STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY, REGULATORY CHANGES AND
COMPANY COST OF CAPITAL
6.1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter has shown that regulatory changes led to a faster impounding
of information into prices. However, as Ross (1989) has shown an increase in the rate
of impounding of information will lead to an increase in the level of stock market
volatility, assuming there are no arbitrage opportunities. There is a widespread belief
that increased volatility is undesirable. This view stems from the belief that increased
volatility is the result of destabiising forces. However, even if increased volatility is
the result of improvements in informational efficiency, it may still lead to an increase
in the equity risk premium and, hence, the cost of capital to firms.
In this chapter, we address the following three important issues using data from the
Istanbul Stock Exchange ISE):
*	 have changes in the regulatory framework had an impact on the
level of stock price volatility?,
*	 if there has been a change, is this due to information being
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impounded into prices more rapidly or is it the result of
destabilizing forces'?,
*	 how have any changes in volatility impacted on the equity risk
premium and what are the implications of such changes for
the cost of equity capital to firms?.
As mentioned in previous chapters the ISE has undergone considerable regulatory
change since the inception of trading in 1986. The developments and regulatory
changes which have taken place in the ISE provide a valuable opportunity to examine
the impact of such innovations on price volatility, the equity risk premium and
company betas. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section
discusses more fully theoretical considerations in relation to volatility, regulatory
change and the cost of equity. Section (6.3) sets out the empirical design adopted in
this chapter. Empirical results are presented and discussed in section (6.4) and section
(6.5) provides a summary and concluding remarks.
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6.2. ISSUES MARKET VOLATILITY, REGULATION AND THE COST OF
CAPITAL
The view that volatility is undesirable is associated with the notion that speculators
have a destabilizing impact on prices. Discussion of this issue dates back at least to
the work of John Stuart Mill (1871) who argued that 'contrary to common opinion'
the activities of speculators lead to fluctuations in prices being less extreme than they
otherwise would be:
[T]he tendency of this operation [by speculators] is to equalise
price, or at least to moderate its inequalities...Speculators,
therefore, have a highly useful office in the economy of society"
(Mill, 1871, pp.2'76-2'7'7).
While Mill is arguing that speculators do not destabilize prices, implicit in his
comments is the view that volatility is undesirable. This general view that greater
volatility is undesirable is also to be found in other discussions of the impact of
speculators, even when there is disagreement about the issue of whether speculation
stabilizes or destabilizes prices (see, for example, Marshall (1923), Kaldor (1960) and
Friedman (1953)). This view of volatility as undesirable stems from a failure to
recognise the relationship between information and volatility. For example, Marshall
(1923) argued that it was in the interests of speculators to be well informed and that
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in pursuing their own interest they would bring good quality information to the
market. However, rather than making a link between information and volatility
Marshall argues in relation to speculators in futures that:
Their influence certainly tends to lessen the amplitude of price
variations from place to place and from year to year." (Marshall, 1923,
p.262).
Within the efficient markets literature there is a clear positive relationship between the
arrival of good quality information and price volatility. In an efficient market prices
respond in a rapid and unbiased manner to the arrival of new information. Thus, if
the flow of information increases in an efficient market, then price movements will
be more frequent and prices will be seen to be more volatile. This issue is addressed
at the theoretical level by Ross (1989).
Ross assumes that an arbitrage free economy exists and proceeds to provide a
condition under which the no arbitrage situation will be sustained. Firstly, he assumes
that asset prices are a martingale which can be represented by the following
differential equation
= pdt + o dz,,
	(6.1)
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where (p) is the asset price with mean (i.') standard deviation (;) and z-N(O,l).
Further, by assuming that prices are determined by a pricing standard, (q), as in an
asset pricing framework for example, Ross (1989, p.5, theorem 1) demonsates that
expected returns will satisfy the following security market line expression
p - r = -cov(p,q)	 (6.2)
where (r) is the risk free rate of interest. Ross also assumes that information evolves
according to
	
=pdt+adz	 (6.3)
S	
S
By imposing a terminal condition that at some future point in time, call this (1'), the
asset price will be such that p(T) = s(T), the foIIowin, pricir relatioashiç ho'ds
- r + cov(q.․ )(T-t)J	 (6.4)p(t) = se
from which Ross derives the following differential equation
- [p5 - r + cov(q,․ )]dt	 (6.5)
p	 S
Substituting (6.1) and (6.3) into (6.5) yields
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	i,, dt + a,, dz = [r - cov(q,․ )]dt + a dz	 (6.6)
S	 S
Using (6.2) in (6.6) and rearranging, we obtain
o,, dz	 ci,dz5	(6.7)
and therefore (Ross (1989, p.8, theorem 2))
a,, = a5	 (6.8)
(6.8) is Ross's condition for no arbitrage, and implies that the variance of price change
will be equal to the rate (or variance) of information flow. The implication of this is
that the volatility of the asset price will increase as the rate of information flow
increases. If this is not the case, arbitrage opportunities will be available. Thus, any
action which increases the flow of information, such as more stringent stock exchange
disclosure requirements, should lead to an increase in the volatility of prices.
In addition, if information becomes more reliable (for example, due to more rigorous
auditing requirements) then prices may become more volatile and news may have less
persistence. If information is unreliable some investors may not respond
instantaneously to news but rather they may delay their response until the information
can be verified. Similarly, if investors are uncertain about the reliability of an item of
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news they may base their investment decisions on the activities of other investors who
are perceived to have access to more reliable information. As such, news will have a
more persistent effect than if all investors have faith in the news and respond to it
instantaneously. Hence, regulatory changes which make information more reliable may
be expected to increase price volatility, but reduce the persistence of news. By
examining and comparing volatility and persistence in periods before and after
regulatory changes, the impact of those changes on the efficient functioning of the
market can be examined.
Even if increased volatility is the result of improvements in informational efficiency,
it may still lead to increases in the equity risk premium and, hence, the cost of equity
capital since investors may perceive any increased volatility resulting from regulatory
changes as an increase in the riskiness of the market. Alternatively, regulatory change
may lead to a reduction in uncertainty concerning the company, since more
information may be available, information may be more reliable and there may be an
increase in informed investors who have confidence in the functioning of the market.
This reduction in uncertainty may manifest itself through a decrease in the equity risk
premium. In order to fully understand the impact of regulatory change on the
operation of financial markets and the real economy, it is necessary to examine the
effect on the cost of equity capital as well as the effect on volatility and persistence.
In this chapter we examine these issues within the context of an emerging market
which has been characterised by considerable regulatory change since it commenced
trading in 1986. The analysis of the ISE provides an experimental framework which
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allows investigation of the impact of regulation on these issues of central concern to
both financial markets and the real economy. In this way important policy advice for
the regulation of financial markets can be obtained.
6.3. METH0DOLO(;Y
The empirical analysis seeks to examine the impact of market wide regulatory changes
on three aspects. First, we wish to determine whether volatility has changed with
changes in regulation. Second, if there has been a change, is this due to the more rapid
impounding of information or is it the result of destabilizing forces? Third, we wish
to determine the effect of regulatory changes on individual firms' cost of equity -
capital. In order to undertake this investigation data is required on the return on the
market and the returns for individual firms. Emerging markets, as mentioned in
chapter 5, are typically characterised by thin and nonsynchronous trading. For this
reason, the returns series used in this chapter are corrected for thin trading using the
methodology outlined in chapter 5.
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6.3.1. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF REGULATION ON AGGREGATE
STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY
In examining the impact of regulatory change on stock market volatility this chapter
is concerned not only with the question of whether volatility has changed post-
regulation, but also if it has changed, why has it changed? As such it is necessary to
employ a technique which allows examination of the time varying nature of volatility.
A natural way to capture the time varying nature is to model volatility as a GARCH
process (Engle (1982), Bollerslev (1986), Engle and Bollerslev (1986)). The GARCH
technique models the conditional volatility for lag lengths of order (p) and (q) as
foil ows'
p	 q
= a0 
+ E au1 , + V 3 h	 (6.9)L..e j i—i
e=1	 j=I
To address the first issue, we augment the conditional variance equation with a
dummy variable, (t) r), taking the value of zero pre-regulatory change and one post-
regulatory change. Thus equation (6.9) becomes:
p	 q
=	 ^ E a1u, + E f3h1..1 + YDr (6.10)
i-i	 j1
If the coefficient ('y) is statistically significant then changes in regulation have had an
impact on price volatility. To address the second issue, the period under investigation
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is partitioned into two sub-periods relating to before and after major regulatory
changes. GARCH models of the form (6.9) are estimated for both sub-periods, thereby
allowing a comparison of the nature of volatility before and after regulatory change.
The advantage of the GARCH specification is that it allows for the separation of the
effect of "new" news and "old" news. To illustrate, assume that the order of the
GARCH model is (1,1) then (a 1 ) represents the impact of last period's news and (f3)
measures past periods' conditional variance (termed persistence). In terms of our
empirical analysis, changes in the GARCH coefficients following regulatory reforms
will indicate the effect of innovation on the volatility of the stock market and
importantly will allow determination of whether changes in volatility result from an
improved flow of information or from noise and feedback trading.
6.3.2. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF REGULATION ON THE COST OF
CAPITAL
While the role of information is important for an effectively functioning stock market
the real test of the imposition of regulation on the stock market is the effect this has
on a firm's cost of equity capital. This constitutes the third part of our investigation.
In order to examine the effect of changes in volatility brought about by regulatory
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reforms on the cost of equity capital, individual firm betas are examined using the
traditional market model which relates a firm's measure of systematic risk to a market
wide measure of risk
R' 
=	
+ f3, R,,;, + v (6.11)I'
where (R11 ) is the return on the ith stock, (R.) is the return on the market index, (70)
is a constant, ([3) is the measure of systematic risk for the ith stock and (v) is a firm
specific error term which measures unsystematic risk. The above equation is
augmented with an interactive dummy variable as follows:
R, =
	
+	 + p.(öxR,,) + e, (6.12)
where (ö) is a dummy variable which takes the value of zero before regulatory
reforms and one after; and (p,) measures the impact of regulatory change on the
systematic risk of firm (i). If changes in regulation have reduced uncertainty and led
to a lower required rate of return by investors and ultimately a lower cost of equity
capital for the firm then (p 1) will be less than zero. Conversely, if regulatory change
has an adverse impact on the risk of the firm then (p) will be greater than zero. The
intermediate case is when regulatory changes have no effect on the firm's beta, in this
case (p) will be equal to (0).
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However, changes in firm betas do not necessarily fully capture the impact of
regulatory changes on the cost of equity capital. It is quite possible that the above
technique for measuring the effect of regulatory change can be distorted by changes
in the overall market risk premium. In this case, the analysis of betas and (p) will
make inferences regarding the equity cost of capital misleading. For example, assume
that the beta falls but simultaneously the equity risk premium increases, the firm may
not experience a fall in the cost of equity capital since the combined effect could well
be different from the effect of the fall in the beta. Similarly, it is possible that the beta
remains the same while there is a fall in the equity risk premium and a resultant fall
in the cost of equity capital. Such a pattern would not be picked up by the analysis
of beta alone. Therefore, in addition to examining the impact on individual firm betas,
the effect of regulatory change on the equity market risk premium is investigated.
In this study we adopt the technique proposed by McElroy et a! (1985) for estimating
the equity market risk premium. This technique involves joint estimation of the betas
and risk premium2. McElroy et al (1985) show that the pricing restrictions imposed
by factor asset pricing models such as the CAPM and the APT can be written as a
non-linear equation
R - R = Xf3. +	 + U.	 (6.13)I:	 /	 i	 It
where (R) is the return on asset (i) in time (t), (Re) is the risk free rate, (13k) is the
sensitivity of asset (i) to the factor (f1), (?) is the risk premium associated with factor
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(f and (e1 is a firm specific error term. In terms of the CAPM, () is replaced by the
excess return on the market portfolio. By stacking the equations for each firm together
a system of non-linear seemingly unrelated regressions (NLSUR) is obtained and
under certain regularity conditions (see, McElroy et al (1985)) the estimates of the
parameters exist. Using this framework we obtain estimates of the equity market risk
premium prior to, and post, regulatory change.
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6.4. DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
6.4.1. DATA
The data used in this chapter consists of daily closing prices for 23 companies listed
on the ISE from January 19$8 to December 1993. This represents the sample of
companies whose stocks were traded continuously on the ISE throughout this period.
The ISE Composite Index proxies for the market portfolio.
6.4.2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The maximum likelihood estimates for the conditional volatility, using a GARCH
(1,1), of the Turkish stock index are reported in table (6.1). Panel A reports results for
the whole period with a dummy variable to assess the impact of regulatory changes
on the conditional volatility. The results indicate that regulatory changes have led to
an increase in the conditional volatility.
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TABLE 6.1
GARCH Models of Stock Market Volatility:
Whole Sample with my (Panel A), Pre-Regulatory Change (Panel B)3,
Post-Regulatory Change (Panel C)b
Panel A
h, = ct0 + a 1
 u, 21 + t3 1 h, 1 + 'yd91
Variable	 Estimate	 . Standard Error
	 T-Stat
ct	 0.0005	 0.0000	 6.39
a 1
	0.3004	 0.03 10	 9.67
0.6479	 0.026 1	 24.8
y	 0.00004	 0.0000 1	 63.53
Panel B
=	
+ a1 u..21 +
Variable	 Estimate	 . Standard Error	 T-Stat
	
0.0017	 0.0000	 32.4
a 1
	0.0052	 0.0023	 2.23
	
1.0096	 0.0022	 47.7
Panel C
= a0
 + a 1 u + f3 1 h1
Variable	 Estimate	 . Standard Error
	 T-Stat
a0
	 .0000	 0.0000	 2.79
a 1
	0.1150	 0.0234	 4.91
I3	 0.8316	 0.0352	 23.6
Notes: 'The pre-regulatory change period dates from January 1988 to December 1990 which
gives a sample size of 755 daily observations.
b The post-regulatory change period dates from January 1991 to December 1993 which gives a sample size
of 741 daily observations.
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The question that arises is to what extent is this increase in volatility due to
information being impounded more quickly into prices or is it the result of
destabilizing forces? In order to address this question we split the sample into two
periods, one relating to pre- and the other to post-regulatory changes. GARCH models
are then estimated for the two sub-periods thereby allowing a comparison of the
nature of volatility before and after regulatory changes. Panel B reports the results for
pre-regulatory changes and panel C reports the results for post-regulatory changes.
These results provide strong evidence regarding the impact of changes in regulation
on volatility. Panel B shows that before the onset of regulatory changes the GARCH
coefficients are integrated (ct 1 +t3 1 = 1) indicating that a shock to the variance is
permanent. Furthermore, the news coefficient (a 1 ) is very small indicating that
volatility is driven more by old news than new news. However, post regulation the
results panel C are markedly different, the coefficients are no longer integrated and
the news coefficient has increased by a significant amount. This shows that conditional
volatility is of a substantially different nature in the two periods. In particular,
conditional volatility post-regulatory change is driven much more by news than past
information and the persistence of "old" news. Overall, this part of the investigation
strongly suggests that changes in regulation which required companies to have their
financial statements audited by members of the Association of Accountants and
Auditors have led to an increase in the quality of information which has impacted on
volatility through reducing persistence and increasing the impact of news. While the
volatility of the ISE appears to be driven more by news after the regulatory changes,
the important question is to what extent has this increase in information had an impact
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on the cost of equity capital and hence the real economy?
To examine this issue we begin by estimating the extended market model given in
equation (6.12). The results are reported in table (6.2) for our sample of 23 Turkish
stocks. For sixteen of the firms regulatory change has a negative impact on the beta
coefficient, out of which fourteen are statistically significant. Of the remaining seven
firms, for only three is there a statistically significant positive impact on the firm's
beta.
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Table 6.2
Estimates of Individual Firm Betas and Effect of Regulatoiy Change on Beta
R' =	 +	 +	 + e.It
Firm No.	 T-Stat	 p1	 T-Stat
1. 0.9346	 28.085	 -0.1298	 -2.901
2. 0.9607	 23.709	 -0.1795	 -3.310
3. 0.9311	 24.083	 -0.1850	 -3.538
4. 0.9811	 27.986	 -0.1578	 -3.333
5. 0.9266	 22.592	 -0.0752	 -1.370
6. 0.9987	 22.781	 -0.2671	 -4.531
7. 0.7768	 14.185	 0.0438	 0.5935
8. 1.1255	 25.408	 -0.3183	 -5.372
9. 0.8429	 23.082	 -0.1669	 -3.412
10. 0.9322	 25.702	 -0.1270	 -2.595
11. 0.7277	 20.062	 -0.0 127	 -0.26 1
12. 0.9670	 27.692	 -0.1088	 -2.356
13. 0.9130	 26.224	 -0.0791	 -1.699
14. 0.9759	 24.763	 -0.0153	 -0.288
15. 0.6769	 16.066	 0.2501	 4.433
16. 0.8887	 25.842	 -0.1280	 -2.756
17. 0.6940	 17.115	 0.0827	 1.512
18. 0.8960	 22.615	 -0.0911	 -1.716
19. 0.6779	 13.949	 0.1944	 2.959
20. 0.9425	 24.837	 -0.0718	 -1.409
21. 0.7312	 16.795	 0.0393	 0.674
22. 0.8279	 20.370	 0.0741	 1.359
23. 0.3066	 8.984	 0.1629	 3.528
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Overall, assuming that the equity market risk premium is constant before and after the
regulatory change, innovations brought about by changes in regulation seem to have
reduced the firms equity beta and hence the cost of equity capital. Interestingly, the
companies which experience a decrease in the value of beta were those with the
highest betas, whereas companies with a low beta value were characterized by an
increase in beta following changes in regulation. This would seem to suggest that as
information has increased and become more reliable and the volume of trading has
increased3
 there has been a re-evaluation of the riskiness of individual companies. In
the absence of reliable information it is reasonable to expect investors to allocate their
funds in what they perceive to be "safe t' assets. Conversely, investors require higher
rates of return for investments in companies which provide little reliable information
and hence are perceived to be more risky than they actually are. Thus, the absence of
reliable and verifiable information leads to an inefficient allocation of resources in the
economy. However, as investors become better informed about the financial and
operating positions of the companies they more accurately perceive the riskiness of
the companies and hence reallocate their funds accordingly. To summarize thus far,
regulatory changes between 1989 and 1991 have led to an increase in stock market
volatility which is a result of the faster impounding of information in prices. This in
turn has changed investors' perceptions of individual firms' risk levels, with an overall
reduction in the perceived level of risk. Hence there has been a reallocation of
investment funds.
However, as noted earlier, examining the beta coefficients independently of the equity
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market risk premium is not sufficient to infer that the required rate of return of
investors and hence the cost of equity capital has fallen. To examine whether the
equity market risk premium has changed post-1991 we estimate (6.7) using actual
returns adjusted for thin trading 4. The data on adjusted returns for the twenty three
stocks are stacked into a system and the coefficients in (6.7) are estimated using
NLSUR. The results are reported in table (6.3). Panel A reports the equity market risk
premium pre-regulatory change and Panel B post-regulatory change. These results
confirm the broad findings of the effect of regulatory change on betas.
Table 6.3
NLSUR Estimates of the Equity Market Risk Premium:
(Panel A) Pre-Regulatory Change, (Panel B) Post-Regulatory Change
- R1 = X +
	
+
Panel A
Coefficient	 Standard Error	 T-Stat
Risk Prem.	 0.00158	 0.00083	 1.91
Panel B
Risk Prem.	 0.00100	 0.00051	 1.98
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The equity market risk premium is a third lower post-regulatory change than pre-
regulatory change. This coupled with the reduction in betas clearly indicates that
changes in regulation in the Turkish stock market has reduced the required rate of
return of investors and hence, the cost of equity capital to firms. Even for those few
firms which experienced a rise in beta, the extent of the fall in the equity market risk
premium is greater than the rise in beta and hence the overall effect is a fall in the
required rate of return.
6.5. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, innovations which bring about increases in stock market volatility are
seen as undesirable. This view stems from the belief that volatility is a result of
destabilizing forces such as noise and feedback trading and speculative forces which
can lead to large swings of prices away from fundamental values. This higher
volatility, it is believed, will result in an increase in the equity market risk premium
and hence a higher cost of equity capital. Ultimately, this can provide a set of market
prices that allocates resources in the economy in a sub-optimal way. While this issue
is important for all economies, it is of particular significance to developing economies.
In this chapter, we address three issues relating to the impact of changes in stock
market regulation. First, have changes in regulation impacted on the level of stock
market volatility? Second, if so, is this the result of destabilizing forces or the
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improvement of the impounding of information on prices? Third, what are the
implications of this for the changes in the cost of equity capital? Using data from the
ISE we find that changes in the regulatory framework which result in more reliable
information, increased participation, and higher volume of trading lead to an increase
in stock market volatility. However, far from being undesirable, the increased volatility
is the result of more rapid impounding of information. In addition, the availability of
more reliable information has led investors to reassess the riskiness of individual firms
and hence the rate of return required from holding these assets. Furthermore, the
period post-regulatory change is associated with a lower equity market risk premium.
In conclusion, it is demonstrated that measures which improve the confidence of
investors in the stock market lead to a more informationally efficient market and an
improvement in the allocation of resources in the economy.
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ENDN( )TES
Most empirical studies have found that a GARCH (1,1) specification adequately
captures the conditional volatility (see, inter alia, Bollerslev et al (1992)). The
GARCH (1,1) model has the advantage of providing straightforward interpretation of
the news and persistence coefficients.
2 The traditional technique for estimating the equity market risk premium is that
proposed by Fama and MacBeth (1973). Typically, researchers using this technique
from portfolios to overcome the errors in variables problem inherent in the
methodology (see, Blume and Friend (1973)). In our case, however, data limitations
prevent us from adopting this approach.
The volume of trade has increased from 7,031 lots in (1988) to 16.6 million in
(1991) and further increased to 90 million in (1993). In addition, the number of
trading members of the exchange rose from 47 in (1986) to 176 by the end of (1993).
Ideally, we would estimate (6.7) in excess return form. However, there is no
adequate and reliable data for Turkish interest rates over our sample period. Since the
use of excess returns involves subtracting the risk free rate from both the individual
stock and the market in (6.7) the only difference in using actual returns rather than
excess returns is that the estimated coefficients will be larger in the case of actual
returns. Furthermore, this part of our analysis is merely illustrative and not definitive.
We are simply trying to establish the overall effect of changes in regulation on the
equity market risk premium, that is, has it fallen or risen post-regulatory change.
218
VII. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS, TRADING VOLUME AND MARKET
EFFICIENCY
7.1. INTR( )DUCTI( )N
In spite of the fact that there is a widespread belief that stock markets are weak-form
efficient and the evidence presented in chapter 5, technical analysis is a pervasive
activity in such markets. In this chapter, we examine the extent to which this apparent
paradox can be explained by expanding the assumed information set used by analysts
to include the past sequence of volume in addition to the past sequence of prices.
Using data from the Istanbul Stock Exchange the chapter demonstrates that for a
number of companies in the sample returns appear to conform to the weak-form
version of the efficient markets hypothesis. However, when returns are conditioned on
past levels of volume, current returns on over half of these companies exhibit
predictability. This is particularly true for companies which have low trading volumes.
As mentioned before in the thesis, Fama (1970, 1976) defines a market as being
weak-form efficient if current prices fully reflect the information contained in past
prices. The implication of this level of efficiency is that technical analysis of past
stock prices has no value. In contrast, technical analysts base their activities on the
belief that information contained in past prices is not fully incorporated in the current
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price. Such analysts believe that by examining the history of prices information can
be gleaned on future price movements. In spite of the fact that there is a widespread
belief that stock markets are weak-form efficient, technical analysis is a pervasive
activity in such markets. This apparent paradoxical situation can be explained if
adjustments to information are not immediate, such that market statistics, in particular
statistics on trading volume, contain information not impounded in current prices. In
such a situation the analysis of past price and volume data will provide information
on future price movements. This will be especially true if, as suggested by Blume,
Easley and O'Hara (1994), volume provides information about the quality of traders'
information which cannot be obtained from price statistics. In this context, technical
analysis can be viewed as part of the process by which traders learn about
fundamentals. Thus, traders use data on volume to update their beliefs, with the results
that volume statistics not only describe the market but also affect the market.
In a world characterised by investors who are homogeneously informed, technical
analysis has no value (see, Brown and Jennings, 1989). However, Blume, Easley and
O'Hara (1994) demonstrate that if investors have differing signals, technical analysis
of price and volume will be worthwhile and will be of most value for less widely
followed stocks. Thus, while current prices may be efficient in the sense that they
contain all information implied by past prices, the use of non-price information in
conjunction with past prices may enable traders to predict future price movements.
This chapter investigates the issue of whether studying the joint dynamics of stock
prices and trading volume can be used to predict future price movements more
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successfully than simply examining the unvaried dynamics of stock prices. This
analysis is undertaken using data from an emerging market which is characterised by
thin trading and differentially informed investors. The rest of the chapter is organised
as follows. Section (7.2) briefly discusses some of the issues on market efficiency,
volume and technical analysis. The data, methodology and results are presented in
section (7.3) and section (7.4) provides a conclusion.
7.2. ISSUES IN VOLUME OF TRADING, MARKET EFFICIENCY AND
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
To recoup from earlier chapters, Fama (1976) defines capital markets as being
efficient when the joint distribution of prices m(it........ . I 	 given the
information set used by the market in the determination of security prices at time (t-
I), is the same as the joint distribution of prices that would be obtained if all relevant
information available at time (t- 1) were utilised, f(P1.... .P0 I	 This is expressed
mathematically as:
= f(P 11 ,...,P,Ic 1_ 1
 )	 (7.1)
The weak-form version of market efficiency defines () as being the previous
history of prices. A market which is weak-form efficient will have incorporated all
information contained in the historical sequence of prices into current prices and thus
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technical analysis of past prices provides no new information and consequently has
no value.
However, technical analysis on other market variables, such as trading volume, which
not only describe but also affect the market may be of value, even in a market which
is weak-form efficient. This will be true in markets where equilibrium prices are not
fully revealing and traders have differential information sets. In a situation where
prices are not fully revealing for all market participants, some traders wifi not be able
to use market prices to distinguish between news and noise. In contrast, if these
(relatively uninformed) traders observe both prices and volume then they may be able
to distinguish between the two types of signals coming to the market. Consider, for
example, a situation where there are two groups of market participants: informed and
uninformed. For the informed trader prices are fully revealing about the fundamental
value of the asset. Thus technical analysis is not required by this group of traders. The
uninformed market participants are unable to distinguish between noise and news on
the basis of market prices. However, by observing the volume of trade which is taking
place they gain insight into the fundamental value placed on assets by the informed
traders. The key role which volume plays is that it enables the uninformed market
participants to determine the quality of the information flowing to the market, i.e. is
the information news or noise? Thus, volume increases the precision of the signal
flowing to the uninformed participants'.
Furthermore, the value of an asset can never be known with certainty, even to
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informed investors, because of the common error term. The lack of perfect revelation
in current market statistics means that all traders face a learning problem in
determining the underlying value of an asset. Since news arrives in every period,
investigation of the sequence of prices and volume may provide information to traders,
including those who are informed. Therefore, technical analysis of prices in
conjunction with volume may be of value.
It is reasonable to assume that technical analysis of price and volume will be of most
value for stocks for which there is relatively little information. Such stocks are
associated with firms for which there is greater uncertainty about their future prospects
and the quality of information is less precise. In addition, the information which is
available may well be private information and the only way for the majority of
investors to infer this information is by examining both prices and volume.
We begin our analysis by examining the role of volume and trade information in the
standard rational expectations framework typically employed to investigate how
market clearing prices reflect underlying information, and how agents, in turn, learn
from prices.
In the standard approach (see, Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) and following Blume,
Easley and O'Hara (1994) a collection of agents, indexed by (i) l,...,I, trade a risky
asset and a riskless asset in a single market. Both Brown and Jennings and Grundy
and McNichols consider the limit case where the number of agents I is infinite. In this
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standard model, trades may occur at time (1) and at time (2). Here we consider only
time (1) and so do not include time indices. At the end of trading, the riskiess asset
pays a known dividend of (1) and the risky asset pays a liquidating dividend given by
the random variable (,). Traders begin with identical beliefs about the pay off (iji)
which are presented by a normal distribution N ( w I/p 0
 ).
U(w= -exp[ -wi]	 (7.2)
where (w0) is agent (i)'s terminal wealth (we have fixed the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion at one). Final period wealth depends on the agents' trading decisions and
the assets' pay offs, and so can be written as (w 0= d ji + n1), where (d1) is agent (i)'s
demand for the risky asset and (n 1) is the number of units of the riskiess asset that
have a price normalized to one.
Before the start of period 1, and shown by Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994) , each
trader receives an endowment of (n 0) units of the riskiess asset. Each trader also
receives a private signal, (y1), on the value of the risky asset which is given by
y = 1i +e1	(7.3)
where the distribution of each (e 1) is N(O,1/p). Because the signals' errors are assumed
normally distributed with finite variances and are independent across traders, it follows
that the average signal
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converges to (iji) with probability 1 as the number of traders grows large.
In the Brown and Jennings framework, there is an exogenous supply of the random
asset given by the random variable (X), with per capita supply X/I, denoted (x). As
is the case with all random variables in the model, (x) is normally distributed and is
independent of any private signals. Equilibrium, according to Blume, Easley and
O'Hara (1994), requires that
x = E1d11
or simply that per capita demand equal per capita supply.
In rational expectations models of the form considered here, equilibrium involves a
set of price and demand functions that satisfy the following properties. First, given
their information sets (H') agents conjecture the equilibrium price function. Based on
these price functions and an observation of the equilibrium price, traders determine
their demands for the risky asset. In an equilibrium, these price conjectures will be
correct and per capita demand will equal per capita supply.
According to Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994), to construct such an equilibrium,
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suppose that each trader conjectures that the price of the risky asset, (p), is a linear
function of aggregate information
and per capita supply (x):
p = aijr0 + pj;•
 -	 (7.5)
Then, the posterior distribution of ('1') given H'	 (y,, p) is normal with mean (E)
['qi\l-P]. Trader (i)'s demand is then
= E[iJrlHl-p	 (7.6)
Var[Ir IH
Using the equilibrium condition (7.4), Brown and Jennings then solve for the
equilibrium price. They show that it is linear as conjectured and that the coefficient
on (x) is not zero. Thus, prices are not revealing. This allows Brown and Jennings to
demonstrate how a sequence of prices could provide information that a single price
observation could not, and thus provides a role for technical analysis.
Now suppose that contemporaneous volume data is publicly available. Volume is
typical defined as the number of shares of the risky asset that are traded. Since every
trade involves a buyer and seller, volume could be calculated by simply adding up all
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buy orders or all sell orders. An equivalent approach in a Wairasian equilibrium is to
sum the absolute value of traders' demands and divide by two.
If traders do know volume in the Brown and Jennings framework, then the role for
technical analysis dissipates. What causes this to happen is that, if traders use the
information conveyed by volume and their trading behaviour, there is a revealing
equilibrium. Consequently, with all information revealed to traders, there is no benefit
to considering the sequence of prices. To see why this occurs, suppose we let traders
condition on per capita volume and the direction of their own trade (i.e., either a buy
or sell). Their information set is now H' = (p. y1 , V, J) where (J) is an indicator
variable denoting whether the trader buys or sells, and (per capita) volume is defmed
by
=	
IdI^IXl).
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Further, let traders conjecture that the equilibrium price function is given by (7.5) and
that price and volume together will be revealing. In this case, each trader's demand
function is given by
d = (J,0p 0 + 7p) P(p0 +lp)	 (7.7.)
and the price function is given by
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p = (i.r0p0 + y7p— x)/(p 0 +Ip) .	 (7.8)
To show that these equations describe an equilibrium, we need to show that the
traders' conjectures are correct and that the market clears. First, note that in a
revealing equilibrium, every trader will demand the same amount of the risky asset,
i.e., (d, = d = d) for all (i) and (j). So per capita volume will be
^Ix I).
Now market clearing yields (d=-), so (V1x1). Thus, each trader infers that (x=-V)
if he is a buyer, i.e., (d1>O), or (V) if he is a seller, i.e., (d'<ZO). using the inferred
value for (x) and the market price, (p), each traders inverts the price equation (7.8) to
solve for
Given by knowledge of
y,
the optimal demand for any trader is given by (7.7). It is easy to check that the price
given by (7.8) clears the market when demands are given by (7.7). Thus, traders have
equal demands and their conjectures are correct. Once you know volume, therefore,
you can infer the underlying supply uncertainty, prices are revealing, and technical
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analysis has no role.
Interestingly, the opposite conclusion arises from the Grundy-McNichols approach:
volume is devoid of any useful information whatever. The reason for this lies in the
uncertainty structure of their model. Unlike the random aggregate supply feature of
the Brown and Jennings model, Grundy and McNichols introduce uncertainty by
assuming that each of the I traders in the market receives a random endowment of the
risky asset. These endowments, (x1), are assumed independently and identically
normally distributed with mean () and variance (ci2 l). in this model, some traders
receive negative quantities of the risky asset, some receive positive quantities, and
trade presumably arises in part to rebalance portfolios.
To ensure that individual traders' endowments carry no information about per capita
supply (x), Grundy and McNichols consider only the limit economy. In this economy,
the variance of (x) is infinite and the Law of Large Numbers cannot be applied. Note
that this assumption of the limit economy (infinite traders) is fundamental to their
approach. If we consider the finite economy, then there is a finite variance and
endowments must provide some information. Each trader also receives a private signal
(y, = N1+w+e) where ('qi) is the per unit pay off from the risky asset, (w) is a common
error, and (e1) is an idiosyncratic error.
If we examine per capita volume in the limit economy we find the distracting feature
that it is infinite. In particular, per capita trading volume is
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.flim1_.3 =i 1d1 -x 1 1	(7.9)
where (d1) is trader (i)'s equilibrium demand and (x 1) is his endowment.
Asymptotically, (d,) and (x 1 ) are uncorrelated, but (x1) has infinite variance. Thus, per
capita volume is infinite and it provides no information about the value of the asset.
The fundamental difficulty is the underlying supply structure. Whether supply is
introduced by an exogenous random supply or by random endowments, if volume
reveals anything it reveals the supply. Consequently, if we allow traders to condition
on contemporaneous volume, it is essentially allowing them to remove the "noise" in
the pricing equation. With prices then depending only on private signals, the only
known equilibrium is one in which price reveals the underlying information.
In this context, volume provides no useful information about any fundamental relating
to the asset but rather is exogenously determined. It seems more reasonable to believe
that the volume statistic should capture some endogenous aspect of the trading process
not necessarily incorporated in prices. In particular, since volume arises from
individual demands, it may be the case that volume reflects aspects of the information
structure that traders might wish to know.
But a second difficulty arises in investing this role. This is the problem created by
conditioning on contemporaneous information. Even if volume has some meaningful
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economic role, when traders use the information conveyed by contemporaneous
volume, the only revealing equilibrium is the anomalous one in which volume actually
has no information. To see why this is so, consider a Grossman-Stiglitz-style model
without the modelling device of random endowments or random supply. Suppose that
traders have common preferences and endowments and receive pay off-relevant
signals. Now, suppose that there exists a revealing rational expectations equilibrium
with conditioning on price and volume. In this equilibrium, traders have common
information and they all choose the same trade. But the only such trade that is
consistent with market clearing is no trade, and so regardless of the signals, volume
is zero and carries no information. Alternatively, there could be nonrevealing
equilibria in which traders condition on price and volume. However, as volume is a
sum of absolute values it cannot be normally distributed. So although such an
equilibrium might exist there seems to be no hope of constructing it, and hence no
hope of using a contemporaneous data approach to study volume.
One way to avoid these difficulties and following Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994)
is to allow traders to condition on all information up to but not including the market
statistic resulting from their desired trade. This approach, first suggested by Hellwig
(1982), avoids the simultaneity problem noted above while retaining the ability to
learn from market information. Blume and Easley (1984) use this approach to examine
the information content of past market prices.
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This approach, like the approach of conditioning on contemporaneous data, is an
abstraction. Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994) offer two justifications for it. First,
traders who submit market orders do not know the price at which their order will
execute until after the trade occurs. Even traders who use limit orders cannot condition
their quantity perfectly on price unless they use incredibly and unrealistically complex
orders. But unless traders know the price at which they will trade, and use the
information the price contains in selecting their trade, the usual rational expectations
approach is not valid. Hence, actual market settings are not consistent with
contemporaneous conditioning requirements, but are compatible with the conditioning
requirement considered by the authors. Second, asset markets such as the New York
Stock Exchange are never in a Wairasian equilibrium: The market is a dynamic
process in which continual adjustments occur. The fiction of a Wairasian equilibrium
is itself an approximation to workings of the market. Whether this oversimplified
description is best constructed with conditioning on past or contemporaneous data
depends on how well each model serves its intended purpose.
Conditioning on predetermined rather than contemporaneous information has another
advantage. If traders can condition on contemporaneous price information, they can
also condition on the information contained in their own net trade. If we include his
own net trade in each individual's information set the conventional equilibrium
remains as an equilibrium. But there are others as well. Jordan (1983) has shown that
with these information sets there always exists a revealing equilibrium. Furthermore,
the revealing equilibrium is in a sense more natural as it is robust to the model
specification (i.e., exponential utilities and normal distributions) whereas the
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conventional equilibrium is not robust. Analyses with conditioning on
contemporaneous information thus fmesse a delicate equilibrium selection problem
which does not arise when traders use past information.
The Informational Content of Volume
Blurne, Easley and O'Hara (1994) considered a repeated asset market in which agents
can trade a risk-free and a risky asset. All trading takes place between the agents they
we modeled; there is no exogenous supply of any asset. Each agent maximizes a
negative exponential utility function of the form defined in equation (7.2). Using,
Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994) notation the asset's eventual value is given by the
random variable (w) where (ip') is normally distributed with mean (ijc) and variance
(l/p). All traders initially have N('qi'0 , l/p0) as their (common) prior on asset value. We
make the usual assumption that all random variables in the model are independent.
Their interest is in the market statistics that arise in a competitive economy with a
large number of traders. They developed these statistics by analysing a market with
(N) traders and providing results as (N .- 00). They refer to results obtained by taking
the limit as the number of traders grows large as results for the large economy.
Because traders are risk averse, movements in the price elicit portfolio rebalancing
trades. In addition, trade may also occur in response to new information on the asset's
true value. Each trader in their economy receives an informative signal in every
233
period. They then divide the traders into two groups, with (N 1 = pN) traders in group
1 and (N = (l-i)N) in group 2. The traders in each group receive signals from a
common distribution, but there are different distributions for the two groups. Formally,
each informed trader (i) in group I, (i) = 1,..., N1 receives a signal at date (t) of
i	 I
Yt = qI^w+e
where (w1) is a common error term distributed N(O,l/p). The
represents and idiosyncratic error which is distributed N(O,1/p'). SimiJarly, trader (i)
in group 2, (1) = N 1
 + l,...,N, receives signal
Yt1	 lWt
where each t - N(O, l/p 2). They keep (p 2) fixed (and known) to reduce the complexity
of the presentation.
The precision of group I 's signals (the p) are random variables. All parameters other
that the (p)'s are known to all traders, but each (p's) is known only to traders in
group 1. This randomness in precision means that the "quality of signals varies over
time. Consequently, the underlying information structure is complex, in that both the
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level and quality of signals are unknown.
Each trader begins with zero endowment of the risky asset and some exogenous
endowment, (N0), of the riskiess asset. For simplicity, they set the price of the riskiess
asset at one. As the utility function is negative exponential and the asset's eventual
pay off has a normal distribution, it is well known that trader's demands for the risky
asset will be independent of his wealth. They are interested in the Walrasian
equilibrium price and volume of the risky asset. To calculate these equilibrium
statistics, they need only find traders' demands for the risky asset and find the price
that clears the market (i.e., makes excess demand zero).
To make it easier to write asset demands, they note assumed that for traders in group
I each signal (y't) is distributed N(Nr, lip 1 1) where p t = p p 't / (P + p 'J (DeGroot
1970). Similarly, for traders in group 2 each (y' 1) is distributed N('qc, l/p) where
P'2 	 p,. p2 / (p + p2). Conditional on (w 1), each (y'1) is distributed N(9 1, lip',) for
traders in group 1 and N(0 1, l/p2) for traders in group 2, where (, = qi + wJ. So by
the Law of Large Numbers, the mean signal in each group,
and
-2
Yt'
converges almost surely to (e 1) as (N_-oo). In the large economy, the mean signal is
235
almost surely equal to the value plus the common error.
Initially, they consider a two-period version of the model, and then extended their
results to the multi-period version. Following Brown and Jennings, they assumed that
traders have myopic, or naive, demands so that each trader chooses his demand to
maximize expected utility on a period by period basis. Denoting the price of the risky
asset by (p s ), the first period demand for the risky asset for each trader (i) in group
1 is given by
p0(ijr0 
-P1) +p'(y1t—p1)
	 Group I and by (7.10)
p0(i110-p1) + p32(y11_p1) Group II	 (7.11)
for each trader (1) in group 2. The equilibrium first-period price for an economy with
(N) traders is then given by
p00+p'5^(1 _)ps25
p1=	 SI
PO + I.J. Pl +(1-)
(7.12)
By the Law of Large Numbers they show that in the large economy,
SI
+ (i.tp 1 + (1-)p2)O1
p1=
S
p0 + ip 1 + (1-li)p
(7.13)
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An important property of this equilibrium price is that it is not revealing. Because
traders in group 2 do not know (p51) they cannot infer the signal (Os) from the
equilibrium price. Hence, while prices reflect the aggregated value of the underlying
signals, these traders do not have enough information to discern what this value is.
The conditional distribution of (9 k ) given price is not normal, so any multi-period
analysis with conditioning on price alone would be quite complex.
Traders in group 1, however, do know (p') and (pSZ), so observing the equilibrium
price tells them (e 1 ), which is everything that can be known about the underlying
asset.
Because traders in group 2 cannot recover (O s ) from price alone, there is a reason for
them to look at volume. The first period volume can be found by summing the
absolute values of demands at price (p 1 ) and dividing by 2. As it will be easier to
consider per capita volume, they defined this as
51V1 = !! (Er
 p0(4,0-p1) + p 1(y1-p1)I +	 N,+1 Ipo(Iro_pi)+p52&_pi)I)
(7.14)
Inspection of the volume definition in equation (7.14) reveals an immediate problem
in analysing the properties of this market statistic. Because volume is based on
absolute values of the demands defined in equations (7.10) and (7.11) its distribution
is complicated. Unfortunately, while demands involve normally distributed random
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variables, volume per se cannot be normally disibuted. Consequently, if we are to
understand the market information conveyed by the volume statistic we must find a
way to describe its statistical properties. Their proposition (1) provides this
characterization of the volume statistic.
PROPOSITION (1): In the large economy, given (Os), per capita volume, (V 1), is
given by
si
p1	 61(p)h121	 81(p)h12	 _1(l)1J2
2 (p)1/2 	 51	 :1	 -	 __________si
	
p 1	 Pi	 p1
(1- )
	
s2
+	 [ 2	 ((P))2	 (p2)"2	 p32
112
+ ö2(b( 2(P2)"2 ) 
- cI)(_ (P2)
p32	 p32
where (4)) is the standard normal density, (cb) is the standard normal cumulative
disibution function and
= P0 ('p0 - r) + p s', (0, - p ,),	 (i=l,2).
From Proposition (1) and equation (7.13), they stated the market statistics for price
and volume in period 1. The question of interest is what information do these market
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statistics provide? Give that price alone is not revealing, aders cannot infer the noisy
signal value (8 k ) from just the market price. However, if aders observe both the price
and the volume, then potentially the volume information can provide sufficient
additional information about (6,).
To determined the value of looking at volume, they argued, it is necessary to separate
out the information generated by prices from that generated by volume. From the
volume equation it is apparent that the volume statistic includes both (8 k ) and (P's).
Using the equilibrium price equation they show that
61
 pl - _____________
-	
-	 (7.15)
51(iLp 1 ^(l_l.t)ps2)
Substituting for (8,) allowed them to write the volume statistic as
1SI	 8(p5'/2	 1(4(I1' /L)4(p	
•	
, 
)+2 (p 5'f2
	pi
	
p1	 p1
s2
+ (1_.I)[	 P
2	 (P2)1'2	 p52
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2)1/2
_____ - (P))]	 (7.16)+ 8(t1(	 p32	
Ps2
where
Wi = p0p1-i3O(	
p14
for j=1,2.SI
I.LP1 +(l_.i)pS2
Using this expression for volume, they then investigated how volume is related to the
underlying parameters in the market. They shown that given price volume conveys
information about signal quality, (p ), which can then be used in the price equation
to make an inference about (8k).
Calculation shows that (p E (p2, p,,), then volume is increasing the precision of
group I 's signal. To explain why this relationship occurs, and how traders use it, they
focused on the simple case where (p 2=O) and (p'>O). As a first property they shown
that given a price (p s ), on volume is given by
1
= "4(8 (Pw+Pbx_	 _________
op 1 	 p(p)'/2 (pl)112 (p+p)'/2	
(7.17)
,1
Thus, for any price, (p 1 ), per capita volume is increasing the precision, (p'1>p).
Given this role for volume, it now becomes apparent why observing price and volume
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together is more informative than observing price alone. A trader observing only a
high price is unable to determine whether the price is high because of a high average
signal (the O) or an average signal with a high quality (p'). In fact, he is left with
a curve of (8 k , P's) that are consistent with the price. Volume picks up the quality of
the signal in a way different from price.
The role of volume as a signal of the precision of beliefs means that the volume
statistic provides information to the market that is not conveyed by price. Moreover,
this information is related to information about the asset value and not to exogenous
liquidity or supply shocks. This role for volume is remarkably similar to that claimed
by proponents of technical analysis. For example, Pricing (1991) explains that "Most
indicators [of market movements] are a statistical deviation from price data. Since
volume indicators are totally independent of price, they offer a more objective view
of the quality of the price trend." Thus, a trader watching only prices cannot learn as
much as a trader watching both prices and volume and so faces an necessary penalty
if he ignores the volume statistic.
PROPOSITION (2) : If P'i E (p2, p)then in the large economy (P's O) is revealed
by(p 1 , V1).
The proposition demonstrates that under our assumptions market statistics are
revealing. Of course, the value of the asset is not known to anyone with certainty
because of the common error term, and so it cannot be revealed by these market
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statistics. Nonetheless, by observing volume in conjunction with price traders can infer
all the information available in the market. However, since traders do not know the
true asset value (the w) it is not the case that the price and the volume reveal complete
information. This lack of perfect revelation means that all traders face a learning
problem in determining the value of the underlying asset. Since new signals arrive
every period, it may be that the sequence of price and volume statistics provides
information to all market participants. If this is the case, then technical analysis of past
market statistics can be valuable. In the next section we begin our investigation of this
role of technical analysis by extending our model to a multi-period setting.
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7.3. DATA, METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
7.3.1. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter uses daily closing prices for 63 stocks traded on the Istanbul Stock
Exchange (ISE) in the period January 1988 to December 1993. As mentioned in
previous chapters, it is well known that emerging markets are characterised by thin
trading, therefore the price series used in this chapter is corrected for thin or
infrequent trading using the Miller Muthuswamy and Whaley (1994) methodology
outlined in chapter 5.
To investigate the issues identified in the previous section the following methodology
is used. We begin by defining the return on asset (i) in time period (t) as (R 1) and
assume that the return generating process is given by
R,1 = f [ R,,_ 1 fl,1_ 1 ]	 (7.18)
where (fl,,.) is the information set which contains the complete history of the
sequence of returns observed up to and including time period (t-1). It is possible to
write (7.18) as:
R1, = f [R11_1 ( R,,_2...R,,_] (7.19)
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From this returns generating process we can obtain an empirically testable proposition
relating to the weak-form of the EMH:
I,
R1, = a0 +	 a R	 + E	 (7.20)
I	 ' i-i	 iti-I
for weak-form efficiency to be accepted we require that (a=O) and that (ca) is a white
noise process. A less resictive version of efficiency is provided by the martingale
process which places no disibutional assumptions on (. In the initial stage of the
investigation, equation (7.20) is estimated for all companies in the sample. For all
those companies where we can not reject the hypothesis of weak-form efficiency, we
extend the information set in (7.18) to include the sequence of volume:
R.
 = f[ R	 I V ...V ,R,, 2....R ] (7.21)I u-I	 U-n It-n
If technical analysis on volume is useful in predicting weakly efficient returns, then
conditioning past returns on past volume should reveal that when the information set
is extended returns are predictable. In order to test the proposition that conditioning
past returns on volume may lead to predictability in the returns series we estimate
equation (7.20) using instrumental variables, where the instruments are those in (7.21).
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7.3.2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Equation (7.20) was estimated for the 63 companies in our sample. For 40 of these
companies we could not accept the null hypothesis of weak-form efficiency. Technical
analysis of past prices would appear to be useful in predicting current prices for these
companies. However, for the remaining 23 companies, where we accept the null of
weak-form efficiency, an analysis solely of the history of prices is of no value. The
results for these 23 companies are reported in table (7. l).2
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Table 7.1
TECHNiCAL ANALYSIS OF RETURNS
R =; +a1R
I I-£1 I'
Company No.	 a0	 a1
	1 	 0.0026	 -0.0113
(1.30)"	 (0.47)
	
2	 0.0036'	 -0.0159
(3.60)	 (1.45)
	3 	 0.0024	 0.0199
(1.20)	 (1.66)
	
4	 0.0036'	 -0.027 1
(3.60)	 (1.51)
	5 	 0.0023'	 -0.0078
(2.30)	 (0.39)
	
6	 0.0044'	 -0.030 1
(2.20)	 (0.10)
	
7	 0.0043e	 -0.039 1
(2.15)	 (0.55)
	8 	 0.0049'	 -0.0246
(2.45)	 (0.45)
	9 	 0.0036'	 -0.032 1
(3.60)	 (0.51)
	
10	 0.0020'	 -0.0063
(2.00)	 (0.49)
	
II	 0.0036'	 0.0398
(3.60)	 (1.21)
	
12	 0.0033'	 0.0272
(3.30)	 (1.51)
	
13	 0.0043'	 0.0016
(2.15)	 (0.09)
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Table 7.1
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF RETURNS
Company No.	 a0	 a1
14	 0.0042'	 0.0007
	
(4.20)	 (0.02)
15	 0.0015	 -0.0103
	
(1.50)	 (0.37)
16	 0.0042'	 0.0308
	
(2.10)	 (0.73)
17	 0.0030'	 -0.0004
	
(3.00)	 (0.01)
18	 0.0030'	 -0.0018
	
(3.00)	 (0.07)
19	 0.0033	 0.0260
	
(1.65)	 (1.37)
20	 0.0032	 0.0356
	(1. 7)	 (0.69)
21	 0.0027	 -0.0006
	
(1.35)	 (0.02)
22	 0.0033	 -0.0418
	
(1.10)	 (1.39)
23	 0.0035'	 -0.0181
	
(3.50)	 (0.45)
Notes:	 • Denotes Statistically Significant at the 5% level.
Denotes a Mean Volume more than 50% below the Sample Average Volume and
returns are predictable.
b Standard Errors are based on Newey-West Variance-covariance Matrix.
However, as discussed in the previous section, technical analysis of prices in
conjunction with volume may be of value even in a weakly efficient market To
investigate whether this is the case, equation (7.20) is estimated for the 23 companies
using instrumental variables1.
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Table 7.2
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF RETURNS CONDITIONED ON THE PAST
SEQUENCE OF VOLUME AND RETURNS
R =a0 +a,R +eit-I	 itit
instruments : R 11_2 .... R11 _5 , V,, .....
Company No.	 c	 a,	 Mean Volume
1	 0.0024'	 0.0285	 41,692
(2 .40)b	 (0.15)
2	 0.0035'	 0.0378	 588,204
(3.50)	 (1.02)
3	 0.0024'	 0.1808*	 736,910
(2.40)	 (3.62)
4	 0.0036'	 0.0107	 190,960
(3.60)	 (0.21)
5	 0.0023	 -0.1281	 939,508
(2.30)	 (1.38)
6	 0.0020	 0.7252'	 21,593
(1.00)	 (2.43)
7	 0.0041'	 0.1389*	 553,286
(2.05)	 (1.96)
8	 0.0039'	 0.2965'	 79,719a
(1.95)	 (5.39)
9	 0.0032'	 0.1038	 89,026
(3.20)	 (1.10)
10	 0.0023'	 0.2534'	 595353
(1.15)	 (3.05)
11	 0.0025'	 0.3953'	 321,634
(2.50)	 (2.69)
12	 0.0032'	 0.3121'	 90,156
(3.20)	 (0.43)
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Table 7.2
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF RETURNS CONDITIONED ON THE PAST
SEQUENCE OF VOLUME AND RETURNS
Company No.	 a0	 a1	 Mean Volume
13	 0.0041'	 0.1056'	 228,499
(2.05)	 (3.02)
14	 0.0041*	 0.0526	 127,356
(4.10)	 (0.64)
15	 0.0014	 0.1435	 104,253
(1.40)	 (0.94)
16	 0.0037'	 0.5281'	 54,914
(3.70)	 (1.87)
17	 0.0030'	 0.1784'	 40,995a
(3.00)	 (1.98)
18	 0.0028'	 0.0893'	 289,843
(2.80)	 (2.08)
19	 0.0031'	 0.167 1	 11,805
(1.55)	 (0.89)
20	 0.0023'	 0.4674'	 6,777a
(2.30)	 (3.00)
21	 0.0020	 0.36 14	 9,226
(1.00)	 (1.11)
22	 0.0028'	 0.3113'	 53,723a
(1.40)	 (1.81)
23	 0.0035'	 0.0146	 105,193
(3.50)	 (0.47)
Notes: Denotes Statistically Significant at the 	 level.
' Denotes a Mean Volume more than
	 below the Sample Average Volume and returns are
predictable.
b	 Standard Errors are based on Newey-West Variance-covariance Matrix.
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The results from this are reported in table (7.2). In contrast to the results in table (7.1),
when returns are conditioned on the past sequence of volume and returns, there is
considerable evidence of predictability for just over half of the returns series.
Therefore, volume, in conjunction with prices, would appear to have a useful role in
terms of stock return predictability and consequently technical analysis will be of
value.
The final column of table (7.2) reports mean volume for the 23 companies.
Interestingly, predictability is more apparent (two-thirds of the cases) when the mean
trading volume is more than 50% below the sample average. As explained above, the
role of volume takes on increasing importance for companies which have a very low
level of volume. This could be rationalised by the fact that there is relatively little
information about these companies and hence greater uncertainty about their future
prospects. Therefore, prices will not reflect all information regarding the company.
Investors may use volume to improve the precision of the information relating to the
fundamentals of these companies. Overall, it appears that volume has a useful role in
predicting returns and this is particularly true for firms with low volume. Therefore,
traders who undertake technical analysis on prices alone cannot and will not learn as
much about the future pattern of returns as those who actively use volume in
conjuncon with returns.
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7.4. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, following the arguments of Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994), we
have argued that technical analysis which incorporates data on volume as well as
returns may provide evidence of return predictability that technical analysis on returns
alone will not. The rationale for this is based on the premise that volume contains
information regarding the quality and arrival of information which is not contained in
prices.
Using daily closing price data on individual companies from the ISE, the chapter
investigates the extent to which past volume, in conjunction with past returns, can
predict returns from seemingly efficient prices. The results reveal that technical
analysis on volume can aid the prediction of returns which can not be predicted by the
analysis of past returns in isolation. This is particularly the case for stocks which
have a low level of trading volume. The results presented here suggest that any
assessment of the value of technical analysis must take account of the fact that market
prices are not fully revealing. Volume has a useful role to play that is not captured in
the past sequence of prices.
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ENDN( )TES
The role of volume in aiding uninformed aders' understanding of the quality of
information is discussed by Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994).
2 The results for the remaining companies for which efficiency could not be accepted
are available on request.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were carried out on the volume series in order to
ensure stationarity in the variables used in the analysis. In all cases the volume series
were found to be stationary. These results are available on request.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter briefly reviews the issues, methodologies used in this thesis and
summarizes the results of the analysis. The specific results for issues considered are
emphasised initially; comparisons are made with the existing literature. Policy
implications of the results follow that discussion. Possible extensions of the present
analysis are pointed out.
The thesis presents empirical evidence dealing with:
*	 The efficiency of the ISE using conventional tests;
*	 The efficiency of the ISE using a methodology that directly
incorporates possible nonlinear behaviour, thin trading and institutional
changes. These are typical features of emerging markets;
*	 The impact of regulatory changes undertaken by the ISE on the
level of market volatility, the equity risk premium and the cost
of capital to firms; and
*	 The conditions under which technical analysis is consistent with weakly
efficient prices.
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The rationale for investigating the above mentioned issues stems from the fact that
capital markets play an important role in the economic development as they directly
affect the mobilization of savings and the channelling of investments into productive
enterprises. In other words, capital markets play a critical role in the efficient
allocation of an economy's scarce resources. However, capital markets will contribute
to economic development only if they function efficiently. The important question is
what makes capital markets function efficiently. The answer to such a question has
important policy implications not only for the Istanbul Stock Exchange but for
emerging markets in general. The general conclusion from the thesis is that measures
which improve: the confidence of investors in the stock market, the liquidity of the
market, the quality and reliability of information and trading conditions by removing
institutional restrictions on trading, lead to a more informational efficient market and
an improvement in the allocation of resources in the economy.
As shown in chapter 2, the ISE was developed at a time when the Turkish economy
went through a process of economic reform and liberalization. This process promoted
economic growth and an economic environment conducive to the successful
development of the stock exchange. The ISE went through considerable regulatory
changes since its inception. The important question is to what extent such changes had
an impact of the functioning of the ISE. This question was the subject matter of
chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.
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In chapter 3, it is shown that the issue of efficiency in emerging markets has been
widely investigated in recent years. Using conventional tests, such as autocorrelation
tests, spectral analysis tests and run tests, the overall results are mixed.
The results presented in the chapter 4 seem to suggest that companies listed on the
ISE are not efficiently priced. However, if the evidence on efficiency is to be reliable
it is essential that the methodology adopted in statistical tests takes account of the
institutional features and trading conditions of the market under investigation. The
conventional tests of efficiency have been developed for testing markets which are
characterised by high levels of liquidity, sophisticated investors with access to high
quality and reliable information and few institutional impediments. Emerging markets,
on the other hand, are typically characterised by low liquidity, thin trading, possibly
less well informed investors with access to unreliable information and considerable
volatility. Therefore, it is not all clear that the evidence of inefficiency presented in
this chapter along with similar evidence from other studies, reflect genuine
inefficiencies or a statistical illusion. In particular, while the evidence presented
suggest that prices do not follow a random walk, thin trading and illiquidity may mean
that trades cannot be carried out at the prices shown in data and therefore such
observed inefficiencies cannot be exploited.
Chapter 5 seeks to re-examine the issue of efficiency when institutional features
specific to the market under investigation are taken into account. In particular, unlike
most previous studies on emerging markets the chapter recognises the importance of
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taking into account the institutional features of the market when examining pricing
efficiency. The chapter recognises that the market may be characterised by non-linear
behaviour, thin trading and market evolution through time. This study uses an
augmented logistic map model to test for efficiency. In addition, returns are adjusted
for thin trading. More importantly, however, efficiency is analysed on a year to year
basis so that it is possible to determine how the evolution of the market impacts on
the efficiency of the market. This investigation sheds light on the important question
of why markets are inefficient and what factors lead them to become efficient. The
results show that up to 1990 the market was inefficient, but inefficiency manifested
itself through non-linear behaviour. However, from 1991 onwards the market became
efficient. This change was brought about by measures taken by the exchange which
led to improved liquidity, better quality of information and more educated investors
along with the abolition of institutional restrictions on trading. The implications of this
research is that the evolution in the regulatory framework of, and knowledge and
awareness of investors in, emerging markets may mean that they wifi initially be
characterised by inefficiency, but over time will develop into efficient and effectively
functioning markets which allocate resources efficiently.
Chapters 4 and 5 have shown that regulatory changes of the ISE have brought about
more volume of trading, more and better quality information, more educated investors
and increased foreign participation. As a result of such changes the market became
informational efficient. However, as Ross (1989) has shown an increase in the flow
of information will lead to an increase in stock market volatility, in an arbitrage free
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world. The results of chapter 5 confirmed that regulatory changes increased the flow
of information to the market and this led to a faster impounding of news into prices.
Using Ross's argument, the increase in information flow should also have an impact
on stock market volatility. However, even if increased volatility is the result of
improvements in informational efficiency, it may still lead to an increase in the equity
risk premium and, hence, higher level of individual firm's risk. Therefore, chapter 6
addressed three issues relating to the impact of changes in stock market regulation. In
particular, the chapter firstly, examined whether changes in regulation impacted on the
level of market volatility. Secondly, if there has been a change, is this due to
information being impounded into prices more rapidly or is it the result of
destabilising forces? (the answer to this question will also validate the fmdings of
chapter 6). And thirdly, how have and changes in volatility impacted on the equity
risk premium and the systematic risk of individual firms? Only by addressing these
issues can inferences be drawn about the desirability or otherwise of innovations, such
as changes in regulation, which bring about increases in volatility. The chapter has
shown that changes in the regulatory framework led to an increased in stock market
volatility. However, far from being undesirable, the increased volatility is the result
of more rapid impounding of information. This in turn has changed investors'
perceptions of individual firms' risk levels, with an overall reduction in the perceived
level of risk. Hence there has been a reallocation of investment funds. Furthermore,
the period post-regulatory change is associated with lower equity market risk premium
and thus more efficient allocation of resources in the economy.
Having shown that regulatory changes of the ISE have led to more stock market
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volatility but to an informational efficient market and better allocation of resources,
chapter 7, tried to identify the conditions under which weak-form efficiency can be
reconciled with the activities of technical analysts. Theoretically it has been shown
(see Blurne, Easley and O'Hara (1994) that technical analysis on prices in conjunction
with volume can aid the prediction of returns, if market prices are not fully revealing.
This is based on the premise that volume contains information regarding the quality
and arrival of information which is not contained in prices. The results presented in
the chapter reveal that technical analysis on volume can aid the prediction of returns
which cannot be predicted by the analysis of past returns in isolation. This finding
suggest that technical analysts have a useful role to play even in markets which are
characterised as informational efficient in the weak-form. Hence regulators need not
worry about the activities of such traders.
The findings of this thesis will be of interest to international investors, stock market
regulators, firms raising funds from stock markets and participants in emerging capital
markets in general. The implication of the results presented in this thesis is that
informational efficient emerging markets are brought about by improving liquidity,
ensuring that investors have access to high quality and reliable information and
minimising the institutional restrictions on trading. In addition, the evolution in the
regulatory framework of, and knowledge and awareness of investors in, emerging
markets may mean that they will initially be characterised by inefficiency, but over
time will develop into informational efficient and effectively functioning markets
which allocate resources efficiently. In addition, the results of this thesis have
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important implications, for emerging markets in general, in identifying the regulatory
framework that will achieve efficient pricing and a reduction in the cost of equity
capital to firms operating in the economy.
The research presented in this thesis could be extended in a number of ways. Firstly,
it will be interesting to revisit all evidence of efficiency on emerging markets using
the methodology adopted in the thesis. Secondly, the impact of financial innovation
could be investigated using the methodology adopted in chapter 6 of the thesis.
Finally, the evidence presented in chapter 7 could be confirmed by similar studies not
only in emerging markets but also in well developed stock markets.
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